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

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MEMOIRS

OF THE MARSHAL

DUKE OF BERWICK.

WRITTEN BY HIMSELF.

With a ſummary Continuation from the Year 1716, *to his Death in* 1734.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

To this Work is prefixed a Sketch of an hiſtorical Panegyric of the Marſhal, by the Preſident Monteſquieu; and explanatory Notes, and original Letters relative to the Campaign in Flanders, in 1708, *are ſubjoined.*

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

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MEMOIRS

OF THE

Marſhal Duke of BERWICK.

Written by Himſelf.

ON my arrival at Verſailles, I was appointed to command the army in Dauphiny, in the room of the Marſhal de Teſſé; but ſhortly after, this appointment was changed. 1708.

THE Elector of Bavaria, ſince the loſs of his dominions by the battle of Hochſtet in 1704, had reſided in Flanders, of which province he was Vicar-General and perpetual Governor, and of conſequence he commanded the army of the two Crowns in that part. The Duke of Burgundy earneſtly ſoliciting permiſſion to ſerve this year, the King thought he could not well refuſe him, eſpecially as the Duke de Vendoſme, who had

1708. had the command in Flanders, ſeconded his wiſhes, expecting, no doubt, to be leſs liable to controul under a young Prince, without experience, than under the Elector, whoſe life had been dedicated to the ſervice, and who, for four-and-twenty years, had been uſed to command in chief. The King therefore being reſolved to ſend the Duke of Burgundy into Flanders, it became neceſſary to find ſome plauſible pretext for engaging the Elector to transfer his operations to the Rhine.

M. DE CHAMILLART formed a grand plan, which he conſidered as practicable: the object was of no leſs magnitude than to penetrate into Germany with a formidable army, to cauſe an inſurrection in Bavaria, and to reduce the whole country between Munich and Alſace, in order to eſtabliſh an uninterrupted communication with France. Lieutenant-General St. Fremont was employed to make this propoſition agreeable to the Elector, who accepted it without heſitation, upon which the Duke of Burgundy was named for Flanders, with

with the Duke de Vendoſme under him; 1708.
the Elector for the Rhine, and myſelf ſecond in command; and the Marſhal de Villars, who was then at the head of that army, was named for Dauphiny in my room, on account of the diſguſt that ſubſiſted between the Elector and him.

I knew nothing of the buſineſs St. Fremont was charged with, till after his return from Compiegne, when the King ordered him to communicate it to me. After having examined it thoroughly, it appeared to me in every reſpect impracticable; and I thought it neceſſary to diſcuſs the matter ſeriouſly with the King, that I might not draw any blame upon myſelf for want of ſucceſs. I intreated his Majeſty that, when I had the honour of laying my reaſons before him, St. Fremont might be preſent, as being better acquainted than any other perſon both with the plan and the country. I carried St. Fremont therefore with me into the King's cloſet at Marli, and there we had a long converſation, in which I

1708. clearly demonſtrated the abſurdity of the project, as St. Fremont himſelf confeſſed. The King was ſo convinced of it, that he told me I was in the right, and that he left it to me to act in the manner I ſhould judge moſt for his ſervice. He added, with a ſmile, "Chamillart "thinks he knows much more than any "General, but he knows nothing of the "matter." This ſpeech ſurprized me the more, as M. de Chamillart was the favourite Miniſter, and had all the King's confidence. I mentioned to nobody what had paſſed; but I collected from it, that the King was perfectly apprized of the inability of his Miniſter; yet, throughout this campaign, he was not the leſs led by his unaccountable ideas, as will be ſeen in the ſequel.

I SET out in May for Straſburg, where the Elector arrived a few days after me. Our army was compoſed of ſeventy-five battalions, and one hundred and fifty ſquadrons; the enemy was more numerous; they ſhewed notwithſtanding by their manœuvres, that it was their intention to keep on the defen-

ſive

ſive in that frontier. The ſituation of 1708.
the country rendered this plan very eaſy to them; for by means of the lines of Etlingen, which extended from the Rhine to the mountains, they ſhut up our paſſage entirely; unleſs we choſe to throw ourſelves into the black foreſt, which was impracticable conſidering the difficulties of the country and the want of proviſions. It is true, ſome perſons were of opinion, that inſtead of following the lead of the enemy, we ought, by our manœuvres, to confine them to the banks of the Rhine; or, if they marched off, to oblige them to return for the defence of the empire; but it was not reaſonable to imagine, that the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene, who had concerted their plans in the winter, were ignorant enough not to ſee, as well as ourſelves, that ſuppoſing we could force the lines of Etlingen, and make good our paſſage to the Neckar, there would ſtill be nothing material for them to apprehend, ſo long as they did not loſe a battle; for being ſtationed near Philipſburg, and having the com-

1708. mand of the Rhine on both ſides, it was not poſſible for us to penetrate further to ſecure any poſts of conſequence, or to eſtabliſh a free communication with our own country, without being infinitely ſuperior in number, and having taken great precautions to be ſupplied with carriages and other requiſites for the ſervice; ſo that we ſhould have been obliged to return and take our quarters in Alſace. They would therefore have been well pleaſed to ſee us amuſe ourſelves with operations, which would have been of no other advantage but merely that of ſaving the reputation of the General; while Prince Eugene, in imitation of the Duke of Marlborough's conduct in 1704, would have made a ſudden incurſion into Flanders with a conſiderable force to cruſh the King's army and invade France on that ſide. Upon my repreſentations therefore to the Elector, that Prince acknowledged, that we could not think of making our way into the empire at preſent, and conſequently, while we were waiting in expectation of a favourable opportunity, muſt

muſt endeavour to ſubſiſt at the expence of the enemy's country, and attend to the preſervation of our own. 1708.

THE Elector of Brunſwick was Generaliſſimo of their forces, and Prince Eugene commanded under him.

As I knew that the Duke of Burgundy had great deſigns in Flanders, I thought it my duty principally to watch the motions of the enemy, in order to ſend him troops in proportion as detachments ſhould be made by them. Accordingly, on the firſt notice that parties were flying off towards the Lower Rhine, we diſpatched M. de St. Fremont to the Sarre, where we formed in different camps a body of thirty-five battalions and fifty-two ſquadrons. In the mean time the Elector of Brunſwick kept cloſe within his lines, and Prince Eugene repaired to Mentz.

WE had paſſed the Rhine at Straſburg and Fort Louis, and were at this time encamped at Leichtenaw; but upon advice of the march of Prince Eugene, we repaſſed the Rhine, and poſted ourſelves with part of the army on the

1708. Sarre: to induce the Elector to this ſtep, (for he had no inclination to part with any troops or to remain with a ſmall army) I repreſented to him, that the fortreſſes we had on that ſide were in danger, and alſo that the enemy might probably attempt to penetrate into France by Lorrain; but my true reaſon was, not to let Prince Eugene get the ſtart of me in Flanders, which I knew was his intention.

We left Lieutenant-General Count du Bourg in the lines at la Loutre, with thirty battalions and thirty-ſeven ſquadrons, to oppoſe the Elector of Brunſwick. At laſt, after many marches and counter-marches, on both ſides, during a month, we learned, that Prince Eugene had ſet out from Coblentz for Flanders; that he had embarked ſix-and-thirty battalions there which were to follow him, and that ſeventy ſquadrons had likewiſe taken the ſame route by land: upon this intelligence, having received orders from the King by a courier on the 7th of July, I parted with the Elector at Remich, on the Moſelle,

Moſelle, and he returned to Alſace, not 1708.
a little chagrined at ſeeing that he was to paſs the reſt of the campaign there in inactivity.

I TOOK with me thirty-four battalions, and ſixty-five ſquadrons; and to make more expedition, I marched by brigades acroſs the foreſt of Arden.

WE had learned at Remich, that our troops in Flanders had ſurprized Ghent; and Bruges had ſurrendered immediately after; ſo that our affairs in thoſe parts bore a proſperous face: theſe events likewiſe determined Prince Eugene to haſten the march of his troops, in order by gaining a battle to repair the loſs the allies had already ſuſtained.

THE Duke of Burgundy was at firſt inclined to beſiege Oudenarde, which would have been a right plan; but afterwards he changed his mind, and reſolved to lay ſiege to Menin. For this purpoſe he ſent the Intendant, M. de Bernieres, to Tournay and Liſle, to make the neceſſary preparations. The Duke propoſed to take poſt with his army between the Lys and the Scheld, oppoſite

to

1708. to Oudenarde, and to intrench himſelf in that poſition, while the ſiege was carrying on behind him by detachments. At the ſame time I was to draw near to Mons, in order to be equally ready to protect the fortreſſes on the Maeſe and the Sambre, or to join the grand army, in caſe the enemy ſhould make a junction to ſuccour Menin. I arrived at Givet on the Maeſe the 11th, and went the ſame day to join St. Fremont's corps, which compoſed my van-guard, at Florenne. On the 12th, I went and encamped at Sart la Buiſſiere on the Sambre, where I learned that there had been an engagement on the 11th, near Oudenarde, the King's army having croſſed the Scheld at Gavre, with an intention of encamping there according to the plan already deſcribed, the Duke of Marlborough had croſſed at the ſame time at Oudenarde and attacked them.

M. de Bernieres, from whom I received the account, informed me that the enemy had had the advantage, and that our army was retreating towards Ghent in great diſorder. Although I

had reſolved to halt, where I was, the next day, on account of the long marches we had made, I thought it of conſequence in the preſent conjuncture to puſh forward to Mons. I therefore cauſed the twenty ſquadrons that I had with me to march thither, and gave orders that the reſt of my troops, as faſt as they came up, ſhould take the rout to Valenciennes. As for myſelf, I went poſt to Tournay, to have a nearer view of the ſituation of things. There I found a great number of ſtraggling parties of the army, which were ſubſiſted by M. de Bernieres. Upon a review of them, the whole number at Tournay, Liſle, and Ypres, amounted to upwards of nine thouſand men; the enemy had made as many priſoners. As it would be ſome days before my infantry could come up, and the frontier was entirely deſtitute of troops, I divided theſe parties among the three places abovementioned, and at the ſame time cauſed the few battalions, that were in the diſtant garriſons, to advance; for M. de Vendoſme, in order to outnumber the enemy, had 1708.

carried

1708. carried all to the field, ſcarcely leaving men enough behind to guard the gates. I cannot abſolutely blame him for this; yet, from the year 1706, it had always been found, that the loſs of one battle was followed by that of all Flanders, for want of garriſons.

THE Duke of Burgundy's army had retreated to Lovendeghem, behind the canal which runs from Ghent to Bruges; and the enemy, after continuing ſome days in the neighbourhood of Oudenarde, came and encamped on the 14th at Pont Eſpierres, from whence they paſſed the Lys the next morning, forced the lines at Commines, which were only guarded by a hundred men, and encamped at Werwicke.

I WENT on the 14th to Liſle, and from thence, after giving all the neceſſary orders, to Douay on the 17th, to aſſemble my troops there. I took care to ſupply the fortreſſes with all ſorts of ſtores, and as my infantry came up, I diſtributed it among them, in order, that which way ſoever the enemy ſhould take, they might meet with oppoſition.

PRINCE

PRINCE Eugene was preſent in perſon 1708.
at the battle of Oudenarde; but his troops, though they had the advantage of mine by ſeveral days march, did not nevertheleſs arrive ſo ſoon in Flanders. They were detained in the neighbourhood of Bruſſels and Louvain, to eſcort a grand convoy which was preparing.

I SENT advice of this to the Duke of Burgundy and M. de Vendoſme; repreſenting to them the neceſſity of beating the eſcort, or at leaſt, of not ſuffering the convoy to paſs; for this purpoſe I propoſed that on a fixed day they ſhouid march out of Ghent with the greateſt part of their army; that at the ſame time I would paſs the Scheld at Condé, and that we ſhould all join on the Dender, in order to attack the convoy, or oblige it to return. M. de Vendoſme would by no means agree to my plan, alledging that he was well poſted at Ghent, that, while he continued there, the enemy would not venture upon any thing of moment, and therefore he was reſolved not to think of removing. Notwithſtanding

1708. withſtanding this, I knew that the enemy had determined to lay ſiege to Liſle, which could not be done without bringing their artillery, and other neceſſaries from Bruſſels. Another more conſiderable convoy was preparing; and I propoſed that meaſures ſhould be taken for attacking it; but M. de Vendoſme ſtill adhered to his reſolution. This however did not prevent me from making another propoſal, the execution of which would have diſconcerted all the projects of the enemy, as we ſhould by that means have hindered the junction of Prince Eugene's army with that of the Duke of Marlborough. My deſign was, that the Duke of Burgundy ſhould leave Ghent in the evening, and encamp the next morning on the heights of Oudenarde, towards Bruſſels, and that I ſhould march at the ſame time from Mortagne to Pottes and Eſcanaffe, where the left of the grand army ſhould be poſted. This ſituation would have united our whole forces, and abſolutely ſeparated thoſe of the enemy; putting it at the ſame time out of the power of

Marlborough

Marlborough to regain Brabant, or to draw any reſources from thence, unleſs he could force us behind the Scheld, which was morally impoſſible, conſidering that we were one third ſtronger than he. To this deſign there could be but one objection made; which was, that the Duke of Marlborough would march to Bruges, where we could not arrive ſo ſoon as he: to this I anſwered, that our right being very near Ghent, we might be there time enough to relieve it; but that the worſt, which could happen, was the loſs of Bruges; and the preſervation of the reſt of our fortreſſes after the loſs of a battle, ought to be a ſufficient conſolation to us. To conclude, nothing was done, all the convoys paſſed, as did likewiſe the army of Prince Eugene; after which the enemy inveſted Liſle. I had placed there twenty-three battalions, and three regiments of dragoons. Marſhal Boufflers had ſhut himſelf up in the place with Lieutenant-Generals de Surville, de la Treſéliere and de Lée. 1708.

When

1708. WHEN I found they were reſolved not to ſtir, I perſuaded them to ſend me Lieutenant-General Cheyladet with forty-one ſquadrons, to enable me the better to cover the country that belonged to us, and to diſturb the operations of the enemy.

I HAD propoſed to the court, as well as to the Duke of Burgundy and M. de Vendoſme, to fix upon ſome enterprize of importance, ſufficient either to oblige the enemy to raiſe the ſiege, in order to prevent the execution of it, or to indemnify us for the loſs of Liſle, in caſe they ſhould not chooſe to moleſt us. My ſuggeſtion was, that we ſhould march to Bruſſels, and by making ourſelves maſters of all Brabant, eſtabliſh a free and ſecure communication with Ghent and Bruges. This was not at all reliſhed by M. de Vendoſme, who was for attacking the enemy at the ſiege; but did not chooſe to move towards them till their batteries were opened; for he ſtill maintained, that the enemy would not dare to beſiege the place, and

that the whole was nothing but a feint to diſlodge him from Ghent. 1708.

WHATEVER reaſon I might have to be diſguſted at the neglect with which M. de Vendoſme received my advice, the deſire of preventing thoſe misfortunes, which the reſolution he had taken threatened to bring upon us, induced me to hazard one propoſal more. I could not conceive, as the enemy were at this time equal to us in ſtrength, that it would be poſſible for us to attack them, after we had given them time to chooſe their ground, or at leaſt to reconnoitre the ſituation they intended to occupy. In times, when armies were ſmall, it was poſſible, by a ſtolen march, to fall ſuddenly upon a weak quarter, and relieve a place beſieged; but this could not be done now, with an army before us of a hundred thouſand men, ſufficient to ſhut up the avenues of a whole country, and to be encamped on all ſides, in two or three lines.

THE Duke of Marlborough was at this time encamped with his army on the Ronne, beyond the Scheld. Prince

1708. Eugene was ſet down before Liſle, with ſixty battalions, and fourſcore ſquadrons. This diſpoſition of the enemy appeared to me favourable for the project I had to propoſe; which was, that the Duke of Burgundy ſhould croſs the Scheld at Ghent, and march ſtrait to the Duke of Marlborough, as if he intended to bring him to an action; that I ſhould at the ſame time draw off from the Scarpe, behind which I was encamped with a hundred ſquadrons, and, after collecting forty battalions from the garriſons in the neighbourhood, which might be done without a poſſibility of the enemy getting intelligence of it, ſhould march without delay and attack Prince Eugene's lines, which were not yet finiſhed.

THE court was ſo pleaſed with this plan, that I received orders to carry it into execution, if I thought proper; and I had already taken my meaſures ſo well, that I ſhould have come upon Prince Eugene with my army, before he could have known that I had one: but M. de Vendoſme, who was determined not to recede from his opinion of marching all

together, prevailed upon the Duke of Burgundy to ſend me a peremptory order to join him forthwith, notwithſtanding any order I might have received from the King. I had it in my power indeed not to obey this; but the fear of ſome miſchief happening to the Duke of Burgundy, which would inevitably have been laid to my charge, and the reflection, that I was not abſolutely certain of beating Prince Eugene, induced me to proceed to join the grand army at the rendezvous appointed in my inſtructions. 1708.

I ACCORDINGLY aſſembled thirty-five battalions, and ninety-ſix ſquadrons at Mons, from whence I ſet out on the 28th of Auguſt for Herinnes beyond Enghien. The Duke of Burgundy arrived the ſame day at Ninove, which ſecured our junction, as we were both of us covered by the rivulet of Viane. The court had been apprehenſive, that we ſhould meet with great difficulties, and that the Duke of Marlborough would advance to attack me, as ſoon as I had paſſed the Haine, but the Duke had ſettled his plan, and was not diſpoſed to riſque an action, ex-

1708. cept in thoſe poſts, which he had reconnoitred round Liſle; he would not even have advanced to the Ronne, but for the convenience of foraging, and for the better opportunity of obſerving us, and obtaining intelligence from Bruſſels. As ſoon as he ſaw that we had effected our junction, he repaſſed * the Scheld, and retired into the province of la Marque, near Liſle.

THE night I arrived at the Duke of Burgundy's camp, I took the word from M. de Vendoſme, the King having given me orders for that purpoſe in writing; after which I continued without any other employment, but that of attending the Prince. I had done every thing in my power to avoid coming into Flanders, becauſe I was of opinion, that a Marſhal of France ought not to be under the orders of any perſon, but a Prince of the blood, and was deſirous, that the eſtabliſhment of ſuch a precedent ſhould not be imputed to me;

* See all the letters at the end of the volume, relating to this campaign of 1708. They are very curious and inſtructive to military men, and contain a full juſtification of the Marſhal of Berwick's conduct.

but

but the King was poſitively determined, 1708.
that I ſhould march into Flanders; and as to the difficulty of taking the word, he inſiſted that I ſhould take it once in obedience to his commands: he was even ſo piqued at my refuſal, that he had a mind to ſend the three oldeſt Marſhals of France from Paris, to take the word from M. de Vendoſme; but was diſſuaded by M. de Chamillart, and Madame Maintenon. One ſhould imagine, that M. de Vendoſme ought to have been thoroughly ſatisfied with the King's deciſion, and that I was the only perſon, who had reaſon to be diſcontented: yet he never forgave me for having ventured to bring the affair into queſtion, and omitted no opportunity of endeavouring to mortify me. The 30th of Auguſt our army, conſiſting of one hundred-and-forty battalions, and two hundred-and-fifty ſquadrons, marched to Leſſines, the next day to Brac, the 1ſt of September to the neighbourhood of Tournay, and on the 2d we croſſed the Scheld.

THE point then to be determined was, what rout we ſhould take to attack the

1708. enemy. I propoſed, that we ſhould go and encamp at three quarters of a league from Pont-à-Treſſin, our left nearly towards Cyſoing, and our right towards the moraſſes of Willem, in order to diſcover if it were practicable to attempt the paſſage of the Marque in that place, and to make roads on our right and left, to communicate with Pont-à-Marque, or towards the lower Marque, and thus endeavour to gain ſome marches upon the enemy. M. de Vendoſme thought it more adviſeable to proceed immediately towards Douay, in order to get the heavy cannon he had ordered there, with which he expected to be able to ruin, and lay open the intrenchments of the enemy. Accordingly we put ourſelves in motion on the 3d, and took the road to Cyſoing, from which place M. de Vendoſme aſſured us, we might proceed up the Marque through a fine plain; but when he had got within a league and a half of Tournay, all the people of the country and the peaſants informed us, that the road was very difficult, being interſected with woods and moraſſes; this intelligence obliged the Duke of Burgundy

Burgundy to repreſent to M. de Ven- 1708.
doſme, that it would be better to purſue the road to Orchies, than to thruſt ourſelves into ſo cloſe a country, and where the enemy would be ſo near us, that they might fall upon our rear by Pont-à-Treſſin and at Bouvines. At firſt M. de Vendoſme fell into a paſſion, and made ſome ſharp reflections upon me, to which, out of reſpect for the Duke of Burgundy, I made no anſwer; but afterwards, when he had converſed with the people of the country himſelf, he changed his order of march, and we took the road to Orchies, where we encamped that night.

SOME perſons have ſince thought fit to aſſert, that M. de Vendoſme meant to attack the enemy by Pont-à-Treſſin, and at Bouvines, and that I prevented his deſign: but I declare, and can prove, that, in the diſpute we had together, the only point in queſtion was, what road we ſhould take to Pont-à-Marque, to which place M. de Vendoſme had ordered his march; for as to myſelf, my opinion had always been, that we ſhould go ſtrait to Pont-à-Treſſin.

1708. THE next day, which was the 4th, we marched to Mons in Peule: on our arrival, we diſcovered the army of the enemy coming into the plain between Seclin and Liſle, and extending its right towards Noyelles; its left ſtretched along the moraſſes of Bretain, within two leagues of Mons in Peule. It was reſolved to encamp that night on the ſpot where we were, and only to ſend ſome brigades of infantry to take poſſeſſion of Pont-à-Marque, at the diſtance of a ſhort league from the enemy's camp. Lieutenant-General d'Artignan marched to the place, and the enemy's parties, that were poſted there, retired on his approach. We likewiſe cauſed the caſtles of Attiches and Laſſeſſoir to be occupied.

ON the 5th, we went upon the heights of Avelin and Attiches, to reconnoitre the ſituation of the enemy. We were divided in our opinions: M. de Vendoſme thought it beſt to attack them; I thought otherwiſe, becauſe the enemy were poſted in a fine plain, where they could move without difficulty, and we had no way to get at them but by defiling through

through a wood and a number of in- 1708.
cloſures, ſo that they might charge us as we came out, before we could have an opportunity of forming; beſide which, the ſituation of the ground was ſuch, that even if they ſhould ſuffer us to form, we could not advance without being attacked on both flanks. The reaſon of this was evident, for the ground between the upper Duele and the moraſſes of la Marque, through which we were obliged to paſs, grew wider towards the enemy.

NOTWITHSTANDING this, M. de Vendoſme remaining firm in his opinion, though he agreed, that it was impoſſible to advance to the enemy without firſt making roads for the columns to paſs, ordered this work to be ſet about immediately; a great number of men were accordingly employed, yet the roads were not finiſhed till the 7th in the evening; ſo that, the enemy having begun on the 5th to intrench themſelves, it may eaſily be judged that we ſhould have reaped no great advantage, their intrenchments being completed, and very high

by

1708. by the 7th. The right was cloſe to the moraſſes of the Deule, near Noyelles. Their center at the two villages of Ennetieres, which projected forward, and their left extending beyond Fretain.

It is to be obſerved, that, when M. de Vendoſme came on the 4th to Mons in Peule, he expreſſed no intention of attacking the enemy, and indeed it was not poſſible that day; for the country being very much interſected, the march had been extremely ſlow, and the troops did not all come up till it was night.

We examined the poſition of the enmy again, and my opinion, in which I was ſeconded by moſt of the General Officers, was, that we could not attack them in their preſent poſt without an almoſt certain loſs. M. de Vendoſme ſtill maintained, that there was no difficulty in it, and engaged with his heavy cannon to drive the enemy out of their intrenchments; not conſidering that the ground they occupied was much higher than ours. The Duke of Burgundy was unwilling to take upon himſelf the deciſion of a point of ſuch delicacy

licacy and importance; he reſolved there- 1708.
fore to diſpatch a courier to the King for orders: M. de Vendoſme wrote at the ſame time. The anſwer was, that we ſhould attack the enemy, and that M. de Chamillart was ſetting off for the army to explain more fully the King's intentions. Thus far there had been little, if any, time loſt; for the courier returned the 8th in the morning, and M. de Chamillart arrived the next day. A council was immediately held, at which the Duke of Burgundy, the Duke of Berry, who ſerved as volunteer, M. de Vendoſme, M. de Chamillart and myſelf aſſiſted. The Miniſter declared, that it was the King's pleaſure we ſhould attack the enemy at all events. We therefore turned our whole thoughts to carry it into execution; and for that purpoſe having paſſed the hollows and woods, we encamped on the other ſide of the Marque, at the diſtance of a quarter of a league from the enemy's camp, our right to Ennevelin and our left to Phalempin, both flanks entirely unſupported and uncovered. We reconnoitred

1708. connoitred the intrenchments the ſame evening, and it was thought neceſſary to take another view of them the next morning. We advanced within muſket ſhot; our cannon in the mean time played the whole day upon the villages of Enneteires, without any other effect but that of obliging the enemy to withdraw what troops they had there, except ſome ſmall poſts.

The report we made of the goodneſs of the ſituation and intrenchments of the enemy, the unanimous opinion of almoſt the whole army, and the perſonal obſervation of M. de Chamillart, joined to an acknowledgment from M. de Vendoſme, that the affair was become impracticable; all theſe circumſtances concurring, induced M. de Chamillart to ſuſpend the reſolution till the return of a courier, which he diſpatched to the King. The anſwer was conformable to our opinions; in conſequence of which we determined to draw near the Scheld, in order to prevent the paſſing of any more convoys; for there was not the leaſt doubt, that without

without freſh ſupplies, the enemy would 1708.
be in want of every thing before they could make themſelves maſters of Liſle. We ſtaid however three days at Pont-à-Marque, the reaſon of which I never could learn. During our ſtay here, two convoys from Bruſſels paſſed without interruption, notwithſtanding that we were informed of their ſetting out. When we mentioned this, we were told, that it was not our buſineſs to ſtop them, and that the King would not have us to attend to any thing but bringing the enemy to an engagement.

The Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene, ſeeing how ill our army was poſted, reſolved, during the night, to level their intrenchments and attack us; but fortunately the Deputies of the States General would not give their conſent, alledging, that as they expected to take Liſle without a battle, the event ought not to be hazarded, eſpecially being at ſuch a diſtance from their own country, that in caſe of ill ſucceſs it would be very difficult to make good their retreat. Had not this deſign been

1708. over-ruled, I am perſuaded we ſhould have been totally defeated, for our flanks were quite expoſed, and we had not ground enough to act upon.

We decamped on the 14th of September, and, having made our retreat in good order, encamped the ſame day at Berſée. M. de Chamillart returned to Court. The next day we marched to Orcq, near Tournay, and on the 16th in the morning paſſed the Scheld. Lieutenant-General de Chemeraut was detached with twenty-three battalions and forty ſquadrons to cover Oudenarde: the reſt of the army formed a chain from Berchem, Eſcanaffe, Pottes, and Herinnes, as far as the convent of Saulchoi, where we had our head quarters. Fearing that the enemy might draw ſupplies from Oſtend, every other road being ſhut up, the Governor was ordered to lay the country on the banks of the canal from Plaſſendal to Nieuport under water, by which means the conveyance would be rendered very difficult.

The

THE Count de Bergueick, who was 1708.
ſuperintendant of the King of Spain's revenue in Flanders, and had the ſupreme direction of all his Catholic Majeſty's affairs in that country; ſeeing that the reſolution was taken of returning behind the Scheld, had formed a plan for ſurprizing Bruſſels, or if that could not be effected, for taking it by ſtorm. He reckoned that it might be carried in two days, the garriſon being very weak. For this purpoſe, the day after our arrival at Saulchoi, ten Spaniſh and twelve French battalions were detached, with ſome cavalry, under the command of Lieutenant-General Count la Motte. He drew near to Bruſſels; but as the enemy, who had notice of our deſign, had thrown into the city ſome of the troops that remained in garriſon in Brabant; Bergueick thought the buſineſs would grow too ſerious if an open attack were made, and that it would divert us from our principal object, which was intercepting all the ſupplies; particularly as intelligence had been received of a very conſiderable convoy

1708. voy which was getting ready at Sas-Van-Ghent, Sluys and Oſtend: he therefore cauſed Count la Motte to return with his troops behind the canal between Ghent and Bruges. The Duke de Vendoſme, who had an inclination to put himſelf at the head of this corps, choſe that they ſhould proceed with the plan of beſieging Bruſſels, and it was not till two days after, that he could be perſuaded to give it up. This occaſioned a delay of two days in the march of Count la Motte's troops, and gave time for four or five thouſand men, juſt diſembarked at Oſtend, to ſeize and fortify the poſt of Leffinghe.

The Count de Bergueick, who came afterwards to the army, preſſed me ſo ſtrongly to make a tour by Ghent and Bruges, that I agreed to it, thinking that I ſhould be more capable of giving advice after I had viſited the country. I ſet out on the 24th of September, and on my arrival at Ghent, I learned that the enemy were ſending off a large convoy from Oſtend to their army before Liſle; upon which I wrote to expedite the

the march of the troops which were on their return from Bruſſels, and took upon myſelf to order two regiments of dragoons from M. de Chameraut's camp, to ſtrengthen la Motte's corps. I likewiſe cauſed the battalions that were already arrived to march the ſame night. On the 25th I went to Bruges. The 26th, eleven battalions, and part of the horſe and dragoons arrived there; the reſt were to come in that night. The Count la Motte, after conſulting with me, (for I had no command) reſolved to march the next morning towards the canal of Leſſinghe, and to ſend forward all his grenadiers to ſeize Oudenburgh. His main body conſiſted of thirty-four battalions and ſixty-three ſquadrons, forty-two of which were of dragoons. The ſame night he had intelligence that the Duke of Marlborough was marching with great expedition to Rouſſelaere, at the head of a very conſiderable body of troops, to facilitate and ſecure the march of the convoy. Upon this information, which had the greater appearance of probability, as the 1708.

1708. continuing or raiſing of the ſiege of Liſle ſeemed to depend on the ſafe arrival of this convoy, I adviſed Count la Motte to advance with his main body half way to Oudenburgh, and to poſſeſs himſelf immediately of that place; then to wait for fuller information by the return of his parties, upon which he might take his final reſolutions for executing the orders ſent him by the Duke de Vendôſme, which were to attack the enemy at all events. The Count began his march on the 27th, and I went back to Ghent, from whence I rejoined the Duke of Burgundy next day. The Count de Bergueick had written to the Duke from Bruges, deſiring that I might be ordered to take the command of Count la Motte's troops; but by the return I received a letter, directing me to join the Duke immediately.

THE detachment ſent by Count la Motte to ſeize upon Oudenburgh, was prevented by ſix hundred of the enemy, and our people did not attack them. In the mean time, the convoy, which had left

left Oſtend without their having intel- 1708.
ligence of it, (though Plaſſendal was not above a league diſtant) had got to Leſſinghe, and from thence to Slype, continuing its route within the Moerdyck. The Count la Motte having proceeded with his troops to the ſaid Moerdyck, learned there, that the convoy was already paſſed; upon which he marched ſtrait to Wynendale, in hopes of coming up with it. There he found eighteen battalions and five hundred horſe of the enemy, poſted in a narrow paſs between two woods. He immediately put his troops in order of battle, his infantry in four lines, his dragoons behind them in three, and his horſe ſtill further in the rear in two lines. After a cannonade of half an hour, he marched his infantry to the attack; but upon the firſt fire they received from ſome of the enemy's battalions, that lined the woods on the right and left, they gave way, and it was not poſſible to bring them up afterwards. The dragoons moved a little forward to give the infantry time to rally, and received a very heavy

1708. fire, which killed a great number of them. The convoy was all this time proceeding by the rear; and night coming on, Count la Motte thought proper to retire towards Bruges, fearing that the Duke of Marlborough ſhould advance upon him before morning with ſuperior forces.

NEVER did military man take his meaſures ſo ill; for inſtead of attacking the enemy by the ſame front they occupied, if he had only oppoſed part of his troops to them, and gone round one of the woods with the reſt, they would have been defeated, and the convoy taken.

NEITHER the Duke of Burgundy nor the Duke de Vendoſme could be blamed for this; for notwithſtanding the delay occaſioned by the affair of Bruſſels, troops had arrived in time, and were ſufficiently numerous, if Count la Motte had known how to make uſe of them.

ALL the faults he committed were enormous; firſt, in not having ſeen himſelf whether the inundation had been made according to the orders given; ſecondly,

ſecondly, after having commanded ſix years in the country, not to have had confidential people to give him notice the very moment the convoy ſet out from Oſtend; thirdly, in having made ſo ridiculous a diſpoſition to attack an enemy who had not half his numbers; but the Court was principally to blame for having placed him in a poſt of ſuch importance; and indeed this is moſt frequently the cauſe of the misfortunes that happen in war; ſufficient attention is not paid to employ capable and experienced perſons, and the preference is uſually given to thoſe who have moſt credit and favour. 1708.

THE Duke de Vendoſme, chagrined at what had juſt happened, ſet out himſelf for Bruges, on the 2d of October, in order to diſpoſe every thing in ſuch a manner, that no convoys ſhould paſs for the future. As ſoon as he arrived, he aſſembled all the troops that were there, amounting to fifty-one battalions and ſixty-three ſquadrons, and encamped with his right at Moerdyck, and his left at the canal which goes from Bruges

1708. to Plaſſendal, having his head quarters at Oudenburgh, behind the center of the line: he ſent orders to Nieuport to have the waters let out, which roſe to ſuch a height, that the borders of the Dyke which goes from Leffinghe through Steene to Oſtend were overflowed.

THE Duke of Marlborough knowing the ſituation of the Duke de Vendoſme's camp, marched on the 7th from the camp at Roncq with ſixty battalions and one hundred ſquadrons to attack him. He arrived the ſame day at Rouſſelaere, from whence he marched the day after to Thorout. It was with much difficulty that the Duke de Vendoſme would ſuffer himſelf to be perſuaded by the General Officers to move out of the hole in which he had put himſelf; for in caſe of ill ſucceſs, it was impoſſible that a ſingle man ſhould eſcape, and he did not take his reſolution till theſe gentlemen had purpoſely let out the waters, and they were even beginning to overflow his camp.

THE Duke of Marlborough, informed of the Duke de Vendoſme's retreat, returned

turned to Rouſſelaere; he cauſed Oudenburgh, and the dyke of Leffinghe to be examined, to ſee whether he could not paſs another convoy; but as the Duke de Vendoſme had placed, in the new Polder, fifteen battalions and two regiments of dragoons, under the fire of which it was neceſſary to paſs, to go by the dyke of Leffinghe, he ordered ſome boats to be got together, that he might convey through the inundation, the powder and other ammunition neceſſary for the continuation of their ſiege. The Duke de Vendoſme collected alſo a number of boats, with which he compoſed a little fleet: M. de Langeron, Lieutenant-General of marines, coming out at the ſame time from Nieuport with a number of ſloops and boats, the enemy were at laſt prevented from having any acceſs by means of the inundations; but it was not till after they had conveyed a hundred and fifty thouſand weight of powder, ſome money, brandy and ſalt, of which they were in great want. 1708.

1708. THE Duke de Vendoſme judging that the only way to be quiet on that ſide, was to make himſelf maſter of the poſt of Leffinghe, ſent thither Lieutenant-General de Puyguion. Trenches were opened upon the dyke, and a battery of cannon raiſed; but as the dyke was very narrow, it would have been extremely difficult to drive the enemy from the village, the head of which they had ſtrongly intrenched; ſo that Count la Motte, who had alſo gone there from Bruges, with a few troops, made a diſpoſition to attack it on all ſides. On the 25th of October, the grenadiers and detachments paſſed acroſs the inundations and watergangs, forced the back of the village, and took all the ſoldiers that were in it, to the number of twelve hundred Engliſh and Dutch, and ſixty officers. Four battalions were placed at Leffinghe, with orders to fortify themſelves ſtrongly, that they might maintain themſelves during the winter in that poſt, which was abſolutely neceſſary for the communication with Bruges.

WHILE

WHILE we were preparing for the attack of Leffinghe, Lieutenant-General d'Albergotti had one day preſſed the the Duke of Burgundy ſtrongly to paſs the Scheld and the Lys with his whole army, in order to join the Duke de Vendoſme at Deynſe, and then march together to attack the Duke of Marlborough at Rouſſelaere. I did not like this propoſal for many reaſons. We had two rivers to croſs in ſight of Oudenarde, and then nine long leagues to march, all of this to be done without Marlborough being apprized of it, which was impoſſible to be imagined: if he therefore waited for us, and kept his ground, it was certain that his poſt was good; and if it were not, he had nothing to do, but to fall back behind the Lys, by which he would prevent our return by that river, and oblige us to make the circuit by Ghent, in order to get back behind the Scheld. He might alſo during this march find ſome means of tranſporting more convoys from Bruſſels; not chuſing, however, that my opinion only ſhould pre- 1708.

vent

1708. vent the execution of this project, if it were a good one, I intreated the Duke of Burgundy to write to M. de Vendoſme about it. His anſwer was, that the propoſal was good for nothing, alledging nearly the ſame reaſons as I had; and for fear the Duke of Burgundy ſhould be inclined to attempt it, he diſpatched a courier to the Court, and obtained a formal prohibition from the King, to forbid the execution of this project. A few days after, Albergotti was ſent to Bruges with ſome battalions of reinforcement; he did not fail to make the ſame propoſal to the Duke de Vendoſme, who then approved of it, and wrote to the Duke of Burgundy about it. The Duke anſwered, that as he did not give him any reaſons to invalidate thoſe he had before alledged, he did not think himſelf authoriſed now to alter his ſentiments. The next day a courier arrived from Court, with orders that we ſhould do every thing the Duke de Vendoſme propoſed; ſo that all the diſpoſitions were immediately made for marching, and the Duke de Ven-

Vendoſme was informed, that the Duke 1708.
of Burgundy would be at Deynſe the 27th. The Duke de Vendoſme wrote back, to beg of him not to arrive there till the 30th, that the affair of Leſſinghe being finiſhed, he might bring all his troops with him; but during this interval, we learned that on the 22d, Marſhal Bouffiers had beat the chamade for the city of Liſle, and had retired into the citadel; this put an end to the project, and we were obliged to wait for freſh orders from Court, to determine our further proceedings.

SINCE our return from the neighbourhood of Tournay, we had been continually writing to know the King's intentions, thinking it not right to be at a loſs how to act in caſe that the place ſhould ſurrender; but notwithſtanding the different plans we ſent, we never got any other anſwer, but that it was impoſſible to think Liſle ſhould be loſt, and that it depended entirely upon us to prevent it, or at leaſt to render the taking of it uſeleſs to the enemy.

THE

1708. THE Duke of Burgundy and I were of opinion, that it was impoſſible to ſhut up the paſſage both of the canal and the Scheld from the enemy, and therefore that we muſt only think of maintaining that of the canal, in order to preſerve Ghent and Bruges. For this purpoſe, we wanted to poſt behind the canal a number of troops ſufficient to defend it, and to march with the reſt of the army into Artois, to cover France, and prevent the enemy from continuing to live at our expence. We were confirmed in this opinion by the news we had, that they had placed thirteen battalions and thirty ſquadrons at la Baſſée; that they were hard at work there to put it in a ſtate of defence, and that beſides, they had advanced a conſiderable body of troops to Lens.

THE Duke of Burgundy, convinced that there was no longer any time to loſe before we determined, ſent M. de Contade, Adjutant-General of the army, to Bruges, to repreſent to the Duke de Vendoſme the inconveniences of our ſituation, and propoſe our idea to him; but

but the Duke de Vendoſme would nei- 1708.
ther liſten to our meſſenger, nor read the memorial he brought with him, ſo that he was obliged to return. The only anſwer he brought us, was, that the Duke de Vendoſme would be with us at Saulchoi, on the firſt of November, and he ſhould then ſee what was to be done, in conſequence of the conferences we were to have with M. de Chamillart. The King knowing that our opinions were divided, ſent him again to the army, to oblige us to keep the Scheld, and had even ordered him, in caſe he ſhould find us on our march, to execute our project, to make us inſtantly return to the place from whence we came. M. de Chamillart arrived on the 31ſt of October, and the Duke de Vendoſme the next day.

On the 2d of November, a council was held, in which it was debated what ſtep we were to take. The Duke de Vendoſme ſtill inſiſted that we ought to march to the Duke of Marlborough, and give him battle; or, if that could not be done, we muſt block up every road by which the

1708. the enemy could return, in order to reduce them to the alternative of being ſtarved to death, or of ſueing for peace. I maintained, as it was not poſſible to prevent the enemy from forcing a paſſage in the ſame place, on account of the prodigious extent of country we ſhould be obliged to cover, that it was neceſſary to carry into execution what we had before propoſed, in order to keep ſomething. I alſo repreſented, if we perſiſted in the reſolution of remaining in the ſituation we were then in, that we ſhould meet with ſome fatal accident.

M. DE CHAMILLART, in whom the power of deciding was inveſted, determined that we ſhould remain behind the Scheld and the canal, till after the citadel of Liſle was taken; after which we ſhould ſee what was to be done: that in order to defend the Scheld more eaſily, dykes ſhould be made to cauſe the river to ſwell, and overflow its banks from Ghent to Tournay. It was in vain that M. de Chamlay, whom the King had ſent with his Miniſter, and

and I, repreſented that the thing was impoſſible; Chamillart concluded that it was eaſy, and they immediately ſet about it; but they could never ſucceed any further than to form here and there a few ſheets of water. 1708.

M. DE CHAMILLART left us a few days after; and as he had himſelf been witneſs of M. de Vendoſme's warmth with regard to me, he obtained permiſſion for me to return into Alſace: I had ſolicited him very ſtrongly for this, more eſpecially as the Duke of Vendoſme's jealouſy towards me, could not but prove very prejudicial to the ſervice. I received my orders on the 14th of November; I ſet out on the 16th, and on the 22d I arrived at Straſburgh: my orders were not to ſeparate the army on the Rhine, till the campaign in Flanders was at an end.

WHILE I was at Saulchoi, I received a private letter from the Duke of Marlborough, ſignifying that the preſent occaſion was a very favourable one, to ſet on foot a negotiation for peace; that the propoſal muſt be made to the deputies of

1708. of the States General, to Prince Eugene and to him; that they would undoubtedly communicate with him upon it; and that he would do all in his power to have it accepted. Nothing could be more advantageous than this advice of the Duke of Marlborough: it opened to us an honourable way of putting an end to a burthenſome war. I mentioned it to the Duke of Burgundy, and to M. de Chamillart, who immediately diſpatched a courier to the King, to receive his orders with reſpect to the anſwer which was to be given. The King ſent them to M. de Chamillart, who, through exceſs of policy, had taken it into his head, that this propoſal of Marlborough's proceeded only from the bad ſituation the allied army was in.

THIS reaſoning I own was beyond my penetration; and by the manner in which Marlborough had written to me *, I was perſuaded that apprehenſion had no ſhare in the matter, and that he had done it only from a deſire of putting an end to a

* See Note, No. [redacted]

war, which all Europe began to be tired of. There was not the leaſt appearance of duplicity in what he wrote, and he addreſſed himſelf to me with no other view than that the negotiation might paſs through my hands, thinking it might be of uſe to me. M. de Chamillart dictated to me the anſwer I was to make, and I thought it ſuch an extraordinary one, that I ſent it in French, to ſhew the Duke of Marlborough, that it did not come from me: he was indeed ſo much offended at it, that no uſe could be made of this opening to bring about a peace. I am even convinced, that this was the principal cauſe of the averſion, which the Duke of Marlborough ſhewed ever after for pacific meaſures. 1708.

As ſoon as I had quitted Saulchoi, the Elector of Bavaria, who had been returned to Mons about ſix weeks, by the advice of the Count de Bergueick, formed a deſign of taking Bruſſels. Accordingly, having aſſembled a body of troops, he marched and laid ſiege to it. The Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene, finding themſelves maſters of the city of Lille, and thinking that they did not

1708. want all their army for the ſiege of the citadel, the circumference of which was ſmall and eaſily inveſted, reſolved upon ſuccouring Bruſſels. They therefore marched with the main body of their army along the Scheld, which they paſſed in the night, partly at Oudenarde, and partly over ſome bridges they had laid, without meeting with any reſiſtance, and even without our troops, who were on the borders of the river, being apprized of it; ſo that in the morning, all the ſeveral corps who were diſtributed there, ſeeing the enemy march up to them, fell back in great diſorder, upon the head quarters at Saulchoi. The enemy continued their march with all ſpeed to Bruſſels, and the Elector was obliged to raiſe the ſiege ſo precipitately, that he left behind him his cannon, his ammunition and proviſions, and all his ſick and wounded. The Duke of Burgundy, with the Duke de Vendoſme, retired under Doway. The enemy having executed their deſign, returned towards Liſle.

THE Duke de Vendoſme, was ſo convinced that the enemy could not force any paſſage, either on the Scheld or the canal, that he had written to court the evening before this diſaſter, that they might make themſelves perfectly eaſy, and he would be reſponſible for the event. The King being informed next day that the contrary had happened, and beſide, wearied out with all the bad manœuvres of this campaign, was ſo incenſed that he ſent orders to the Duke of Burgundy and the Duke de Vendoſme, to ſeparate the army immediately, and to return in perſon to Verſailles. The Duke de Vendoſme, who was ſenſible of the importance of preſerving Ghent, repreſented to his Majeſty, that if he would allow him to go and encamp behind the canal, with the main body of the army, the enemy would be much embarraſſed to fill their magazines at Liſle, becauſe as they could do it no other way than by land, from Bruſſels, they ſtood in need of almoſt all their army to eſcort the convoys, on account of the neighbourhood of Ghent; beſide, that this would 1708.

1708. employ them the whole winter, which, together with the badneſs of the ſeaſon and of the roads, would ruin all their troops, without their being able perhaps to convoy all the ſtores they wanted. Notwithſtanding all the Duke de Vendoſme could offer, the King ſtill inſiſted on the order he had given; and the army was ſent into winter quarters, though the citadel of Liſle was not yet taken. It is aſtoniſhing, that the King ſhould have agreed to all the Duke de Vendoſme's extraordinary propoſals during the campaign, and ſhould then have perſiſted in rejecting the only reaſonable one he had made.

As ſoon as Marſhal Boufflers had capitulated for the citadel of Liſle, the enemy, who were apprized of the difficulties they ſhould have in conveying the neceſſary proviſions into the town by land, reſolved to open to themſelves the navigation of the rivers, in order that they might convey whatever they pleaſed, without trouble, and without expence. For this purpoſe they marched ſtraight to Ghent; a city, which, from its ſitua-

tion, was the key of all the rivers, and all the canals. Count la Motte was there with thirty-ſeven battalions; in four days after the opening of the trenches, he beat a parley and ſurrendered, though there were yet no batteries raiſed againſt the body of the place, and the covered way had not been attacked. He alledged in excuſe, the fear of being obliged to ſurrender priſoners of war, and by that means of loſing a garriſon which would be wanted the following campaign, in forming the army. Had he not ſacrificed every thing to this falſe political reaſoning, the enemy would have been obliged to raiſe the ſiege; for the great froſt ſet in the ſame evening that he ſurrendered, with ſo much violence, that it would have been impoſſible to open the ground, or to remain in camp. 1708.

THUS ended this campaign, which was ſo much the more unfortunate, becauſe it ought not to have been ſo: it was neceſſary, in order to make it ſuch, that we ſhould commit abſurdity upon abſurdity; and notwithſtanding all this, if the laſt had

1708. not been committed, we ſhould have had a good game to play next year.

MARSHAL BOUFFLERS acquired much glory by his defence of Liſle: it was at his own particular deſire that he had leave to throw himſelf into the capital of his government: accordingly, on his return to court, the King created him a peer of France, gave him the appointments of premier Gentil homme de la chambre, and the reverſion of his government to his ſon.

I CANNOT avoid taking notice here, that in four month's time, I commanded the King's troops in Spain, upon the Rhine, upon the Moſelle, and in Flanders, without reckoning the commiſſion that was made out for me, for Dauphiny.

I HAVE not ſaid any thing of ******'s † enterprize in Scotland the beginning of this year, becauſe I had no ſhare in it; and even knew nothing of it till after it was

† The Pretender, mentioned by the author in this place, and ſeveral others, under the title forfeited by his father.

public.

public. At the ſolicitation of the greateſt part of the nobility in Scotland, the King reſolved to ſend ſix thouſand men with that Prince. He had embarked at Dunkirk, but contrary winds having detained him in that port, the Engliſh had time to ſend out a fleet, which followed him ſo cloſe, that they came up with him off the Frith of Forth: as he could not land in their ſight, the fleet diſperſed, ſome of the ſhips were taken, and the Prince returned to Dunkirk. 1708.

This affair had been very ill concerted on the part of France, and that on account of the miſunderſtanding and jealouſy between M. de Chamillart, miniſter for the war department, and M. de Pontchartrain, miniſter for the navy. It is alſo ſaid, that if the Chevalier de Fourbin, who commanded the ſquadron, would have riſked the loſs of his ſhips, the young * * * * † might have landed; for he had nothing more to do but to enter the Frith of Forth, and run aground there, by which means the troops might

† Pretender.

1708. have landed: the Engliſh indeed might poſſibly have burned the ſhips, before all the military ſtores and proviſions they had on board, could have been cleared. This conſideration ought not to have prevented him; for the material point was, that the troops ſhould land with the young ****†: all Scotland expected him with impatience, and was ready to take arms in his favour: what is more, England was at that time entirely unprovided with troops, ſo that he might have advanced, without reſiſtance, into the north, where numbers of conſiderable perſons had promiſed to join him. It is even probable that his ſiſter, Queen Ann, apprehending a civil war, would have endeavoured to come to ſome terms with him, by which means he would have been ſure of aſcending the throne of his anceſtors. The conſternation was ſo great at London, that the bank was like to break, every man haſtening to withdraw his money; but the news of the ill ſucceſs of the enterprize

† Pretender.

ſoon

ſoon reſtored the credit of the govern- 1708.
ment. The only perſon that profited by this expedition, was the Count de Gacé. M. de Chamillart, his intimate friend, had cauſed him to be appointed to command the French troops, and he received, while he was on board, the brevet of Marſhal of France. The Scotch had aſked with earneſtneſs for me; but the King refuſed, ſaying he wanted me elſewhere; this was the effect of Chamillart's intrigue for the Count de Gacé.

****† afterwards ſerved the campaign *incognito*, with the Duke of Burgundy, and was preſent at the battle of Oudenarde, where he ſhewed much courage and coolneſs, and by his affability acquired the friendſhip of every body; for we are naturally prejudiced in favour of the unfortunate, eſpecially when they are ſo without any fault of theirs, and when in other reſpects they behave themſelves well.

In the month of March, the King made 1709.
new appointments to the armies. He

† The Pretender.

named

1709. named the Dauphin to the command of that in Flanders, with the Marſhal de Villars under him: that of the Rhine was given to the Duke of Burgundy, and the Marſhal d'Harcourt under him; and that on the frontiers of Piedmont, compoſed of eighty-four battalions and thirty ſquadrons, fell to my ſhare.

I SET out on the 22d of April, and arrived at Grenoble on the 26th. My firſt attention was to examine the ſtate of the magazines, and I found that, far from having a ſufficiency for the whole campaign, there was not enough for the daily ſubſiſtence of the troops till the end of May; upon which I diſpatched a courier to court, to repreſent the dangers we ſhould be expoſed to for want of proviſions, the impoſſibility of collecting an army, and conſequently of oppoſing the deſigns of the enemy, whoſe preparations were very great on the ſide of Suſa; and therefore it was neceſſary to remedy this inconvenience immediately, or elſe I ſhould be expoſed to the diſagreeable neceſſity of putting only into each fortreſs, a number of troops

proportioned

proportioned to the proviſions, and ſend- 1709.
ing the reſt back to France.

As I received no other anſwer, but that the contractors ſhould be ſpoken to, and that it was hoped they would find means not to let us want, I thought, as the court ſeemed to abandon us, notwithſtanding the importance of the matter, that it was neceſſary for me to endeavour myſelf to find out ſome expedient for defending this frontier, which was the weakeſt in the kingdom, and by which the enemy might penetrate into France in one campaign. I wrote therefore to all the Intendants both in the neighbourhood and at a diſtance; I laid before them our wretched ſituation, ſhewed them the conſequences of it, and intreated them to aſſiſt us without loſs of time. I went into Languedoc myſelf, from whence, with the aſſiſtance of M. de Baſville, the Intendant, I procured ſome corn. I ſent Major-General de Mauroy into Franche Comté, Burgundy and Champaign; he brought me ſome corn from theſe places, which he got conveyed by the Saone. I levied alſo ſome taxes in Savoy, Dauphiny

1709. phiny and Provence, which I collected very ſpeedily, by means of the officers to whom I had intruſted this commiſſion. M. le Gendre, Intendant of Montauban, though he had received no orders, nor had any fund for the purpoſe, ſent us twenty thouſand quintals on his own credit. At length we managed ſo as to collect a ſufficient quantity of corn for part of the campaign, in expectation of the harveſt; but as, on account of the diſtance, it required a great deal of time to convey our ſtores to the different depôts, we could only ſubſiſt from one day to another, always at the riſk of being in want, if the leaſt accident ſhould happen to our carriages. The want of money was another great difficulty: we did not get the leaſt aſſiſtance in this reſpect from court; every thing that could be collected there was immediately ſent off into Flanders. This obliged me to make uſe of my authority, to take all the money I could find in the hands of the receivers. M. Deſmaretz, Comptroller General of the Finances, wrote to me, to repreſent that this was againſt all kind of order; but I anſwered him,

him, that it was ſtill more ſo, to ſuffer an army to periſh, which was defending the entrance of France againſt the enemy, and I heard no more of him. I alſo ſtopped a carriage with a hundred thouſand crowns, which was going from Marſeilles to Paris: M. de Trudaine, Intendant at Lyons, found means to borrow one hundred thouſand crowns more, and by this means our circumſtances became tolerably eaſy. 1709.

AFTER having put every thing in the beſt train I could, I viſited the frontiers.

I BEGAN by the upper Dauphiny, from whence I went into Provence, then I came back into Savoy, after that into the Tarenteſe, from whence I returned by the valley of Morienne to Briançon.

THE knowledge I had now acquired of the country, determined me upon a method of defending the frontier by a chain of poſts from Antibes, to the Lake of Geneva. This extent was more than ſixty leagues acroſs the Alps.

THE defence was difficult, conſidering that an enemy having poſſeſſion of the plain of Piedmont, and whoſe plan was already

1709. already formed, might on a ſudden march with all their forces, on which ſide they pleaſed; while we, uncertain of their intentions, were obliged to ſeparate ourſelves, in order to attend to all ſides; ſo that it was very probable they might penetrate in ſome part; in which caſe they would be able to proceed as they pleaſed. I thought upon a new diſpoſition, by which I found myſelf at hand for every thing, and able to reach any part with all the army, or at leaſt with a ſufficient force to bar the paſſage of the enemy.

I ACCORDINGLY formed to myſelf the idea of a line, the center of which was advanced, and the right, and left falling back, ſo that I was always on the ſtring, and the enemy were neceſſarily obliged to make the bow.

I CHOSE Briançon, for the fixed point or center, where I intended to place the main body of my troops, and from whence they were to file off either to the right or to the left, according to the motions of the enemy. My line upon the right, ſtretched through the valley of Barcelonette,

nette, by the pass of Cayolle, into the valley of Entraunas, where the Var takes its source, and continued following the direction of the river, to its opening into the Mediterranean, between St. Laurent and Antibes. To secure my communication on that side, I had an intrenched camp made at Tournos in the valley of Barcelonette, which I intended should serve me as a magazine and reservoir of troops, in case the enemy should direct their march towards Coni, or the pass of Tenda. The entrance of the valley of Barcelonette was very easy, and from thence the enemy might, without going through any pass, march on to Seine, or along the Durance, and thus penetrate at once into the middle of our country; so that I was very glad to be certain of shutting this entrance against them, by taking proper care to strengthen the post of Tournos, through which they must necessarily pass, in order to march forward. 1709.

My line upon the left went by the pass of Galubier, fell upon Valloire, from thence to St. Jean de Morienne, and after

1709. after that under cover of the Arc, to the place where it diſcharges itſelf into the Iſere, which I alſo followed as far as Montmellian, and fort Barraux; where I deſigned an intrenched camp. I did not expect to preſerve the Tarenteſe, nor the reſt of Savoy, becauſe my line would then have been too ſtraight, and the enemy might eaſily, by counter-marches, have penetrated it in ſome part; but, by putting my line back, I had always time enough to get before them. In order to ſecure the neceſſary communications, I kept my principal attention on Valloire, an excellent poſt which covered the Galubier, prevented the enemy from deſcending by the valley of Morienne any lower than S. Michel, and conſequently by throwing them back of courſe, into the Tarenteſe, if they meant to go into Savoy, gave me ſufficient time to get there before them, and take my poſt. I was very certain, that while I ſhould leave the enemy no other communication with Piedmont, but by the little Mount St. Bernard, they could not winter in Savoy, becauſe their pro-

viſions would come from too great a diſtance, and becauſe we could eaſily, when the ſnow had ſtopped up the paſſages, fall upon them, with ſuch a number of troops, as it might pleaſe the King to ſpare us from the other frontiers. 1709.

As all my ſyſtem depended upon preſerving the central point of my line, I thought it neceſſary to attend particularly to the ſecurity of that; ſo that Briançon, being a very bad town, commanded on all ſides, and upon which I knew the Duke of Savoy had always an eye, I cauſed an intrenched camp to be made on the eminences, called the *Heads*, above the town. This was done with ſo much diligence, that in a month's time it was in a ſtate of defence: I alſo took poſſeſſion of the Randouillet, another eminence which commanded the *Heads*: and at length, by dint of labour, I made ſo excellent a poſt of it, that twelve battalions would have been ſufficient to defend it againſt a whole army; it was baſtioned all over, had a covered way, out-works, and fifty pieces of cannon. I alſo built ſome houſes upon it, and had

1709. ſome ſpring water brought up to them, for it was not without difficulty that it could be fetched up from the Durance, though at the foot of the camp. All theſe diſpoſitions being made, I encamped in the vale of Monneſtier, two leagues from Briançon, with the main body of my infantry. I put five battalions into the valley of Quieras, twelve in the camp of Tournos, and nine in Provence. I poſted four battalions at Valloire, and four at la Gondrana, near St. Jean de Morienne. I alſo detached ſeven into the Tarenteſe, with all my cavalry, under the command of Lieutenant-General de Thouy, whom I ordered to keep up a good countenance, but to fall back on Conflans, and from thence on Montmellian, if the enemy ſhould advance upon him with ſuperior force.

I HAVE entered into a more minute detail, becauſe the diſpoſition was ſingular, and could not have been comprehended without the particulars I have given. It appears at firſt extraordinary, and very difficult; but I can affirm, that by following the idea I formed to myſelf

ſelf of it; it is the eaſieſt. It only re- 1709.
quires to be well informed of the ene-
my's motions, and to make the chain of
communication properly; both of theſe
are very eaſy; for by my poſition, the
approach of the enemy was to be ſeen
at ſuch a diſtance, that we might always
come up in time, even if they had ſtolen
ſome marches upon us.

It is to be obſerved, that in a war, carried on among mountains, when one is maſter of the heights, the enemy is neceſſarily ſtopped; and this is what I had made my principal object in the line I had laid down for myſelf.

As a proof that I thought my plan of defence a good one, I ſent away, the next campaign, of my own accord, twenty battalions out of the eighty-four I had, that the King might augment his other armies with them.

In the month of May, there was an inſurrection, occaſioned by ſome fanatics. The Duke de Roquelaure, Lieutenant-General, who commanded in Languedoc, applied to me for aſſiſtance. I immediately ſent him four battalions, which

1709. attacked the rebels, and defeated them; ſo that tranquillity was reſtored immediately after.

TOWARDS the 12th of June, we received information of a change in the Miniſtry: M. Voiſin was made Secretary of State for the war department, in the room of M. de Chamillart. The cauſe of the latter's diſgrace proceeded from the univerſal clamours raiſed againſt him, ſo that the King, conſidering the general confuſion of affairs, did not think it right to keep him in office any longer, notwithſtanding the perſonal friendſhip he had for him. It muſt be acknowledged, that he was a good kind of man, who meant very well; but he had ſo little genius, that it was ſurprizing how the King, who was endued with great penetration, could chuſe him for his miniſter, or at leaſt keep him in office for ſo long a time, at the riſque of the injury his affairs ſuffered daily from it. He had a wonderful opinion of his own capacity, and always ſaid, when any one began to ſpeak to him, *I know*, though the point in queſtion was

was quite a different thing from what he imagined. He thought himſelf a General; and indeed ſent word once to the Marſhal de Teſſé, that if he were at the head of five or ſix thouſand horſe, he ſhould not be at a loſs to make great manœuvres. The firſt thing that introduced him to the King, was the billiard table; he was one of the beſt players in the kingdom, and as the King liked to play, this gave him occaſion to come often to Court, to make one of the party. By this means, he obtained the office of Intendant of the Finances, and having inſinuated himſelf into the good graces of Madame de Maintenon, was appointed Comptroller-General, when M. de Pontchartrain was made Chancellor. A little time after, M. de Barbeſieux, Secretary of State for the war department, dying, that office alſo was given to him. It is not ſurprizing that he could not properly fill theſe two poſts, ſince Meſſrs. Colbert and de Louvois, two of the greateſt Miniſters France ever had, found each of them ſufficient employment in one of them. In 1708, 1709.

1709. having got quite out of his depth, he intreated his Majeſty's leave to reſign the finances, which were given to M. Deſmaretz; and at length, the King ſeeing that there was no poſſibility of keeping him any longer in place, without riſking the loſs of every thing, granted him a conſiderable penſion, and gave his office to M. Voiſin. It had been granted in reverſion to the Marquis de Cany, M. de Chamillart's ſon; but he was alſo obliged to give it up. The Marquis bought the regiment of marines, which ſerved in Dauphiny under me, and joined it as ſoon as poſſible. He has always ſerved with diſtinction, beloved by the officers of his regiment, who did not uſe to care for their Colonel; he gained the eſteem of every one by his bravery, affability and politeneſs; in a word, he never appeared as if he had ever been Secretary of State: and accordingly his behaviour drew upon him every kind of reſpect. He died of the ſmall-pox in 1716.

THE beginning of M. Voiſin's fortune was, that being Intendant of Maubeuge, during

during the ſieges of Mons and Namur, 1709.
he had an opportunity of being known to Madame de Maintenon, who had a great regard for his wife; this, joined to his probity and his induſtry, was the reaſon why Madame de Maintenon intruſted him with the management of the convent of St. Cyr, and got him appointed Counſellor of State. In 1714, the Chancellor Pontchartrain having aſked leave to retire, merely that he might prepare himſelf for another world, M. Voiſin was made Chancellor, and ſtill continued to the laſt to keep his poſt of Miniſter of the war department, and his direction of St. Cyr. He died of an apoplexy in the year 1717. He was a ſenſible man, capable of entering into all the minuteſt particulars of buſineſs, but little verſed in political matters. He was very harſh in his anſwers, but very upright, and very aſſiduous in looking out for men of merit, in order to employ them. He was always intent upon buſineſs, having no other paſſion. Many perſons who knew him thoroughly, thought that he was the fitteſt man

1709. in the kingdom to be Comptroller-General of Finances.

MARSHAL Villeroy, who could not bear Chamillart, diſpatched a courier to me to give me notice of this change.

TOWARDS the beginning of July, the enemy having aſſembled the main body of their infantry in the neighbourhood of Suſa, ſet to work to put the roads of Mount Senis in order; they paſſed the Alps on the 11th, and encamped in Upper Morienne, between Lannebourg and Termignon; upon which I detached Lieutenant-General M. de Cilly, with two brigades of infantry, to reinforce Major-General the Marquis of Broglio, who was there already with one brigade.

I alſo ordered all the grenadier companies of theſe troops to advance to la Sourdiere, an excellent poſt upon the river Arc, between S. Michel and S. André, in order to bar the paſſages to the left of the Arc. I drew all the troops which I had extended to my right, near to Briançon.

COUNT

COUNT Thaun, Field-Marſhal of the Emperor, who was commander in chief of the enemy's army, advanced afterwards between Oſſois and Bourget, and from thence to S. André. A ſmall corps drew near at the ſame time to the little mount S. Bernard, by the valleys of Aoſta; and M. de Rebender, General of the Duke of Savoy's troops, came to encamp at Oulx, with eighteen battalions and ſome ſquadrons: the main body of their cavalry remained in the plain, near Orbaſſan. 1709.

I WOULD not make any other motion till I had ſeen more clearly into the deſigns of the enemy, being very ſure of coming up always in time, on which ever ſide they ſhould march.

COUNT Thaun, ſeeing us reſolved not to quit the poſts we occupied, judged that he could not advance further into the Morienne, nor contrive any method to diſplace us from about Briançon; which was his principal object. He therefore determined to take the road of the Tarenteſe, to penetrate into Savoy. For this purpoſe, he ſent forward a body

of

1709. of ſix thouſand men by the paſs of the Vanoiſe, and at the ſame time M. de Shulembourg came down the little mount S. Bernard.

As ſoon as I ſaw that Marſhal Thaun was determined, I extended my troops by the lower Morienne, to the river Iſere, in order to croſs it on the bridge of boats I had laid over it at Fretterive, to oppoſe the enemy on the other ſide, and to ſuccour M. de Thouy. The inſtructions I had given in writing to this General, were, to fall back behind the river Arly, in caſe the enemy ſhould advance with a ſuperior force, and if he were driven from thence, to retire to Fretterive, throwing three battalions into the mountains of Tamie, and five ſquadrons of dragoons towards Haverge and Annecy, in order the better to obſerve the motions of the enemy, and to harraſs their rear, if they ſhould continue their courſe along the Iſere.

M. DE THOUY, in conſequence of my orders, withdrew his troops from the head of the Tarenteſe, and then evacuated Mouſtiers; but when he came near Conflans,

Conflans, inſtead of putting himſelf be- 1709.
hind the Arly, he poſted himſelf in the plain between La Roche Sevin and Conflans. The enemy attacked him there on the 28th of July, and he was defeated; as much by ſuperior force as from the bad diſpoſition he had made, having placed his infantry in a plain, and his cavalry in a moraſs; he had the good fortune, however, to loſe no more than two hundred horſe, and about three or four hundred foot; he then retreated to Fretterive, where I arrived at the ſame time with the van of the army. I found he had forgotten to occupy the paſs of Tamie, ſo that, from Conflans, the enemy might, by that paſs, gain the heights which commanded the plain of Fretterive; I therefore fell back to the camp of Franchin, placing my right to the town of Montmellian, and my left to the mountain, to prevent the enemy from coming there. I ſent M. de Berenger, a Colonel of infantry, with four hundred men to occupy the Bauges: two days after, I ſent M. de Maulevrier, a Brigadier, to join him with a reinforce-

ment

1709. ment of twelve hundred men. M. de Prades retreated towards Taverge with two regiments of dragoons.

THE enemy encamped on our ſide of the Arly, in the plain of l'Hopital, occupying the paſs of Tamie, and then brought up all their cavalry, to the number of ſeventy ſquadrons.

IT will be curious and even uſeful for the ſequel, to explain the poſition of my troops, more eſpecially ſince it was as ſingular, as new and advantageous. My principal attention was, not only to cover Fort Barraux, but alſo to preſerve, at the ſame time, a ſafe communication with the upper Dauphiny, for fear the enemy, by counter-marches, ſhould find means to put themſelves between me and Briançon, which I could no longer ſuccour if once they were poſted. The buſineſs was therefore to guard an extent of five-and-twenty leagues of mountains; for ſuch was the diſtance between Briançon, and Mountmellian. I left M. de Dillon with twenty-two battalions, for the defence of the camp at the *Heads*, Quieras, and the vale of Monneſtier; three battalions

talions at Valloire, for the ſecurity of the 1709.
paſs of the Galubier, which was the eſſential point for our communication. I placed three battalions at S. Jean de Morienne, four at S. Eſtienne de Cuine, fifteen at Agguebelle, five at Aiguebellette, and as many ſquadrons near the mouth of the Arc in the Iſere, and I placed myſelf at Francin, with nineteen battalions, and twenty ſquadrons. From Valloire to the bridge at Montmellian, all theſe ſeveral corps were covered by the Arc, and the Iſere, and had orders continually to keep parties upon the heights, to obſerve the motions of the enemy in the Tarenteſe, or on the ſide of Conflans: they were to march by their right, or by their left, according as they ſhould ſee what the enemy did, and without waiting for my orders, that they might come up with a proper force, on which-ever ſide the enemy ſhould attempt to penetrate our line. Nothing was more ſimple than all our manœuvres, and unleſs we were aſleep, the enemy could not get before us in any part, becauſe we could ſee all their motions, and they had always

1709. always a circle to make, while we went by the ſhorteſt cut: I had directed roads to be made every where, in order that our poſts might communicate more ſpeedily.

THE enemy puſhed on ſome detachments by Faverge, and near Lake Annecy, to penetrate into the Bauges, without which they could not diſlodge us from Montmellian, but the good countenance our troops kept up, prevented them even from attempting it: nevertheleſs, not to remain inactive, and to endeavour by one laſt effort to diſplace us, they advanced all their cavalry towards the Rhone. They had an additional motive for this ſtep, which was to be at hand to ſuccour the Baron de Mercy, who had entered into upper Alſace, with a body of troops; and if he ſhould ſucceed, they took it for granted, that, by the communication they might eſtabliſh with the Imperial troops in Franche-Comté and Alſace, they ſhould be able to winter in Savoy, and by that means, to puſh forward in the enſuing campaign.

FOR theſe reaſons therefore, the enemy 1709.
firſt attacked the caſtle of Annecy, in which we had only ſixty men; they ſoon made themſelves maſters of it, and advanced afterwards to the Rhone.

M. DE PRADES, who had then eight ſquadrons of dragoons, retired to Seiſſel; and I ſent him ſix hundred foot to aſſiſt him in defending the Rhone, in conjunction with the militia of Bugey and Breſſe, which I had aſſembled. I poſted eleven companies of grenadiers at Chanaz, to be at hand to join M. de Prades: I put five at Bourget, with five hundred infantry; and I ſent Lieutenant-General M. de Cilly, to encamp at Chambery, with ſixteen ſquadrons and five battalions: in this manner I faced them on all ſides.

THE enemy did not dare to weaken themſelves too much at Conflans, for fear I ſhould march up there; for that poſt was neceſſary for them, to preſerve the communication with their country; and if I had happened to get poſſeſſion of it, they would have had no other retreat

1709. into Piedmont, than by paſſing through Swiſſerland.

WHILE we were quietly looking at each other, General Rebender, had an inclination to ſtrike ſome great ſtroke: for this purpoſe he marched from his camp near Exilles, and advanced to Mount Genevre, with a deſign to put the Val de Praz, and eſpecially the town of Vachette, which was no more than half a league from Briançon, under contribution. M. Dillon, who commanded on that ſide, perceiving that Rebender was come down from Mount Genevre, towards Vachette, marched thither with two battalions, and ſix companies of grenadiers, which he poſted behind the town. As ſoon as the enemy (after having ranged themſelves in order of battle), had put themſelves in motion to attack a bad intrenchment of paliſades, which we had thrown up there, M. Dillon ruſhed upon them by the right and left of the town, and charged them with ſo much bravery, that he beat them, killed ſeven or eight hundred on the ſpot, and took four hundred priſoners. Re-

bender retreated as faſt as poſſible towards Exilles, and did not ſhew his face again during the reſt of the campaign. 1709.

We learned, a few days after, that Count Mercy had been attacked in upper Alſace by Count du Bourg, and entirely defeated. The victory was very complete: the enemy had two thouſand men killed, and as many taken priſoners. This ſucceſs determined Count Thaun to return into Piedmont, perceiving that there was no longer any probability of ſucceeding in any of his projects; he accordingly moved off his army at the end of September, partly by the paſs of the little Mount S. Bernard, partly by Mount Senis. I marched back at the ſame time by my right, and returned to Briançon, where we had only to wait till the bad weather was ſet in, in order to be able to ſend our troops into winter quarters without apprehenſions for the frontier.

While I was encamped about Briançon, I received orders to repair with all expedition to the army in Flanders. Some time before, there had been a very

1709. bloody action at Malplaquet, where Marſhal Villars received ſo conſiderable a wound on the knee, that he was diſabled from ſerving the reſt of the campaign. Marſhal Boufflers, who had been preſent at the battle as volunteer, (though he was an older officer than Marſhal Villars), then took the command of the army. The point was to ſave Mons, which the enemy laid ſiege to, in conſequence of their victory. I ſet out on the 11th of October from Briançon; paſſed by Verſailles, where I received the King's orders, and arrived on the 18th at the army near Queſnoy: Marſhal Boufflers and I, viſited the approaches of the enemy's camp, to ſee if we could not find means to attempt the relief of Mons: but beſide that the matter was almoſt impracticable, from the poſition of the enemy, whoſe right was at the Haine, their left at the Sambre, and their front covered with woods and rivulets, we had another inſuperable difficulty, which was that of ſubſiſtence. It was a diſtance of ſeven leagues from our camp to that of the enemy; ſo that two days were required to

to get there. The Superintendants of provisions, far from being able to give us bread before-hand, had it not even in their power to distribute in the evening the bread that was due in the morning. This determined us to turn our thoughts, only to prevent the enemy from making any other conquests; and for this purpose I repaired to Maubeuge with fifty battalions, and one hundred squadrons. Marshal Boufflers remained in camp between Valenciennes, and the Quesnoy with the rest of the army, in order to cover those two places. On my part I worked at an intrenched camp upon the heights, on the other side of the Sambre; and in a few days I made it so strong, that I could not easily be attacked in it. Mons capitulated on the 20th of October, and the enemy separated their army at the latter end of the month. We did the same, after which I returned to court. 1709.

This winter the King erected the territory of Warty into a Dukedom and Peerage, for me and my heirs male of the

the ſecond bed. I had the name of Warty changed into that of Fitz-James.

No alteration was made in the command of the armies; but as the campaign in Dauphiny always began very late, the King, at the requeſt of Marſhal Villars, ordered me to go into Flanders to relieve Douay, which was beſieged by the enemy. Marſhal Monteſquieu, who had commanded in that country during the winter, might eaſily have hindered that ſiege; but he was ſo little apprized of the motions of the enemy, that he did not know they had aſſembled their army, till after they had paſſed the upper Deule; and inſtead of intrenching himſelf under Douay, (which was a very eaſy matter), he ſuffered himſelf to be ſurprized at Vitry, and had only time to retire in diſorder towards Arleux, and from thence to Cambray.

As early as the month of March, M. Voiſin had propoſed to me, from the King, to command the army in Flanders, till the wound Marſhal Villars had received, ſhould allow him to go there. I had conſented, upon condition that I ſhould

ſhould ſet out immediately, in order to take the proper meaſures to chooſe my poſt, to ſecure it, and to collect the army, on the firſt intelligence of the enemy being in motion; for I was convinced, that with theſe precautions, it was very poſſible to preſerve Douay, and all the fortreſſes between that and the Sambre; but I affirmed at the ſame time, that if once the enemy were poſted there, it would be impoſſible to relieve either of them, becauſe ſuch large armies block up a whole country. After this converſation with M. Voiſin, he ſpoke no more to me upon the ſubject; and I believe that this was owing partly to the jealouſy of Marſhal Villars, who was not deſirous that I ſhould be by myſelf at the head of the army, and partly to the falſe intelligence which the court received from Flanders, that the enemy would not be able to take the field till the month of June. 1710.

I SET out therefore in the month of May, and repaired to Cambray, where Marſhal Villars was aſſembling the army. We marched to [illegible]as, and from thence

1710. having croſſed the Scarpe, we advanced upon the enemy, whom we found well intrenched; their right was at the moraſſes of Lens, and their left at the Scarpe, oppoſite to Vitry. After having reconnoitred them, we agreed that it was not poſſible to attack them. It would have been equally impracticable to paſs the rivulet of Lens, and the upper Deule, eſpecially as that would have taken up a great deal of time; and the enemy being behind the Scarpe, much leſs ſhould we have been able to force them. On the ſide of Vitry they were likewiſe ſo well ſecured with inundations and double intrenchments, that we could not prudently think of attacking them. It was therefore reſolved, that we ſhould only attend, to endeavour to prevent them from making any other conqueſts after the taking of Douay; and in the mean time we drew near to St. Eloy, for the convenience of forage. As there were therefore no thoughts of coming to an action ſoon, I received orders to go with ſpeed to my own proper poſt at Dunkirk, where the

enemy were beginning to put themſelves in motion. 1710.

I ARRIVED at Chambery on the 22d of June, and at Briançon on the 27th.

I RECEIVED intelligence that the Duke of Savoy's army was aſſembling in the plain of Piedmont, about the neighbourhood of Orbaſſan; that there were a a body of troops on the ſide of the vale of Stura; that they were conveying quantities of ammunition and proviſions to Coni and Demont; and beſides, that there were very large magazines at Suſa. I therefore thought it neceſſary to prepare myſelf to oppoſe the deſigns of the enemy on the ſide of the Var, or of Barcelonette, having at the ſame time an eye to the upper Dauphiny and Savoy. In this view, I made the following diſtribution of my troops.

I GAVE Lieutenant-General M. d'Artagnan ſix battalions, and two regiments of dragoons for the defence of the Var; I poſted two regiments of dragoons at Seine; ten battalions at the camp of Tournos in Barcelonette; twelve battalions at Guillestre, where I fixed the

1710. head quarters; ſeven battalions at the camp of Rouſſe, in Quieras; nineteen battalions at Briançon; ſeven at St. Michel in Morienne; and two battalions and twenty-ſeven ſquadrons in the Tarenteſe.

In this poſition, I was equally at hand, whether it became neceſſary to puſh troops on by my right to the Var, (for which purpoſe I had had roads made as far as Broc, which we could have reached from Tournos in five days march); or whether it was proper to defend the valley of Barcelonette, or turn by my left into Quieras, to Briançon, or in the Morienne, if the enemy ſhould advance towards Mount Genevre, or ſhould paſs Mount Senis.

The only place I was apprehenſive for, was Monaco, becauſe that being out of the line I had formed, I could not hinder it from being beſieged; moreover, the ſituation of the country made it ſcarce poſſible to relieve it, in as much as the enemy could lay ſiege to it with twenty battalions, and obſerve us with fifty

THE army of the enemy was compoſed of ſeventy battalions, and ſeventy ſquadrons, excluſive of the garriſons; ours conſiſted of ſeventy battalions, including all the garriſons, and thirty-one ſquadrons. 1710.

TOWARDS the 10th of July, the main body of the enemy's army began to file off on the ſide of Coni and Demont. I contented myſelf with puſhing on ſome battalions to Colmars, and encamping on the paſs of Waars. I drew the battalions that were in the Morienne, nearer to Briançon, and ſent twelve ſquadrons to Grenoble, and ten to Moneſtiers, in order that they might have a leſs way to get to the Var, and at the ſame time not to be at any diſtance from Savoy.

THE enemy, to keep me in ſuſpenſe, with regard to their real deſign, and to alarm me on all ſides, made M. de Rebender advance to Oulx, and then to Salabertran, with twelve battalions. M. de Shulembourg appeared at the ſame time in the valley of Aooſta, with four battalions, and ſome cavalry; upon which I marched to Guillestre, and puſhed on ſome

1710. ſome battalions towards Briançon and the Morienne.

AT length, on the 21ſt of July, Count Thaun, with the main body of his army, advanced by the paſs of Argentera, and entered the valley of Barcelonette. Upon this, I marched from Guilleſtre, and placed myſelf at the caſtle of Waars; an excellent poſt on the mountain of the ſame name, which entirely ſtopped up the paſſage into Dauphiny, ſtrengthened the camp of Tournos, which was only two ſmall leagues diſtance from it, and might be ſecurely defended with twelve battalions. My right was placed towards the ruins of the old caſtle, and covered by the river of Waars, which, running through impracticable precipices till it comes near Guilleſtre, ſecured my communication with that little town, from whence I drew my proviſions. My left was at the great mountain, which ſeparates the vale of Seerins from that of Waars.

I DISPATCHED Lieutenant-General de Chamarande, with ſome troops, to reinforce the camp [illegible] Tournos, ſo that there

there were fifteen battalions there. I encamped a brigade of infantry, with two regiments of horſe and dragoons, at the paſs of Waars, the better to obſerve the motions of the enemy. 1710.

COUNT Thaun attacked the caſtle of Arche, which was ſituated in a ſmall plain, at the opening of the paſs of Argentera: he made himſelf maſter of it in two days; and on the 26th came to encamp at Foglioſa. On the 27th he advanced ſome conſiderable detachments upon S. Paul and Caſtellet; upon which the troops I had left at the paſs of Waars fell back upon me. The enemy afterwards occupied Caſtellet, and the heights bordering on the paſs of Waars oppoſite to my camp; they had alſo ſent forward ſome troops, and ſeveral *barbets* *, into the valley of S. Pierre, and of the Caſtle Dauphin; this obliged me to leave a brigade of infantry at Guilleſtre, as much to prevent our being diſturbed in our communication with Briançon and Quieras, as to reinforce the camp of Rouſſe in Quieras, if it were neceſſary;

* A kind of provincial troops, called by that name, in Savoy.

or

1710. or to join me, the diſtance between the caſtle of Waars and Guilleſtre being only two leagues. I alſo poſted two battalions and eleven ſquadrons near Mount Dauphin; I ordered M. d'Artagnan to march from Provence to Colmars, with three battalions and two regiments of dragoons, in order to keep our communication open with the camp of Tournos on that ſide, as I did on mine.

General Rebender, to keep us in alarm, and endeavour to diſlodge us, advanced on the 29th of July to Mount Genevre; but as we did not make any motion in conſequence of this, and as M. Dillon, whom I had left at the camp of Briançon, harraſſed him very much by his parties, he ſoon retired to Sezane, where he was joined by the Baron de S. Remi, with a few battalions.

At the ſame time that the enemy were making all theſe different movements, I received an expreſs from the Duke de Roquelaure, Commandant in Languedoc, to inform me that two thouſand men had landed at Cette, of which they had taken poſſeſſion, that they had afterwards advanced to [illegible], and that it

it was to be feared, the malcontents would join them, if they were not ſpeedily driven away; ſo that he deſired me to ſend him ſome troops with diſpatch. I had ſo much upon my hands on all ſides, that I could not comply with his requeſt; and beſides, as I had diſcovered the real projects of the enemy, I was ſure that by keeping Count Thaun upon this frontier, I ſhould prevent the deſcent from having the deſigned effect. The following is the account of the matter, as I ſent it to the King, which I received by advice from different places, as well as from intercepted letters, and from the avowal of thoſe who were concerned in it. 1710.

The enemy expected to make themſelves maſters of the valley of Barcelonette; after which they would have brought down all their cavalry, which they had left on purpoſe near Coni: they would then have extended themſelves by their left, upon the Durance, and after having paſſed that river, would have encamped at Gap, preſerving their communication with Piedmont,

by

1710. by means of troops they would have poſted at the paſs of S. Pons, of l'Echallette, of the Orres, and of Parpaillon; at the ſame time the malecontents, and the new converts of Dauphiny, were to riſe and aſſemble about Die, whither they had cauſed ſeveral refugees and a number of arms to be conveyed.

THE deſcent at Cette was to have been made at the ſame time that the enemy entered into Dauphiny; and the new converts, ſupported by the troops, were to riſe in Dauphiny and Languedoc.

THE inſurgents were to form a chain along the Dromme, by the valley of Creſt, and from thence by the Vivarez. The enemy, in this ſituation, would, without ſtriking a ſtroke, have ſeized upon Siſteron, Seine, and Digne, by their rear, and would thus have cut off our communication with Provence.

SOME troops which I ſent into the Diois, were the cauſe that no one dared to ſtir, and the poſition I had taken rendered the execution of the enemy's project impracticable; but at the ſame time I could not [illegible] the Duke de Roquelaure.

Roquelaure. The Duke de Noailles, 1710.
who commanded in Rouſſillon and Lampredan, being leſs occupied and nearer, took all the beſt and moſt active troops he had, and went with extreme diligence into Languedoc; ſo that M. de Seiſſan, who commanded the enemy, finding no inſurrection in the province, and fearing he ſhould be demoliſhed, returned quickly to his ſhips.

COUNT Thaun ſeeing no poſſibility of executing his project, and being otherwiſe much incommoded with the multiplicity of guards and eſcorts of convoys, reſolved to return into Piedmont; but being apprehenſive that as ſoon as he ſhould have got beyond the paſs of Argentera, we ſhould fall upon General Rebender with all our forces; he detached on the 12th of Auguſt eight battalions to reinforce him. His troops paſſed by the vale of Maurin, by the paſs of Loup, from thence into the valley of the Caſtle Dauphin, and then having proceeded by the paſs d'ell Agnello, they entered into the head of the valley of Quieras. This made me, at

firſt,

1710. firſt, apprehenſive that they intended to attack the camp of Rouſſe, in Quieras, where I had left Major-General M. de Cadrieu with ſeven battalions. The preſervation of this poſt was of great conſequence, in as much as I conſidered Quieras as the covered way of Briançon; if the enemy had taken poſſeſſion of it, we could not have kept up our communication between Embrun and Briançon without danger, or a conſiderable eſcort.

THE camp of Rouſſe, above the caſtle of Quieras, though of a great extent, was eaſy to be maintained; and I was ſure, that if thoſe who commanded there did not loſe their ſenſes, we ſhould always have time enough to get there with a ſufficient force; the right was upon a craggy perpendicular eminence, the front on a very high riſing ground, with a rivulet before it, and the left was ſupported by the great mountain near the paſs of Iſſoire; one could get at it by the rear without even being ſeen by the enemy. From Briançon, by the paſs of [illegible], one could get there

there in five hours march; and one might reach it from Guilleſtre in the ſame ſpace of time along the rapid ſtream of Guill. Moreover, between this laſt paſs and that of Hayes, there were two other paſſes to penetrate into Quieras. 1710.

To prevent any enterprize on the part of the enemy, I cauſed five battalions to march to the paſs of Furfande, and I poſted as many near Guilleſtre.

On the 14th of Auguſt the army of the enemy decamped from Foglioſa, taking the road of the valley of Stura, by which they came. I immediately advanced to S. Paul, upon the Ubaia, with twelve battalions, and I puſhed on to Barcelonette two brigades from the camp of Tournos, in order to be more at hand to reach the Var, if the enemy ſhould clear the paſs of Tenda, and ſhould come down into the county of Nice; but at length, in a few days, I was informed, that the enemy had drawn near to Pignerol, and that the corps which had entered the upper part of the valley of Quieras, had con-

1710. tinued its march by the paſs of Maye, and had joined General Rebender at Oulx; I therefore marched back to Briançon, and replaced all the troops in the ſame poſition they were in at the beginning of the campaign. Count Thaun came on the 28th, and encamped above Sezane with his whole army; upon which I advanced ſome brigades behind Vachette; and reinforced my camp near Briançon with a good number of troops, which I drew from the valley of Barcelonette.

In the month of October, the two armies ſeparated to go into winter quarters.

Towards the end of the month of Auguſt, the Archduke totally defeated, near Saragoſſa, the army of the King of Spain, who was preſent at the action. His Catholic Majeſty retreated towards Burgos, to aſſemble the remains of his army; upon which the Duke de Noailles earneſtly requeſted that a large body of troops ſhould be given to him, in order that he might enter Catalonia, and by making a diverſion there, oblige the Archduke to return. Philip V. in the

diſtreſs he was in, had aſked for me to be his General; but the King would not withdraw me from the command of the frontier of Italy. Upon this occaſion, I thought it my duty, from the knowledge I had of the kingdom of Spain, to give my advice; which was contrary to the Duke de Noailles's propoſal. I repreſented, therefore, what I thought was proper to be done, and reaſoned in the following manner. Nothing could be more for the advantage of the Archduke, than the project of a diverſion in Catalonia, by the Rouſſillon, inaſmuch as Count Staremberg, the General of that Prince, would be very well pleaſed to ſee the French army buſied in a ſiege, in order that he might have time to drive the King of Spain intirely out of Caſtile, and to give aſſiſtance to the army of Portugal; after which, he would return with all his forces reunited, to carry on the war againſt us as uſual in Catalonia. I inſiſted therefore that the only way of ſaving his Catholic Majeſty, was to enter, as ſoon as poſſible, with an army 1710.

1710. by Navarre; which would be making a real and effectual diverſion. For if Count Staremberg did not return upon the Ebro to make head againſt us, we ſhould retake Arragon in as ſhort a time as we had loſt it; and at the worſt, we ſhould remain maſters of all the country on this ſide the Ebro, from Miranda-di-Ebro, to Lerida. If Staremberg ſhould return upon the Ebro, his junction with Portugal became almoſt impoſſible; and the King of Spain might eaſily ſupport himſelf on the other ſide of the Tagus, and even return to Madrid, to form a new army there during the winter; and in the ſpring, to act in concert with the army of France, which will be in Navarre, to expel the enemy from Arragon. Moreover, the Spaniards, when they ſhould perceive that his Catholic Majeſty was ſupported in earneſt, would be encouraged to perſiſt in their fidelity, and to ſupport their King.

THE propoſal I made was not only more for the intereſt of the King of Spain, but France alſo derived a certain

advantage

advantage from it; for it could not be doubted, that if the enemy reduced Spain, they would return through that kingdom, to fall upon our frontier with all their forces. It was therefore much better for us to carry on the war on the Ebro, in Arragon, or in Navarre, than upon the Bidaſſoa, at the gates of Bayonne, or in the Rouſſillon. 1710.

I WISHED therefore that the Duke de Noailles ſhould march immediately to Pampeluna with all his troops; and as the latter ſeaſon was advancing, I would have detached ten battalions and twenty ſquadrons from my army to join him. My advice was not followed, and the troops remained inactive, while preparations were making for the ſiege of Gironne, to which the Court had conſented upon the repreſentations of the Duke de Noailles.

IN the month of October, I received orders to ſend thirty-four battalions and thirty-one ſquadrons into Rouſſillon. Nevertheleſs the Duke de Noailles could not be ready to put himſelf in motion till the end of December; and he was

1710. very near failing in his enterprize, on account of the continual rains that diſtreſſed him. Fortunately for him, the face of the King of Spain's affairs was now changed. The Duke de Vendoſme commanded the troops; Philip V. having aſked for that General, upon his Majeſty's refuſing to ſend me. The King of Spain had found means to collect an army; he had marched up to the enemy, and had given them battle at Villa Vicioſa. Though Staremberg had had the advantage in that action, yet the loſs he had ſuſtained the evening before, of the Engliſh troops in Brihuega, amounting to four thouſand men, joined to the total want of proviſions, obliged him to retire with ſuch precipitation, and in ſo much diſorder, that when he entered Catalonia, his army was reduced to five or ſix thouſand men, infantry and cavalry *; ſo that he could not think of ſuccouring Gironne, and the Duke de Noailles made himſelf maſter of it.

* See Note No. III.

I HAD

I HAD had, during the campaign, ſome private negociations with the Court of Turin; perhaps the reader may be curious to know them. About the middle of Auguſt, while I was at Barcelonette, after Count Thaun's retreat, Major-General Guerchois, who uſually commanded in that valley, told me, that one Arnaud, a monk, whom the Duke of Savoy employed in many affairs, had ſpoken to a man named Laurent, an attorney, in the valley, upon the ſubject of the war between the King and his Royal Highneſs. He had given him to underſtand, that it might be eaſy to hit upon terms of accommodation, and allowed him to make uſe of his name upon the occaſion. I told M. le Guerchois, that M. Laurent might go to Father Arnaud, and aſſure him, in general terms, that, on our part, we ſhould be always inclined to liſten to propoſals of peace. I thought all this was mere matter of converſation; but, on the 5th of September, M. Laurent came to me near Briançon, and brought me a letter from Father Arnaud, which ſignified that 1710.

1710. his Royal Highneſs would readily liſten to any propoſals that ſhould be made to him, provided they were conſiſtent with the ſecurity of his dominions, and he could be indemnified for the towns that had been demoliſhed. For this purpoſe he required that we ſhould give up to him Briançon or Fort Barraux, Antibes and Monaco. Before I gave any anſwer, I wrote to Court, and received the neceſſary inſtructions and powers; after which, I ſent the following memorial to Father Arnaud.

"THE King is ſo much inclined to "treat with his Royal Highneſs, that "he has charged me to enter upon the "negociation, for which he has ſent "me the neceſſary powers. Therefore, "to cut matters ſhort, and come to a "ſpeedy concluſion, I take the liber-"ty to propoſe to his Royal Highneſs, "that he would be pleaſed to order "ſome confidential perſon to converſe "with me on the ſubject, that when "I am informed of the real intentions "of his Royal Highneſs, I may be "able to make ſuitable propoſals. In

"caſe

"caſe his Royal Highneſs ſhould not 1719.
"think proper to ſend any perſon to
"me, I intreat that he would be
"pleaſed to ſignify to me, by whom,
"and in what manner, he wiſhes I
"ſhould treat the point in queſtion.
"As for myſelf, I ſhall conſider it as
"the greateſt happineſs of my life, to
"be able to contribute to a perfect re-
"conciliation between his Majeſty and
"a Prince, to whom I have the ho-
"nour of being ſo nearly related, and
"for whom I entertain an infinite re-
"ſpect."

I WAITED near three weeks without having any anſwer; but at length, on the fourth of October, M. Laurent came and told me, that Father Arnaud had repreſented ſtrongly to him, that his Royal Highneſs could not enter into any negociation with France, unleſs he were certain of reaping conſiderable advantages from it. He alſo gave me to underſtand, that it would be proper a league ſhould be made with the Venetians, and the other Princes of Italy. He offered his mediation for a

1710. general peace; he propoſed, in conſequence of the treaty, to ſtand neuter, or not to make it publicly appear that he was upon good terms with France, but to remain apparently united with the allies, and only to prevent them from undertaking any thing on our frontier. All this appeared to me to come from a man who was only ſounding us, and endeavouring to diſcover what we would offer him, that he might make a merit of it with the allies. The victory which the Archduke had juſt gained at that time in Spain, did not, perhaps, contribute a little to keep him in ſuſpenſe; for it might naturally be ſuppoſed, that the Archduke was totally maſter of Spain, and conſequently that the war was at an end in that country. And indeed, had it not been for the unparalleled fidelity of the Spaniards, and the great fault which the Archduke committed in not ſeizing upon Navarre, contrary to the advice of Count Staremberg, it would have been impoſſible for his Catholic Majeſty to receive

any

any ſuccours from France, and conſe- 1710.
quently he muſt ſoon have been cruſhed.

THOUGH I did not expect any great ſucceſs from my negotiation, yet, as the Court did not chuſe to break it off, on the 5th of October I wrote the following letter to the Duke of Savoy.

"THE affair in queſtion cannot be "treated too ſecretly; but, at the ſame "time, as it is neceſſary to get on in the "buſineſs, that we ſhould begin to put "things in form, I am led to think, "in virtue of the powers I have re- "ceived from the King, and conſidering "the advantageous manner in which "your Royal Highneſs has been pleaſed "to ſpeak of me, that I ought to pre- "fer a direct addreſs to your Royal "Highneſs to every other mode, and "have therefore ſent a memorial, which "I intreat you to make remarks upon. "You will not ſee any figures of rhe- "toric in it, but a plain diſcourſe, "ſuch as becomes a man of my pro- "feſſion."

MEMO-

1710.

MEMORIAL.

" No one can doubt, but that the King " ſincerely wiſhes for a peace with his " Royal Highneſs, ſince his Majeſty's in- " tereſt is concerned in it: there is alſo " reaſon to think that this will be found " equally conſiſtent with the intereſt of " his Royal Highneſs. It is in this view " that his Majeſty has charged me, to " give all the neceſſary aſſurances of his " aſſent to every thing that can be rea- " ſonably aſked of him.

" As his Royal Highneſs wiſhes to " have an acccount of the advantages and " ſuccours he would receive from his " Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, it will be " proper, before they are explained, to " make the following reflections; after " which, his Royal Highneſs will be " better able to judge of the ſolidity of " his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty's offers.

" THE pretenſions of the Emperor upon " all Italy, the conſtant maxims of the " council of Vienna, and the daily cavils of " that court againſt his Royal Highneſs, " to elude the execution of their treaties;

" all

" all theſe circumſtances, I ſay, make 1710.
" us judge, that as ſoon as the Emperor
" ſhall be diſengaged from the war with
" France, and ſhall no longer need the
" aſſiſtance of his Royal Highneſs, not
" only there will be nothing more ſaid
" about the Vigevenaſco, or an equivá-
" lent; but the Emperor will alſo be deſi-
" rous of taking from his Royal Highneſs
" what he has already given him, and
" of reducing him to the ſame ſtate
" of ſubmiſſion as the Princes of Italy.
" His Royal Highneſs, whoſe penetra-
" tion nothing eſcapes, knows very well,
" that in that caſe he will only have his
" own forces to defend himſelf with;
" for there will then be no other power
" in Europe, either at hand, or willing
" to aſſiſt him. France will think of
" nothing but enjoying peace, and reco-
" vering herſelf from the miſchiefs occa-
" ſioned by the war. England and
" Holland will be in the ſame mind,
" becauſe it will be their intereſt, and
" will not for a long time be diſpoſed
" to engage in another war, unleſs it
" be on account of trade. There re-
" mains

1710. " mains only the Houſe of Auſtria,
" which, purſuing ſtill the ſame views
" of aggrandiſement, traced out by
" Charles the Vth, will not fail to avail
" themſelves of every opportunity; and
" as his Royal Highneſs can be the only,
" or at leaſt the firſt obſtacle to their
" vaſt deſigns, they certainly will begin
" by attacking him.

" His Royal Highneſs knows better
" than any other perſon the meaſures
" he is to take, to prevent theſe in-
" conveniences; but it appears from a
" review of matters, that there can be
" no firm engagement, except in an al-
" liance with France. The King, there-
" fore, upon the whole, makes the fol-
" lowing offers.

" 1°. The reſtitution, on both ſides,
" of the dominions reciprocally ta-
" ken, ſince the commencement of this
" war.

" 2°. The total ceſſion of all the
" rights of the King of Spain, upon the
" ſtate and Dutchy of Milan, which his
" Catholic Majeſty gives up without
" reſerve

" reſerve to his Royal Highneſs, for him 1710.
" and for his ſucceſſors.

" 3°. The union of his Majeſty's " forces with thoſe of his Royal High- " neſs, as much for the preſervation of " that part of the Milaneſe he is in poſ- " ſeſſion of, as for the recovery of the " reſt of that ſtate, which the Emperor " has reſerved to himſelf, and which the " King of Spain, to whom, in right, the " whole belongs, ſhall have ceded to his " Royal Highneſs.

" 4°. An entire concurrence between " his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty and his " Royal Highneſs, as much with reſpect " to the number, as the nature of the " ſuccours he is to be ſupplied with, " and the abſolute command of which " ſhall be left to his Royal Highneſs.

" 5°. His Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty " will furniſh the neceſſary ſubſidies, " in proportion to what his Royal High- " neſs would receive from the allies. " This article requires to be further ex- " plained, and cannot be entirely ſettled, " without entering more minutely into " particulars.

" 6°. His

1710. "6°. His Moſt Chriſtan Majeſty will "acknowledge his Royal Highneſs King "of Lombardy."

M. Laurent came back to me on the 21ſt of October, and told me at firſt, that the Duke of Savoy had ſent word to Father Arnaud, to break off all correſpondence; but however that M. Lanfranc, private Secretary to that Prince, had ſent a long memorial to the father, in order that he ſhould communicate it to me. This method of acting ſurprized me: however as the court would not break off the negociation, I debated thoroughly with Laurent upon the matters this memorial contained. 1°. It was required that the King ſhould indemnify the Duke of Savoy, for all the towns which had been demoliſhed; 2°. That his Royal Highneſs ſhould keep Exilles and Feneſtrelle; 3°. That a Swiſs garriſon ſhould be put in Briançon and Fort Barraux, for the ſecurity of the performance of the treaty; 4°. That Monaco ſhould be given up to his Royal Highneſs.

As to the firſt point, I anſwered, it was in conſideration of the places which had

had been demoliſhed, that his Moſt 1710.
Chriſtian Majeſty conſented to give up Exilles, and Feneſtrelle: that the ſecond point was anſwered by the firſt: with regard to the third, his Majeſty could by no means conſent to put into the hands of any foreign power two towns that were the keys of his own kingdom; and with reſpect to the laſt article, the King could not either in honour or conſcience diſpoſe of what did not belong to him. Beſide, that if his Royal Highneſs's affairs required ſome pecuniary aſſiſtance, his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty would aſſiſt him as much as his own finances would allow, without however binding himſelf to any thing by a public treaty.

I SENT back M. Lauret with this reply, which he carried himſelf to M. Lanfranc at Turin; but I could not get any anſwer till after my return to St. Germains; for having received orders for winter quarters, and the enemy alſo retiring, I ſeparated the army, and returned to court the beginning of December.

1711. THIS winter the Abbé Gautier came to Verſailles, with propoſals of peace on the part of England; which determined the King to order me to ſend word to the Duke of Savoy, that if he had any thing to propoſe, it muſt come through the channel of the Queen of England, without whoſe concurrence France was determined not to treat with any power. I ſhall not take any notice of the ſhare I had in this negotiation, till I have finiſhed what concerns my campaigns; I ſhall only ſay a word of the Abbé Gautier, whoſe fortune has been very ſingular. He was of the meaneſt extraction, and very poor; being Sexton of the pariſh of St. Germain en Laie, he was ambitious of becoming one of the clerks of the chapel of the caſtle, which may be worth about three or four hundred livres per annum. L'Abbé du Vivier, Maſter of the chapel, being diſpleaſed that he ſhould ſolicit for this little employment through any channel but his own, did not ſpeak favourably of him to the King, ſo that other people, who were trying for the place, exclaiming againſt him, he took the

the reſolution of ſeeking his fortune elſe- 1711.
where. He found means to be appointed one of the chaplains of Marſhal Tallard, Ambaſſador in England: And the war afterwards breaking out, he entered in the ſame capacity into the houſhold of Count Gallas, the Imperial Ambaſſador. This gave him an opportunity of being known to the Counteſs of Jerſey, who went there to maſs; and as the Earl of Jerſey, Lord Chamberlain to the Queen, with ſome others, entertained deſigns of overturning Godolphin's, and Marlborough's adminiſtration, and as this could not be done without a peace with France, the Counteſs pointed out Gautier to her huſband as a man, who might be employed without ſuſpicion. He was ſpoken to, and employed in carrying meſſages into France: the familiar acceſs he had at the houſe of the Count de Gallas, often furniſhing him the means of obtaining paſſports, he acquitted himſelf of this commiſſion with underſtandſtanding, and in a word it was through him alone that all the negotiation was carried on. The Earl of Oxford, when

1711. he became Prime Miniſter, looked upon him as his confidential man. M. de Torcy did the ſame; and he knew ſo well how to avail himſelf of the good opinion that was entertained of him, that he obtained for himſelf a revenue of thirty or forty thouſand livres, either in penſions or Abbeys.

On the 14th of April, the Dauphin died at Meudon of the ſmall-pox, at fifty years of age: he was a very good Prince, of moderate talents, but not without underſtanding. Never had King a better ſon; always attentive to pay his duty, and interfering with nothing but as far as his father choſe.

I set out in the month of May to repair to Dauphiny, and arrived at Grenoble on the 1ſt of June. After having given all the neceſſary orders, I went into Provence, in order to viſit the banks of the Var, from its mouth to its ſource: I then went back to Barcelonette on the 13th of June, and from thence proceeded to Briançon.

The enemy began to aſſemble in the plain of Piedmont, about Orbaſſan and Vigone,

Vigone, and they were making great preparations at Coni; this ſeemed to indicate a deſign upon the county of Nice, or upon the valley of Barcelonette. 1711.

THAT I might be in a ſituation to oppoſe the enemy on which-ever ſide they ſhould march, I encamped at Guilleſtre with four-and-twenty battalions.

I PLACED ten battalions in the camp of Tournos, four at S. Martin d'Entraunas, near the ſource of the Var, and four at St. Laurent on the Var. I diſperſed fifteen ſquadrons, from Gap to Frejus, and ſeven along the Rhone, towards Valence and Montelimart. I left fifteen battalions at Briançon and in Quieras, and five with ſeven ſquadrons in Morienne and the Tarenteſe. By this poſition, I could arrive by my right in five days upon the Var, with thirty-ſix battalions and twenty-two ſquadrons; which were ſufficient to defend the paſſage of it, eſpecially as the banks of it are ſteep, and I had beſide raiſed ſome ſtrong intrenchments there. If the enemy ſhould march on the ſide of the Morienne, or of the Tarenteſe, by the paſs of Galubier,

1711. I could have got there three days before them with any number of troops I might chooſe.

In the firſt week of July all the enemy's infantry had crouded into the valley of Suſa, excepting two battalions which remained in the vale of Stura; their cavalry took the road of the valley of Aoſta, and the Duke of Savoy ſet out from Turin for Suſa. Upon this I marched all my troops back by the left, leaving my right at the camp of Tournos, and my left at Valloire, that I might be able to preſent myſelf equally on all ſides, if the enemy ſhould make any counter-marches. At length I was no longer in uncertainty with reſpect to the Duke of Savoy's deſign: for on the 6th of July, having paſſed Mount Senis, he encamped at Lannebourg with part of his army; and the next day he advanced to Termignon, from whence he detached four thouſand men by the paſs of Vanoiſe, in order to oblige our forces to abandon the Tarenteſe, and to be able to aſſiſt thoſe troops that were to paſs by the little Mount S. Bernard.

I MARCHED

I MARCHED to Valloire, and puſhed on ſeveral battalions to S. Jean de Morienne, Aiguebelle, and Montmellian, in order to execute the ſame manœuvre as in the year 1709. 1711.

THE Duke of Savoy judging that he could not force his way into Savoy by the Morienne, followed a few days after the detachment he had ſent by the paſs of Vanoiſe, and having continued his march by Mouſtiers, he croſſed the Arly, near Conflans, and encamped with his right at Cheuron, and his left at the Iſere. I then reſumed my former camp at Montmellian; and inſtead of the detachment of fifteen hundred men, which I had kept before in the Bauges, I ſent thither ſix battalions, and two hundred dragoons; leaving a few battalions to preſerve my communication with the Galubier by the Morienne.

THE enemy's army was compoſed of fifty-four battalions, and about ſixty ſquadrons; ours of forty-four battalions, and twenty-four ſquadrons: By this I mean the troops that were on this ſide the mountains of the Dutchy of Savoy;

1711. for I do not include thoſe which the enemy had left for the defence of their intrenched camp near Exilles, and their other poſts; nor do I, for the ſame reaſon, comprehend thoſe which we had left about Briançon, Quieras, &c.

OUR cavalry, which in retiring from Conflans to Montmellian, had been purſued by ſome of the enemy's ſquadrons and Huſſars, fell into ſome diſorder, but on the arrival of Lieutenant-General de Cilly, who haſtened up, every thing was quiet, and there was very little loſs. Brigadier de Prades, retired to Seiſſel with a regiment of dragoons to defend the Rhone: I alſo ſent him a detachment of infantry.

THE enemy not being able to diſlodge me from Montmellian, but by making themſelves maſters of the Bauges, and by that means of the heights that commanded my camp, detached General Sumjungen, who firſt advanced to Chaſtellar: M. de Maulevrier, who was poſted at the Abbey of Aillon, did not think he could maintain himſelf there, and retired towards my camp; upon which the

enemy gained the paſs and the woods of Lindar, from whence I could not hinder them from coming to la Tuille, and upon the heights of Montmellian; ſo that not being able to remain any longer with prudence in my camp, I retired on the 21ſt of July in the morning, and encamped with my rear to ſome mountains, upon the edge of the plain, from Chapareillan to S. Bardolf, half a league from Chambery, from whence I took care to withdraw all our magazines. 1711.

I STAID a whole day in this camp, to ſhow the enemy that we were not running away from them; and on the 23d I took poſſeſſion of the camp of Barraux, one league and a half from Montmellian.

I HAD reconnoitred it two years before, with an intent to take poſſeſſion of it at that time, if the enemy had made themſelves maſters of the Bauges. My right was upon ſome heights near the Iſere, my left to a chain of very ſteep mountains; upon the top of which, however, I had a poſt of two hundred men, which could

1711. could not be driven off. I had thirty battalions with me, and although the poſt was a very excellent one, I had ſome good intrenchments thrown up as faſt as poſſible, that I might be able to ſend off large detachments if it ſhould be neceſſary.

I SENT Lieutenant-General de Cilly with my cavalry and eight hundred infantry behind the Echelles, to prevent the enemy from making any excurſions on the ſide of Lyons: I poſted Major-General Cadrieu near the caſtle of Entremont, with fifteen hundred foot and ſome dragoons, that the *blue* parties might not be able to ſlip into the neighbourhood of Grenoble, and moleſt our rear.

THE poſition I had taken covered Fort Barraux and Grenoble; and by means of the bridge I had laid over the Iſere at Pont Charra, I preſerved my communication with the Morienne and Briançon. For this purpoſe I had poſted four battalions and one regiment of dragoons oppoſite to Montmellian, in order to obſerve the motions of the enemy, and prevent

prevent them from repairing the bridge 1711.
I had deſtroyed in my retreat. I placed two battalions at Aiguebelle, where the entrance of the Morienne begins. They were to keep a detachment of one hundred men oppoſite to Fretterive, and to have ſome parties continually above Conflans, to obſerve what was paſſing in the enemy's rear. As the Arc was not yet fordable, I contented myſelf with ordering patroles, and left three battalions for the guard of S. Jean and Valloire. I had good roads made, to be able to go with expedition from my bridge at Aiguebelle to S. Jean and Grave; by which means I was ſure of not being ſurprized, nor out-ſtripped, by the enemy, unleſs all the commanders of the troops which compoſed my chain, ſhould agree to fall aſleep together.

As M. de Cilly's camp was not ſtrong enough to ſtop the enemy, if they ſhould march thither in a ſtrong body, I ordered that all the city militia of Lyons ſhould mount conſiderable guards on the bridge of the city upon the Rhone, till the twenty-five ſquadrons which were ordered

1711. ordered to come from Alſace were arrived.

THE army of the enemy appeared on the 28th, in the plain oppoſite to us, and encamped near the caſtle of Marches; the right near the Abbey of Mians, and the left near the Francin, a quarter of a league on this ſide of Montmellian: as they were obliged to follow the courſe of the Iſere, the cannon we had placed at la Chavane did ſome miſchief to their columns. The enemy ſent parties to take poſſeſſion of Chambery, and all their cavalry encamped there.

IN a few days, my intrenchments being finiſhed, I detached ten battalions from our camp to the Croix d'Aiguebelle, and Aiguebelle, in order to remove any anxiety for the Morienne, eſpecially as the rivers were now beginning to become fordable.

ON the 8th of September the enemy's army decamped from the caſtle of Marches, and retook the rout of S. Pierre d'Albigny and Conflans, in order to return into Piedmont by the ſame way they came. I had calculated, that, conſidering

ſidering our poſition and that of the enemy, I ſhould be able to reach Exilles ſeveral days ſooner than they, and if I were once poſted, I could eaſily lay ſiege to it, without any apprehenſion of it's being relieved; in conſequence of this, I had made all my diſpoſitions ſecretly; and as ſoon as I ſaw the enemy on their march, under pretence of being alarmed for my line in the Morienne, I puſhed on ſeveral battalions towards Aiguebelle and S. Jean, and made the following diſpoſition. 1711.

Messieurs d'Aſfeld and Dillon were to ſet out on the 13th from about Briançon, with fourteen battalions and a regiment of dragoons, and were to be on the 16th oppoſite the camp of S. Colomban, on the other ſide of the Dora. M. de Broglio was to march at the ſame time from S. Martin on the Arc, with twelve battalions, to proceed by the upper Morienne, gain the little Mount Senis, take poſſeſſion of the Tetines and la Touille, and to arrive on the ſame day, the 16th, below the camp of S. Colomban, announcing his arrival by throwing

1711. throwing up ſome rockets, and making a ſmoke. M. d'Aſfeld was to paſs the Dora, below Chaumont, proceed to Ramat, and there attack M. la Roque, while M. de Broglio was to fall upon him by the heights.

It could not naturally be ſuppoſed that Count la Roque would remain in ſo bad a ſituation, where he ran the riſque of being taken with all his troops. Undoubtedly, therefore, he would have retired towards Suſa, and we ſhould have laid ſiege to Exilles; but the Marquis of Broglio's ardour, or rather his deſire of doing every thing without any other perſon having any ſhare in it, was the cauſe of the failure of the affair, at the very inſtant that it had, as it were, ſucceeded.

Broglio, inſtead of regulating his march according to my directions, and of arriving on the 16th at la Touille, got there on the 15th by break of day, and reconnoitred the enemy's intrenchments. On the 16th in the morning, without waiting for any intelligence of Meſſrs. d'Aſfeld and Dillon, he attacked the redoubt

doubt *des quatre dents*. Some ſoldiers and officers got poſſeſſion of it; but as the enemy were not attacked by the ſide of Ramat, for d'Asfeld could not yet have got up, they threw all their troops againſt Broglio, and obliged him to deſiſt from the attack, after having killed or wounded one hundred and ſixty of his men; upon which he retired into the Morienne. Had he even ſtaid there till the next day, every thing would have ſucceeded, notwithſtanding the check he had received; for M. d'Asfeld had arrived on the 16th, at the Puy de Pragelas, and had immediately extended himſelf to the paſs of Argeuil, oppoſite to Exilles. He had even puſhed on a conſiderable detachment to reconnoitre the enemy, and make the diſpoſitions for attacking the next day. Count la Roque finding himſelf incommoded by M. d'Asfeld's manœuvres, and not being informed of the Marquis de Broglio's retreat, abandoned his intrenchments on the 16th in the evening, threw his cannon into the river, ſent three hundred men into Exilles, and retired beyond the Ravin 1711.

of

1711. of Claret, near Giaion, in order to wait there for the ſuccours that were coming to him from Savoy, or at leaſt to prevent us from cutting off his communication with Suſa. M. d'Asfeld having no news from Broglio, and being only informed from the report of the country people, that he had made an attack and had been repulſed, did not think proper to paſs the Dora with his fourteen battalions, and poſt himſelf between Exilles and Suſa, leſt the main body of the enemy's army, which was moving up with all poſſible expedition, ſhould fall upon him. He therefore remained below Chaumont till five o'clock in the afternoon of the 17th, in hopes of receiving ſome intelligence of M. de Broglio; but perceiving that Count la Roque, who was better informed of Broglio's retreat, and reinforced with five or ſix battalions, was re-entering the camp of S. Colomban, he retired to the Puy de Pragdelas, and from thence to the Cotte-Plane, placing his left at Oulx. I cauſed M. de Broglio's troops to join him, and arrived there myſelf on the 25th of

of September, with the reſt of the army; 1711.
ſo that I had fifty battalions and ſeventeen ſquadrons there: I extended my right into the valley of Pragelas. I may venture to ſay that no plan was ever better concerted, or would have been more glorious for his Majeſty's arms; for at the ſame time that the Duke of Savoy thought he could keep us in awe by the ſuperiority of his troops, and imagined that he could even make an irruption into France, we ſhould have taken from him a fortreſs, on which the ſecurity of his dominions, on the other ſide of the mountains, depended. Perhaps we ſhould even have taken Feneſtrelles.

I HAD left M. de Cilly in Savoy with ſeven battalions and the reſt of my cavalry. On the 26th the enemy had all paſſed the little Mount S. Bernard; and towards the end of the month, Count la Roque's corps was increaſed to thirty battalions. I remained in this camp till the 12th of October, when I marched back to Sezane; from whence, on the 14th, I repaſſed Mount Genevre, and

1711. encamped at the bridge of Servieres, near Briançon.

I SENT back into Savoy ſome of the troops that were to winter there; and M. d'Asfeld alſo took the road of the valley of Barcelonette, with the troops that were deſtined for Provence. He marched to Barricades, beyond the paſs of Argentera. The enemy abandoned it on his approach, and retreated towards le Pianche, where they had intrenchments guarded by two battalions, and a number of barbets: M. d'Asfeld attacked them, and after an engagement of an hour and a half, he drove them off, and purſued them near to Demont. He afterwards brought away from the valley of Stura, a number of hoſtages for the contributions, and reſumed the road to Provence by the valley of Barcelonette.

MAJOR-GENERAL le Guerchois had entered at the ſame time the valley of Maira, had forced ſome intrenchments guarded by one battalion and ſome peaſants, and had likewiſe brought away ſome hoſtages. Lieutenant-General de

Cilly was to have entered the valley of Aoſta with ſixteen battalions and the cavalry; but there fell ſuch a prodigious quantity of ſnow, that he was obliged to put his troops into quarters, without undertaking any thing. At the end of October, I ſeparated the army entirely, and arrived at Court in the beginning of November. 1711.

I CANNOT omit mentioning a very extraordinary adventure that happened at Lyons about the month of September. It was the cuſtom to ring a bell, to give notice to the perſons who were on the other ſide of the bridge of the Rhone, that the gates were going to be ſhut. There were above thirty thouſand people out a walking; the ſerjeant who kept the gate, rang the bell an hour ſooner than uſual, upon which every body was haſtening to re-enter the city. The ſerjeant, who had his views, kept the bar ſhut, in order to get a little money; ſo that the crowd increaſing, thoſe who were neareſt the bar, were ſo much preſſed, that there were more than a thouſand of them ſtifled, or very

1711. much hurt. A coach and horſes that were there, were cruſhed to pieces; in a word, it was a ſhocking ſight to ſee heaps of bodies piled upon one another, and all this in an inſtant. The ſerjeant was taken up, tried, and broken alive upon the wheel.

1712. In the month of February the Dauphineſs died, a week after the Dauphin her huſband; and in three weeks time the young Dauphin alſo expired. They were all three buried together at St. Denys. The loſs of the Dauphin was very ſenſibly felt by the French; for they expected that his future reign would at leaſt alleviate, if not put an end to their miſeries. It is certain that no Prince ever united a greater fund of religion, with more underſtanding; it ſeemed as if nature had taken pleaſure in indemnifying him for the injury ſhe had done him with reſpect to his perſon, which was deformed. He was of a very haſty diſpoſition; but had taken ſo much pains to ſubdue it, that it never broke out; he was much addicted to pleaſures; but his piety reſtrained him from indulging

ing in any that were unlawful, and often led him to abſtain from thoſe which were permitted. Though he was very fond of his wife, he never ſuffered her to break in upon his hours of prayer and meditation: ſo extenſive was his charity, that he denied himſelf many conveniences, to give to the poor. He carried his pardon of injuries, and neighbourly love ſo far, that he would riſk his own reputation rather than ſay any thing againſt calumniators, or even expreſs any diſſatisfaction towards them. I have ſeen him receive ſuch perſons with as much politeneſs and regard, as if they had never deviated from the rule of truth, and from the reſpect which they owed him. Though I was honoured with his confidence, he never allowed himſelf to ſpeak to me of their bad conduct; ſo much was he upon his guard againſt every thing that might be injurious to Chriſtian charity; in a word, he made a continual ſacrifice to God of all the croſſes and mortifications he experienced. He had a very ſound underſtanding and great penetration, was very 1712.

1712. fond of reading, and of converſing with men of merit and knowledge. His view in this was to make himſelf capable of governing well, in order to promote the happineſs of his people, when he ſhould be upon the throne. But Divine Providence, either to reward this Chriſtian hero, or to deprive us of a Prince we were not worthy of, removed him from this mortal life to a bleſſed eternity, in the flower of his age, ſince he was no more than thirty years old when he died.

THE advanced age of Lewis XIV. and the extreme infancy of the Dauphin, who was no more than two years of age, occaſioned many perſons to ſolicit the King ſtrongly to make a will, and to appoint a regency, in order to avoid the troubles which, without this precaution, might ariſe. The King ſpoke of it to M. de Harlay, who had been Firſt Preſident of the Parliament of Paris, a man of diſtinguiſhed wiſdom and probity, who had reſigned his employments voluntarily. He received orders to draw up a plan, which might be conſiſtent with

with the laws of the kingdom, and the good of the ſtate. M. de Harlay being much a valetudinarian, employed his ſon, a counſellor of ſtate, to reduce to writing all the ideas that occurred to him. This gentleman, who had a great ſhare of wit and much imagination, but very little ſound judgment, laid it down as a fundamental principle, that the King of Spain, uncle to the young Dauphin, ſhould be his tutor, and regent of the kingdom; but as his Catholic Majeſty could not abſent himſelf from his kingdoms, he appointed the Cardinal Deljudicé to govern France in his name and by his authority. He carried this plan to the King from his father; but it was thought ſo extravagant, that at firſt reading it was laid aſide. Notwithſtanding this, M. de Harlay, the ſon, ſtill perſiſted that the King might with propriety adopt it; and in order to make a merit of it with the King of Spain, he opened the matter to the Cardinal Deljudicé, when the latter came into France in 1714, from his Catholic Majeſty. The King was told of it, and 1712.

1712. was very near ſending him to the Baſtile. The Duke of Orleans was likewiſe informed of it; but never ſhewed him any other mark of reſentment on that account than not to give him any employment in the miniſtry.

In the month of June I went back to reſume the command of the army in Dauphiny. I began by viſiting Savoy, and drew near to Geneva with a few troops, in order to alarm the canton of Berne, and by that means to endeavour to make them more tractable with reſpect to the other cantons, with which they were at variance. I afterwards repaired to Briançon. As the treaty of peace, which was negociating in England, was far advanced, the Duke of Savoy did not form any deſigns againſt us this campaign; on the contrary, for fear of the Germans, he had put the greateſt part of his troops into garriſon; ſo I thought it beſt to proceed with the army on the other ſide of mount Genevre, as much for the ſake of ſubſiſting at the expence of the country, which was to be ceded to that Prince, as to ſpare our own. I put myſelf in motion

motion on the 11th of July to croſs the Alps; and on the 12th I encamped at the Sauze d'Oulon, with forty-one battalions, and nine ſquadrons of dragoons, extending my right to le Duc, in the valley of Pragelas, and my left to Oulx. The enemy placed eighteen battalions in the intrenchments of S. Colomban, five near Feneſtrelles, and the reſt of their army was diſtributed from Exilles to Suſa. We remained in this poſition till the 6th of September, when we marched back to Sezane, and the next day to Pont de Serviers. I could have found ſubſiſtence for a longer time at Oulx; but I had projected an incurſion into the plain of Piedmont on another ſide; and I had two motives for this; the firſt was, that in caſe the enemy ſhould move from the neighbourhood of Exilles, to follow me, I could, by a forced march, eaſily advance in two days time, near enough to inveſt that place; the other was, that at the worſt, if the enemy ſhould not make any motion, I ſhould levy contributions, and ſhew the 1712.

King

1712. King how eaſy it was to penetrate on the other ſide of the Alps.

On the ſame day that I arrived at Briançon, twenty ſquadrons arrived there likewiſe, to the great aſtoniſhment of our infantry and the people of the country, who had never ſeen a camp of cavalry.

I began my march on the 8th of September, and croſſed the paſs of Hayes and of Iſſoire, in the valley of Quieras, from whence I detached Lieutenant-Generals d'Arennes and de Cilly, with my cavalry, and ten battalions. Major-General de Cadrieu, who marched in front with one hundred dragoons, twenty-five companies of grenadiers, and as many pickets, deſcended by the paſs dell Agnello, into the vale of S. Pierre, drove away ſome detachments of the enemy, who guarded the intrenchments, and encamped at S. Pierre. Meſſrs. d'Arennes and de Cilly came up to him; the firſt remained there with the battalions, and the latter marched on with the cavalry and the detachment of M. de Cadrieu. He left his infantry at Venaſca, upon the borders of the plain of Piedmont, which he

he entered with his cavalry; he found 1712.
there two regiments of the enemy's cavalry, which he charged, and took ſome priſoners; but the main body of the enemy's horſe moving towards that ſide, he did not think proper to purſue any further than Villa-fallet, and contented himſelf with ſending a number of parties into the towns and villages round about, in order to take hoſtages for the contributions; they brought away a great number, and we got fifty thouſand crowns from them. In the action he had, there were forty troopers killed on our ſide, and twenty wounded. The loſs of the enemy was more conſiderable.

I HAD advanced with the main body of my infantry to La Chanaz, near the caſtle Dauphin, and at the ſame time M. d'Asfeld had marched by the paſs of Argentera, forced Barricades, and reduced Demont to ſubmiſſion; and having proceeded into the plain of Coni, he had picked up a great number of hoſtages, and had afterwards returned into the valley of Barcelonette.

M. DE

1712. M. DE CILLY, after having returned to Venaſca, ſent a conſiderable detachment into the valley of Maira, which brought off a number of hoſtages. Another detachment deſcended by the valley of the Po, and put the whole country under contribution as far as Barges.

AT my return to Pont de Servieres, I diſpatched ten battalions for the Rouſſillon, where they were to be under the command of the Count de Fiennes. The campaign ended towards the latter end of October, and having ſeparated the army, I returned to Grenoble, and from thence to court.

DURING this ſummer the face of affairs in Flanders was totally changed: at the beginning of the campaign Prince Eugene attacked Queſnoy.

DURING this ſiege, Lord Bolingbroke being come into France to conclude the treaty of peace, and having ſettled every thing, the Queen of England ſent orders to the Duke of Ormond, her General, to put a ſtop to every act of hoſtility. After the taking of Queſnoy, he accordingly declared to Prince Eugene, the orders he had

had received from the Queen, and that 1712.
he was going to publiſh the Armiſtice. The reſt of the Generals, together with the Emperor's General, would not accept of it: ſo that Ormond retired with his troops to Ghent, and ſent, agreeably to the preliminary articles, ſome battalions to take poſſeſſion of Dunkirk. Of all the foreign troops in the pay of the Queen, there were only thoſe of Holſtein that followed him: the reſt refuſed to obey him.

PRINCE EUGENE, to ſhew the allies that he was able to purſue his conqueſts notwithſtanding the deſertion of the Engliſh, advanced to Landrecy, which he beſieged. Marſhal Villars received orders to ſuccour the place: this was not an eaſy matter; but fortunately, upon the Marſhal's approach to the Sambre, the enemy drew near to it likewiſe with all their troops, leaving only eighteen battalions and ſome ſquadrons at Denain upon the Scheld, to preſerve that poſt, which was neceſſary for the protection of their convoys; for they brought every thing from Douay and Tournay. Mar-

1712. ſhal Villars made a counter-march in the night time, and proceeded with all poſſible diſpatch to the Scheld, over which he threw ſome bridges, croſſed the river, attacked the corps encamped at Denain, and totally defeated it. Prince Eugene was marching up to its relief; but the affair was at an end, before he could arrive. In a fit of deſpair, he ordered the bridges upon the Scheld near Denain to be attacked; and loſt upwards of a thouſand men, to no manner of purpoſe; for had the bridges been abandoned to him, he would not have been the more enabled to croſs the Scheld in the face of the King's army. Prince Eugene, notwithſtanding this check, would ſtill have continued the ſiege; but the deputies of the States General obliged him to raiſe it, and to retire to Mons. Marſhal Villars took Douay, and afterwards Bouchain and Queſnoy; which determined the Dutch no longer to refuſe the peace propoſed by France, and approved of by the Queen of England.

At my return to court, I was ordered to leave it again in the month of Novem-

ber.

ber. The Count de Fiennes, having 1712.
marched with ſix thouſand men to the relief of Girona, which was blocked up by the enemy, found them ſo well poſted at the Côte Rouge, and moreover ſo ſuperior in number, that he thought himſelf fortunate to be able to get back again to the Rouſſillon, without receiving a check. Upon this the King, fearing leſt Girona ſhould be loſt for want of proviſions, reſolved to ſend me thither with a ſufficient force to ſucceed. I repaired to Perpignan on the 10th of December, after having ſtopped a few days at Montpellier, to concert with M. de Baſville the ſuccours I wanted for my expedition, and which he ſupplied me with. The troops which were to compoſe my army, coming from Germany, from Dauphiny and Provence, could not arrive till the 23d: and the 26th I took the field at Boulou, with thirty-four battalions, forty-one ſquadrons, and thirty pieces of cannon. It was very difficult to find ſubſiſtence for the men and horſes, on account of the ſeaſon, and becauſe we had fifteen tedious leagues of an enemy's country

1712. country to traverſe, and in very bad roads. We had collected a kind of fleet, which was to coaſt along with us, in order to furniſh us with what we wanted; but one is never ſure of any thing when one depends upon the winds.

On the 28th we marched from Boulou, and croſſing the Pyrenees, encamped at Junquera, the firſt village of Catalonia. On the 23d we marched to Figueras, where we placed our right, and our left at Alfar: we halted on the 30th, in order to have ſome bread and oats brought from Roſes. On the 31ſt we croſſed the Fluvia, and encamped at Armantera.

Count Staremberg, having learned that I was marching to the relief of Girona, had cauſed moſt of the troops that were in Catalonia to march to the blockade, and had repaired thither himſelf: he had thirty-ſix battalions, and thirty-ſeven ſquadrons.

1713. On the 2d of January I marched from Armantera, and went to encamp at Verges on the Ter, three leagues from the enemy's camp, and four from Girona. The ſame evening I ordered three diſcharges

charges of my artillery to be made, in order to apprize the Marquis de Brancas, who commanded there, of my arrival. As I knew that the poſt of the Côte Rouge, which the enemy occupied, was ſtill ſtronger from the natural advantage of the ground, than from the intrenchments they had thrown up there, I judged it beſt not to think of attacking them in that place, although it was the moſt convenient to get at the town, it being the great road leading from that ſide of the Ter to Girona: if we had choſen to go by our right, we ſhould have fallen in with ſome large mountains, where the enemy might have amuſed us for a longer time than our proviſions would have laſted; ſo that I determined to march to the relief of the place by the other ſide of the Ter: As it was neceſſary for this purpoſe to have four days bread, becauſe the circuit was great on account of the mountains, I reſolved to wait for my biſcuit, which was to be landed at Eſcale; and in the mean time I pretended to have no other deſign but to attack the Côte Rouge. 1713.

1713. UPON my arrival at the camp at Verges, I ſent a detachment of ſix hundred horſe acroſs the Ter, in order to drive away the miquelets, and ſome troops of cavalry, which made their appearance there, and I alſo ſent off a detachment towards the enemy's army to obtain ſome intelligence.

COUNT Staremberg ſtrongly ſuſpecting that I ſhould take the reſolution of croſſing the Ter, and fearing that in that caſe he could not make his retreat without riſque, decamped at the beginning of the night, and quitting the Côte Rouge, paſſed over the Pont Mayor, from whence, before break of day, he took the road to Oſtalric, leaving behind him ſome pieces of cannon, ammunition and proviſions. I was not informed of this march till it was rather late in the morning; I immediately diſpatched Lieutenant-General de Cilly, with two brigades of infantry and all my dragoons, to take poſſeſſion of the Côte Rouge, and to eſtabliſh a communication with Girona: I afterwards extended myſelf in a line from Verges along the Ter, and remained in that

that ſituation till I had completely re-victualled the fortreſs, in which there were no ſorts of proviſions; I alſo changed the garriſon, which ſeemed rather dead than alive. 1713.

Our diligence was ſo great, that on the 21ſt of January, Girona was completely ſupplied with proviſions; after which I decamped from Verges, and retired to Figueras, where I left the Count de Fiennes, with twenty battalions, and as many ſquadrons, to take up his quarters in the Lampredan. I ſent back the reſt of the troops into the different provinces from whence they came, and then returned to court, where I arrived on the 5th of February, 1713.

M. Voysin had propoſed to me to demoliſh Girona, after having relieved it, upon pretence of ſaving the expence of a garriſon; but in fact, with a view that the Spaniards might have one fortreſs leſs upon our frontier; I told him I could not do it without an expreſs order under the King's own hand. When I ſpoke of it to his Majeſty, I perceived that he wiſhed it alſo; but was unwilling

1713. to give the order I required, and I thought it not right to incur his Catholic Majeſty's diſpleaſure without having my excuſe in form; ſo that I heard no more of it.

On my arrival, I found that the articles of peace were upon the point of being ſettled, and that all the valleys beyond Mount Genevre were ceded to the Duke of Savoy, as if they were of no value. I was too well acquainted with this country not to think myſelf obliged to repreſent to the King, that it was not proper to abandon ſo extenſive and ſo rich a tract of land, without endeavouring to have at leaſt ſome kind of equivalent. I therefore adviſed that the valley of Barcelonette ſhould be demanded, as that would be of great uſe to us for the facility of our chain of communication upon this frontier, and for defending the entrance into Provence and Dauphiny. The King and the Miniſters had no mind to make the propoſal, leſt it ſhould retard the concluſion of the peace; but I inſiſted ſo ſtrongly, that at length they conſented to it. The Duke of Savoy,

Savoy, who, on his part, was apprehen- 1713.
ſive, if he made any difficulties, that the other allies would ſign without him, and who, moreover, knew not the importance of what was required, made no objection; and thus France, in loſing Exilles and Feneſtrelle, acquired a very plentiful valley, compoſed of twelve communities.

At length, on the 11th of April, peace was ſigned at Utrecht, between France, Spain, England, Holland, Savoy, Portugal and Pruſſia; but the Emperor and the empire would not come into it. It has always been a maxim with the court of Vienna, not to accede to the different treaties at the ſame time as the other crowns, thinking by this proceeding to ſhew the ſuperiority of their grandeur and power, though in fact they cannot continue the war for any length of time by themſelves.

There was therefore no longer any war, except upon the Rhine, where Marſhal Villars commanded inſtead of the Marſhal d'Harcourt, who had been ſeized with an apoplexy. He firſt laid ſiege to Landau, and afterwards to Fribourg;

1713. Prince Eugene, who was much inferior in number, not ſtirring all the while, but keeping cloſe and covered behind the lines of Etlinguen. The King's army conſiſted of two hundred battalions, and three hundred ſquadrons. Towards the cloſe of the campaign, the two Generals had ſome conferences, and then the congreſs was held in the winter at Raſtat, where the peace was ſigned.

In the month of May I had given up my regiment of infantry to my eldeſt ſon, in order that he might go through the campaign with more ſatisfaction; he had already ſerved two campaigns with me.

England and Holland had made a ſeparate treaty, ſigned the 14th of March 1713, for the evacuation of Catalonia, and the Emperor's plenipotentiaries had ſigned it afterwards. It was there ſtipulated that the allies ſhould withdraw all their troops from that Province, and ſhould give it up into the hands of Philip the Vth, King of Spain. In fact, Count Staremberg did deliver up Tarragona and Oſtalric, and in the month of December,

cember, 1713, embarked at Barcelona with all his troops. The people of that city, notwithſtanding the advice of Staremberg and of the Cardinal de Sala, their biſhop, would never ſubmit to his Catholic Majeſty, unleſs they were previouſly aſſured of preſerving all their privileges. They therefore reſolved to defend themſelves, and ordered the Governor of Cardona, who was a Catalan, not to deliver up that place to the Spaniards, notwithſtanding Staremberg's orders. 1713.

By the terms of the treaty, Staremberg was not only obliged to evacuate, but alſo to deliver up to his Catholic Majeſty all the places in Catalonia, reſerving only Barcelona or Tarragona, at his option, which he was alſo to deliver up when he embarked. Indeed M. de Grimaldi, a Spaniſh Lieutenant-General, having been ſent to Staremberg, to concert the execution of the treaty, made a kind of new one with him, in which he omitted the words *deliver up*; this ſerved as a pretence to Staremberg, not to compel the people of Barcelona to open their gates,

1713. which, according to the treaty ſigned in Holland, he ought to have done.

As the Imperialiſts retired, the Duke de Popoly advanced into Catalonia, and ſummoned Barcelona to ſurrender; but the inhabitants not liſtening to any thing, the army of his Catholic Majeſty advanced towards the town to blockade it, till all the neceſſary apparatus for a ſiege could be brought up. There were none of the requiſites in Spain; ſo the King ordered that his Catholic Majeſty ſhould be ſupplied from our forts and magazines, with every thing he might want; and ſent M. Ducaſſe, Lieutenant-General of Marines, with two veſſels of the line to command the Spaniſh fleet deſtined to block up Barcelona by ſea.

1714. At the beginning of this year died the Queen of Spain; upon which the King reſolved to ſend me to Madrid, under pretence of a compliment of condolence, but in fact to determine that court not to defer any longer to ſign the peace with Holland. The matter in diſpute was a principality in Flanders, which the King of Spain was determined to give

to the Princeſs Orſini. The Engliſh and the Dutch, whom this did not concern, readily conſented to it; but the Emperor, to whom the ſovereignty of the low countries was ceded, would not liſten to it. The Dutch however, who were then maſters of Flanders, offered to put her in poſſeſſion of this little principality, but this did not ſatisfy the King of Spain, who wanted, that they ſhould engage themſelves by the treaty of peace, to maintain her in it. This the States-General refuſed; upon which his Catholic Majeſty gave orders to his Plenipotentiaries, not to ſign the peace with them but upon this condition. The Dutch called upon the King of France to fulfil the promiſe he had made them; to wit, that the King his grandſon ſhould make peace with them upon the terms already ſettled, among which the guarantee of the principality to the Princeſs Orſini, had never been mentioned. This was the principal motive of my journey to Madrid. I had orders beſides, in caſe the King of Spain ſhould ſign the peace, to concert with him the means of reducing Barcelona, and 1714.

1714. and to make him the offer of a French army, but upon condition that it ſhould be commanded by one of the King's Generals.

BEFORE I ſet off, it was thought proper to ſend a courier into Spain. Great was the ſurprize, when by the return of the meſſenger, it was found that his Catholic Majeſty intreated his grandfather not to ſend me to Madrid, but to make me go ſtraight forward to the army before Barcelona; this expedition being more neceſſary to him than a compliment of condolence. The Ambaſſadors of Holland made at the ſame time loud complaints, upon his Catholic Majeſty's trifling with them, and continued to inſiſt on the performance of the engagements the King had entered into with them; upon which the King not only ordered me not to go, but wrote word to the King of Spain, that he would ſend neither troops nor ſhips, nor any kind of aſſiſtance for the ſiege of Barcelona, till he had ſigned the peace with Holland.

THREE

THREE months paſſed away without 1714.
any anſwer from Madrid. Orry, who governed Spain under the Princeſs Orſini, went to the camp before Barcelona, in order to ſee if it were poſſible to carry on the ſiege without the aſſiſtance of France, and at the ſame time the Cardinal Deljudicé was ſent to Paris, to have an eye upon what was going forward, and to endeavour to prevent the King from taking any ſteps contrary to his Catholic Majeſty's deſigns. But at length Orry finding it impoſſible to ſucceed without the aſſiſtance of France, the King of Spain wrote, in the month of June, by a courier, to the King, that he would conſent to every thing he deſired, and ſent him the neceſſary orders for the Spaniſh plenipotentiaries at Utrecht: he preſſed the King at the ſame time to ſend me off with all poſſible diſpatch. Accordingly I received orders to repair to Barcelona, and the French troops deſtined for this expedition, were ordered to march.

I SET out on the 22d of June, and as I paſſed by Narbonne, a courier came to me

1714. me from his Catholic Majeſty, with the patent of Generaliſſimo, and inſtructions for my conduct with regard to the inhabitants of Barcelona; it was ſignified in theſe, that in caſe they ſhould aſk to capitulate, before the opening of the trenches, I ſhould only engage to interfere in their favour with the Prince, that their lives ſhould be ſaved; but if once I had begun the works, and the batteries, I was abſolutely forbidden to receive them, on any other terms, than thoſe of ſubmitting at diſcretion. This order appeared to me ſo extraordinary, and ſo unchriſtian, and even ſo contrary to the intereſt of his Catholic Majeſty, that I inſtantly ſent diſpatches to the King his grandfather, to know his intentions. I received for anſwer, that I was at liberty to do as I thought proper. I likewiſe wrote to Madrid to repreſent my reaſons; but the only permiſſion I could obtain from thence, was to promiſe my good offices, after the opening of the trenches, and the raiſing of the batteries. I was not in the leaſt ſurpriſed at theſe ſentiments in the court of Madrid; for ſince the acceſſion of Philip the Vth to the crown,

crown, it had always been their maxim 1714.
to proceed with haughtineſs; and they had by that means often brought themſelves to the brink of deſtruction, through the diſcontents which this behaviour had occaſioned: the miniſters never ſpoke but of the grandeur of the Monarch, of the juſtice of his cauſe, and of the unworthineſs of thoſe who dared to oppoſe him; all thoſe who had revolted were to be put to the ſword, all thoſe who did not take part againſt his competitor were to be treated as enemies, and thoſe who aſſiſted him were ſuppoſed only to have done their duty, and his Catholic Majeſty was not bound to conſider them in the leaſt for it. If the Miniſters and Generals of the King of Spain had been more moderate in their language, as it ſhould ſeem that prudence would have required, Barcelona would have capitulated immediately after the departure of the Imperialiſts; but as Madrid, and the Duke de Popoly, talked of nothing elſe publicly but of ſackings and executions, the people became furious and deſperate: Popoly indeed had a perſonal

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1714. and well founded hatred againſt the people of Barcelona, on account of the inſults they had committed againſt his wife, when the Archduke took the city in 1705.

I ARRIVED at the camp before Barcelona the 7th of July; the Duke de Popoly reſigned the command to me, and ſet out three days after to return to Madrid.

ORRY was with the army, and it was at my requeſt the King inſiſted, with his Catholic Majeſty, that he ſhould be there: uncertain whether the accounts that were ſent me of the immenſe preparations for the ſiege were true, it was my wiſh that Orry ſhould be preſent, knowing well that while he was with me, he would neglect nothing to have me ſupplied with all I wanted. But when I found that we had plenty of every thing, and that money was the only article we might poſſibly be in want of, if the ſiege were long, I conſented that Orry ſhould return to Madrid, more eſpecially as he was the only perſon in Spain who could find the neceſſary funds.

A FEW

A FEW days before he went away, he had propoſed to me to remain in the ſervice of the King of Spain, after taking Barcelona. He aſſured me, that his Catholic Majeſty would give me the command of all his forces; that I ſhould, moreover, be his Vicar-General in the kingdom of Arragon, and that I ſhould have ſuitable appointments and penſions. I rejected the propoſal entirely; 1ſt, becauſe I was become a Frenchman, and being an officer of that crown, it did not become me to think of any ſuch thing: 2d, I conſidered every eſtabliſhment in Spain, as a very uncertain matter, and continually ſubject to the caprices of an ever-turbulent Court. He, however, preſſed me again upon the ſubject, and told me, that the propoſal ſhould be made to the King by his Catholic Majeſty, without committing me in any thing. I peremptorily refuſed, aſſuring him, that after the obligations I had to the King his Grandfather, I would never leave him, unleſs he ſhould diſmiſs me from his ſervice. 1714.

THE

1714. THE army was compoſed of fifty battalions of French, and twenty of Spaniſh troops, and of fifty-one ſquadrons; we had beſides fifteen battalions in Lampiedan and Girona, and eight ſquadrons to keep the country in awe; and about fifteen other battalions and thirty ſquadrons, diſperſed on the ſide of Tarragona, Ygualada, and the plain of Vich, to keep the miquelets in awe.

THE garriſon of Barcelona conſiſted of ſixteen thouſand men divided into ſeveral regiments, as well foreigners as miquelets and ſoldiers of the Deputation.

IN our park of artillery I found eighty-ſeven pieces of heavy cannon, twenty of which were ſix-and-thirty pounders, and thirty-three mortars; there were more than fifteen hundred thouſand weight of powder, and every thing elſe that could be thought of for a ſiege, in profuſion; ſo that it remained only to determine where we ſhould attack the place. The ſide of Monjuich would have been very difficult, by reaſon of the cannon which the enemy might have fixed half way up the declivity, to ſcour our trenches,

trenches, and batter them in reverſe, and the more, as on that ſide the glacis of the town concealed the baſtions, and the ditch there was very deep. 1714.

THE front, which looked towards the convent of the Capucins, had not only five baſtions, but was alſo provided with re-entering angles; and we ſhould have found it difficult to advance under ſo great a fire.

I DETERMINED, therefore, to make my attack on the ſide towards the ſea, which faces the river Beſos, as the front, in this place, was only compoſed of there baſtions, the curtains of which being much raiſed, offered a fair mark to the cannon, and the ditch was only ſix feet deep. The approaches here were much more eaſy, by reaſon of ſome ſmall riſing grounds, behind which ſeveral battalions might be placed under cover; beſides, our park of artillery was near this ſpot; whereas in every other part, it would have taken us infinite time to have conveyed all the apparatus. The ground, indeed, was very low, and in caſe of rain there would have been a great deal of mud;

1714. but the ſeaſon made us hope for dry weather.

ON the 12th of July we opened the trenches, with ten battalions, to which were added ten companies of grenadiers, and three hundred horſe. The night was ſo ſhort, that the parallel could not be extended ſo far as had been determined, ſo that the left could not be carried on to the ſea, as we had deſigned.

THE next day, at one o'clock in the afternoon, the rebels made a ſally on that ſide with four thouſand foot and three hundred horſe. Their cavalry paſſed along the ſhore, till they came to the rear of our parallel, and killed ſome of our workmen; their infantry advanced as far as upon the Boyall; but our grenadiers and pickets coming up, repulſed them briſkly. Our three hundred horſe advanced at the ſame time at full ſpeed, charged the enemy, killed ſixty of their horſemen on the ſpot, took one Lieutenant-Colonel priſoner, and purſued them as far as the palliſades of the covered way. About ſix thouſand of the rebels ſallied out of the covered way at

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the ſame time, and marched in order of battle to our parallel; but our ten battalions putting themſelves in motion from behind the riſing ground, obliged them, in an inſtant, to re-enter the place with very great loſs on their part. In this action, which was long and ſharp, we had not more than fifty men killed or wounded. The bad ſucceſs of this ſally diſconcerted the garriſon, who did not make any other of conſequence during the reſt of the ſiege. 1714.

I HAD forgotten to mention that on the 8th we ſaw a fleet of fifty ſail on the ſea; upon which Lieutenant-General de Bellefontaine, who, ſince M. du Caſſe's illneſs, commanded our naval armament, ſet ſail to go and meet it. Night came on before he could come up with it; and the next day this fleet endeavoured to make their way into the port of Barcelona. M. de Bellefontaine took twenty of their ſhips and one frigate, but thirty ſhips and three frigates entered the harbour. They were laden with proviſions, and came from Majorca.

1714. On the 25th of July our batteries began to play; there were fourſcore pieces of cannon; they fired upon the baſtions of Porteneuve, of S. Clara, and of the Eaſt. On the 30th a lodgment was made in the covered way, with very little loſs; conſidering that the trenches were not more than ten toiſes diſtant from the ſalient angles, and that there were no traverſes within. The next day the enemy attempted to drive away our troops from this lodgment; but they were repulſed with loſs.

The Marquis Delpoal, a Catalan of diſtinction, who was among the mountains, at the head of the Miquelets, reſolved to attempt the ſuccour of the place; for this purpoſe he aſſembled, on the ſide of Lanſan, between nine and ten thouſand men. I contented myſelf with reinforcing Meſſrs. de Bracamonté, de Montemart, and de Gonzales, who were in the plain of Vich, giving them orders to attack the rebels as ſoon as they ſhould find an opportunity.

On the 12th of Auguſt, there being a breach in the baſtion of S. Clara, and the

the mine under the flanked angle of the baſtion of port Neuve being ready, I cauſed thoſe two baſtions to be attacked. Our people entered them at fir ſtwithout reſiſtance, and worked at their lodgment; but in half an hour's time the enemy returned, and drove us away. However, we had no more than about a hundred and fifty men killed and wounded. 1714.

On the 13th, at eight o'clock in the evening, I cauſed the baſtion of St. Clara to be re-attacked; our people entered it, and made their lodgment, though with much loſs and difficulty, on account of the ſuperiority of the inner rampart, which cloſed the gorge of the baſtion. The next day at noon, after the trenches had been relieved, the beſieged ſallied out afreſh, and drove our troops from the baſtion again; we had near a thouſand men killed or wounded in this affair.

The vigorous reſiſtance of the enemy determined me to hazard no more attacks of this kind; but at the ſame time it was very difficult to find out how one could make one's ſelf maſter of the town by any other method. Our

1714. engineers, whoſe knowledge did not extend beyond the ordinary rules of the art, ſeeing that the environs were all laid under water, propoſed to me, as the only reſource, to give the general aſſault at a breach of thirty toiſes, which had been made in the curtain between Portneuve and S. Clara. It appeared plainly, that thoſe who were capable of making ſuch a propoſal, muſt have loſt their ſenſes; for the flanks were ſtill entire, the breach undermined; and beſides, there was behind it a very ſtrong intrenchment, and there were large openings made in the rampart on each ſide of the breach. At length, after having examined on all ſides, and maturely conſidered, I determined to lay the front of the attack ſo much open, that one might enter the place as it were in line of battle; ſo that without expoſing myſelf to freſh checks, I went ſecurely to work. I therefore advanced ſome batteries, and armed myſelf with patience againſt all the diſcourſes of the officers of the army, who grew very much tired with the length of the ſiege.

DURING

DURING this time, I had ordered M. de Bracamonté to revictual the caſtle of Berga, which, for want of proviſions, was upon the point of falling into the hands of the rebels. He marched, for this purpoſe, with ſix hundred foot and five hundred horſe, and introduced his convoy. Delpoal had reſolved to fall upon him at his return, and had poſted himſelf at a defile with three thouſand men. Bracamonté attacked and beat him, killing three hundred of his men upon the ſpot. Two other corps of rebels likewiſe attempted to prevent his return, but he defeated them alſo, and killed ſeveral of them. Delpoal, after this, having aſſembled twelve thouſand men, came down the great mountains as far as Olſa, ſix leagues from our camp. I thought it beſt not to ſuffer his numbers to increaſe, nor to let him come nearer to us. With this view, I detached Major-General the Marquis d'Arpajon, with four French battalions and two hundred horſe, to join Captain-General the Marquis de Thouy, near Martorell: De Thouy might have with him about twelve hun- 1714.

1714. dred men: Montemart and Gonſales were alſo to march from their ſide, and to attack the body of the rebels at the ſame time. The rebels, emboldened by their number, came further down into the plain, advanced to Teraſſa and Sebadell, and from thence to Samanat; whither our detachments marched. Count Montemart arrived there firſt, with nine hundred infantry and five hundred horſe, attacked Delpoal, beat him, and purſued him as far as the great mountains, into which all the Miquelets and Somettani threw themſelves, and from thence returned home. Thouy and Gonſales likewiſe met on their ſide with ſome large bodies of the rebels, whom they defeated. We had not more than twenty men killed or wounded. The enemy had near one thouſand killed and taken priſoners.

M. DE MORAGAS, a Major-General of the Archduke's, advanced at the ſame time towards the plain of Vich, with three thouſand Miquelets; but Bracamonté obliged him to retire with precipitation. The Marquis Delpoal endeavoured

deavoured again to get together ſome troops; but the Somettani did not chuſe to venture: ſo that he could not collect more than about three thouſand Miquelets. Count Montemart advanced to him with his uſual vivacity, came up with him about Montſerrat, attacked him on the higheſt part of the ſteep mountains, routed him totally, killed one hundred and fifty men upon the ſpot, and took ſixty priſoners, who were immediately hanged. Delpoal appeared again a few days after, and entered, by ſurprize, the town of Manreſa; a ſmall Spaniſh battalion, which was there, retired into a corner of the town, where it defended itſelf with wonderful bravery; it would, however, have been taken, if Count Montemart had not come up. The rebels, who dreaded the ſight of him, retired with precipitation, leaving behind them their wounded men and proviſions. 1714.

As our breaches were very much advanced, and as I reckoned they would ſoon be in readineſs for the general aſſault, I thought it neceſſary to comply with

1714. with the deſire of all the General Officers, who preſſed me to ſummon the place. This ſtep was naturally repugnant to me; but as I would not have to reproach myſelf with the effuſion of blood, I ordered the Lieutenant-General of the trenches, on the 3d of September, to acquaint the people of the town, that they ſhould ſend me ſome deputies. Two hours after he had delivered my meſſage, an officer appeared on the breach, to enquire if the deputies were to be military men, or inhabitants of the city: we anſwered him, that it was the ſame thing to us, provided they were perſons in whom they repoſed a confidence: upon which the officer ſaid, that M. de Villaroel, who was General of the Barcelonians, had it not in his power to give an anſwer to ſuch a queſtion, and that they were going to aſſemble the councils to deliberate upon it.

On the 6th of September, an officer of the enemy aſked to ſpeak to the General of the trenches. Lieutenant-General d'Asfeld advanced to the head of

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the ſaps; and then the officer read aloud 1714.
a paper he held in his hand, the contents of which were, that the three ſovereign bodies in Barcelona being aſſembled in council, had reſolved to do nothing, and to liſten to no propoſal for the ſurrender of the place. The officer then ſaid to M. d'Asfeld, *Vueſtra Excellentia quiere algo mas?* "Does your Excellency deſire any thing more?" M. d'Asfeld did not deign to give an anſwer, and immediately ordered our artillery to begin firing again. The obſtinacy of theſe people was the more ſurprizing, as there were ſeven breaches in the body of the place; no poſſibility of receiving any ſuccours, and no proviſions in the town. They wanted to ſend the women out; but I would not ſuffer them to come near us, and even gave orders that they ſhould be fired upon.

The King of Spain, who had juſt concluded his marriage with the Princeſs of Parma, ordered me to ſend away immediately eight large ſhips to go to Genoa to fetch the new Queen. I did not think proper to do this, eſpecially

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1714. as I knew that there were at Majorca forty veſſels laden with all kinds of proviſions, ready to ſet ſail to endeavour to get into Barcelona. I therefore delayed the departure of this ſquadron, till after the taking of the place.

At length, all the breaches being very practicable; and all the diſpoſitions being made for a general aſſault, the troops deſtined for the ſeveral attacks marched from the camp on the 10th day of September, after the night was ſet in, and placed themſelves in columns at the openings that had been marked out for them in the trenches; thoſe troops that were to make the corps de reſerve, occupied the ground that was marked out for them in the rear.

M. de Dillon, Lieutenant-General of the trenches, commanded the right of the attack; and M. de Cilly, who was to relieve him the next day, was to take care of the left.

On the 11th, at day-break, the ſignal was given by a diſcharge of ten pieces of cannot, and twenty mortars; all the troops marched out in an inſtant, and went

went up to the aſſault: every thing was carried with little reſiſtance, except at the baſtion of the Eaſt, where the rebels kept their ground, till M. de Cilly cauſed them to be attacked by the neck of it. All the troops that were in the three baſtions, were put to the ſword: the intrenchments, which paſſed from the baſtion of Porteneuve, to the curtain that was between the ſouthern and eaſtern baſtion, were carried with the ſame rapidity; after which the troops extended themſelves into the churches, houſes, and neighbouring ſquares, that they might be able to advance with ſome kind of order into the town. 1714.

THE chiefs of the rebels, upon the report of the aſſault, having aſſembled all the garriſon, came to attack our left; but found it ſo well poſted, that they contented themſelves with leaving ſome troops there to maintain themſelves near the palace, and went with their main body to the ſide of the baſtion of S. Peter. Our people had ſeized upon it, but had neglected to occupy the convent of nuns of S. Peter, which commanded all the

1714. rampart on that ſide; ſo that the enemy having taken poſſeſſion of it, made ſo briſk a firing upon our troops who were on the rampart, and at the neck of the baſtion, that they were forced to abandon it. The rebels advanced there, and turned the cannon; we marched up to them again, and drove them away ſeveral times; but the convent prevented our people from maintaining themſelves in this poſt, ſo that they were obliged as often to quit it. Though I had forbidden any thing to be attempted on that ſide, yet for a long time it was impoſſible for me to reſtrain the indiſcreet ardour of ſome general officers. At length I went there in perſon, and confined myſelf to the keeping of the baſtion of Porteneuve by my right, till I could make a freſh attack upon the reſt of the city.

The firing, during all this time, was continual and terrible, till three o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy demanded a parley. They ſent me three deputies with offers of capitulation. I anſwered that it was now too late; that we were al-

ready maſters of the city, and had it in 1704.
our power to put every thing to the ſword; and I ſhould not therefore liſten to any propoſals on their part, except of ſubmitting at diſcretion to his Catholic Majeſty, and of imploring his mercy. They at firſt attempted to talk in a high tone; but finding that this did not ſucceed, they wanted to engage me to treat with them, by propoſing to me the reſtitution of the iſland of Majorca, upon condition that both places ſhould preſerve their privileges. I liſtened no more to this propoſal than to the reſt; and having at length ſent them back to the town to ſignify my intentions, they returned next morning, and ſubmitted to every thing I thought proper to order. I then promiſed them that their lives ſhould be ſafe, and even that there ſhould be no plunder; which I did in order to preſerve, to the King of Spain, a rich and flouriſhing city, from which he might hereafter, by this means, derive conſiderable ſuccours.

I WOULD not ſuffer our troops to take poſſeſſion of the reſt of the city that day,

1714. leſt night coming on before I could have ſettled every thing, confuſion and plunder ſhould have enſued: I therefore thought proper to conceal from every one all I had been concluding with the deputies, and pretended to diſpoſe all things for the general attack next day. I ſent word to the rebels to keep a good guard on their barricades and intrenchments: in the evening however I took poſſeſſion of Monjuich. On the morning of the 13th, the rebels retired from all their poſts; and our troops having beat the general, märched through the ſtreets in ſuch order to the quarters that were aſſigned them, that not a ſingle ſoldier got out of the ranks. The inhabitants were in their houſes, their ſhops, and the ſtreets, looking at our troops paſſing by, as in time of peace; a circumſtance perhaps incredible, that ſuch profound tranquillity ſhould in an inſtant have ſucceeded to ſo much confuſion; and what is ſtill more wonderful, that a town taken by aſſault ſhould not be plundered: this can only be aſcribed to God;

for

for all the power of man could not have contained the ſoldiers. 1714.

THIS action would not have coſt two hundred men, had it not been for the improper manœuvres on the ſide of the Baſtion of S. Peter. We had near two thouſand men killed and wounded; the loſs of the rebels that day did not amount to more than ſix hundred men.

MESSIEURS Dillon and de Cilly did all that could be expected from officers of courage and ability; and I muſt do this juſtice to all the troops in general, that they behaved themſelves with great bravery.

DURING this ſiege we had ten thouſand men killed or wounded: the inhabitants about ſix thouſand.

As ſoon as Barcelona was taken, I ſent Count Montemart to Cardona, with ſome battalions, to take poſſeſſion of that place, by virtue of the order I cauſed the deputation to give for this purpoſe: the governor opened his gates, upon condition that thoſe who choſe to ſtay in the country ſhould have their pardon, and thoſe who wiſhed to retire with their effects, ſhould

1714. ſhould be permitted to do ſo. The Marquis Delpoal, and ſeveral others, had thrown themſelves into the town on purpoſe to take the benefit of the capitulation. The court of Madrid was not ſatisfied with the terms I granted to the people in Cardona; but I thought, conſidering the ſtrength of the place in a country difficult of acceſs, and the advanced ſeaſon of the year, that it was better for his Catholic Majeſty's ſervice, to reduce all Catalonia to obedience as ſoon as poſſible.

When I had diſarmed all the inhabitants of Barcelona, I aboliſhed by decree the deputation and all the antient form of government; and eſtabliſhed a new one under the title of Adminiſtration and Junto, ordering that the police in future ſhould be regulated according to the laws of Caſtile. The King of Spain would have wiſhed me to remain ſome time in Catalonia, in order to put all things in proper order again; but ſuch a commiſſion could not ſuit me on any account: beſide that my health was much impaired, having had ſeveral attacks of fever, both

before and during the ſiege of Barcelona; 1714.
I was moreover ſo much exhauſted by fatigue, that I had not the power of doing any thing. I therefore intreated the King of Spain to appoint a Commandant General of the principality, and the choice fell upon Prince Tzerclaes, who then commanded in Arragon.

I ISSUED a proclamation, requiring all the inhabitants of Catalonia, on pain of death, to give up their arms, except the gentlemen whom I allowed to keep a certain number. I gave at the ſame time ſuch ſtrict orders to the Commandants of the different quarters, that this matter was executed with as much exactneſs as poſſible, at leaſt no perſon ventured to keep any arms in the houſe; and if they did not give them up, they took great care to conceal them in caverns.

THINKING it neceſſary to make an example of the principal incendiaries among the people of Barcelona, in order to intimidate thoſe who ſhould venture to excite freſh troubles, I ſent twenty of them to be ſhut up for life in the caſtle of Alicant: I likewiſe embarked the

1714. Biſhop of Albaraſin, with two hundred prieſts and monks for Genoa, forbidding them on pain of death, ever to ſet their foot in the dominions of his Catholic Majeſty.

I ORDERED the inferior officers and Catalan ſoldiers of the garriſon, to retire to their reſpective homes, having firſt made them take the oath of allegiance. With regard to the Caſtilians, Arragoneſe and Valencians, who happened to be among them, I wrote to his Catholic Majeſty to intreat him either to ſend them home, or convey them to Ceuta, to ſerve againſt the Moors.

AFTER having ſettled the winter quarters, and ſent away twenty French battalions into their own country, I reſigned the command of the army and of the country to the Chevalier d'Asfeld, till the arrival of Tzerçlaes: I afterwards went to Madrid, paſſing by the Kingdom of Valencia, being deſirous of looking into the eſtates I had there.

I ARRIVED at Madrid on the 28th of October, and ſet out again on the 4th of November to return into France. The King of Spain ſent Orry to me upon the road

road at ſixteen leagues from Madrid, to confer with me upon the expedition to Majorca, which that Prince was determined to undertake. The King *, to whom he had written about it, referred the matter entirely to my deciſion, as much with regard to the project itſelf, as to the time of executing it, and the number of troops required. Orry preſſed me to go there myſelf; but not being able on account of my health, I named in my ſtead the Chevalier d'Aſfeld, whoſe abilities I was thoroughly acquainted with. Thus I ſettled every thing with Orry, and then continued my journey. D'Aſfeld conducted the affair admirably well; and as ſoon as he landed in the iſland of Majorca, Palma and all the country ſubmitted. 1714.

After my return from Spain, I reſumed the conduct of ****'s † affairs, which I had taken a part in ſince the year 1708, and from which the ſiege of Barcelona had withdrawn me for ſix months; but in order to underſtand them better, it is neceſſary to take matters up

* Of France. † The Pretender.

1714. further back, not having been willing hitherto to interrupt the ſeries of what related to military operations.

At the end of the year 1710, the Abbé Gautier *, who was employed by the court of France to treat in private of peace with England, came to me at Saint Germains from the Earl of Oxford, who had been lately made Lord High Treaſurer. He was ſent by the Marquis de Torcy, who ſignified to me that I might confide in him. Accordingly, he told me that he had orders to ſpeak to me about ****'s † affairs, and to concert with me the means of reſtoring him; but before he entered upon the point, he had orders to exact a promiſe, 1°. that no perſon at St. Germains, not even the Queen, ſhould be privy to the matter; 2°. that Queen Ann ſhould enjoy the crown in tranquillity during her life, provided that ſhe confirmed the poſſeſſion of it to her brother after her death; 3°. that ſufficient ſecurities ſhould be given for the preſervation of the Church of England, and of the liberties of the

* Mentioned before, p. 114. † The Pretender.

kingdom.

kingdom. To all this, it may eaſily be imagined, that I readily conſented, and I had the ſame confirmed to him by * * * * * †, to whom I introduced him for that purpoſe. Theſe preliminaries being ſettled, we conſulted upon the means of executing the buſineſs: but the Abbé could not, at this time, enter into any great detail, inaſmuch as the Lord Treaſurer had not yet fully explained his intentions to him; and it was neceſſary that the peace ſhould previouſly be concluded, without which, the preſent miniſtry could not venture to open a matter which required ſo much nicety to manage. Though it appeared to me, that one of theſe points was no hindrance to the other, yet, in order to ſhew that we would omit nothing, and to give proofs of our ſincerity, we wrote to all the Jacobites to join in with the court. This contributed greatly to make the Queen's party ſo ſuperior in the Houſe of Commons, that every thing was carried there according to her wiſhes. 1714.

† The Pretender.

1741. GAUTIER told me, before he returned to London, the Earl of Oxford had ordered him to aſſure me, that in the courſe of the ſummer the plan ſhould be ſent over; and that if I were not at court, it ſhould be forwarded to me at the army, for that no one was to be truſted but myſelf. In order that an anſwer might be ſent to the plan without delay, we agreed that ***** †, under pretence of making the tour of France, ſhould repair in the beginning of Auguſt to Dauphiny, where I was to command the army, and ſhould ſtay with me as long as poſſible. Accordingly that Prince came there; but I did not receive the papers in queſtion, and I heard no further mention of the matter till the winter; Gautier only wrote to me that he would ſoon come over with ſufficient inſtructions.

WHEN Gautier returned into France, I expected him to be more explicit; but he only told me that we muſt ſtill have patience, till the peace could be entirely concluded; that the leaſt hint of Queen

† The Pretender.

Ann's

Ann's intentions in favour of her Brother, would give the Whigs occaſion to exclaim loudly againſt the Court, and might not only deſtroy the neceſſary buſineſs of the peace, but perhaps even occaſion a ſubverſion in the Miniſtry and the ſtate: Moreover, that it was neceſſary to make ſure of the army, which could not be done till after the peace was ſigned, when they would proceed to a reduction of it, and care would then be taken to keep only ſuch officers as could be depended upon. 1714.

So far the reaſoning appeared very prudent; but when the peace was concluded and publiſhed, and the reduction made, the Lord Treaſurer did not ſpeak more clearly nor with greater preciſion, and deferred from day to day the regulation of the army, notwithſtanding the ſolicitations of the Duke of Ormond, with whom I correſponded, unknown to Oxford.

The Jacobites and other well-affected perſons, were alſo continually preſſing Oxford to take advantage of the moment; they repreſented to him, that

1714. there never was a Houſe of Commons more favourably diſpoſed; ſo that there was nothing more to do than to propoſe to them the repeal of the acts in favour of the Houſe of Hanover, which would infallibly be carried. His anſwer was, that it was neceſſary to proceed more gently in the buſineſs; that he was ſeriouſly at work in the matter, and that we might make ourſelves eaſy.

In this manner did Oxford amuſe us, and it was difficult to prevent it; for to break with him, would have been the deſtruction of every thing, becauſe he had the power in his hands, and entirely governed Queen Ann. We were, therefore, forced to pretend to truſt to him; but, at the ſame time, we neglected not to concert meaſures privately with the Duke of Ormond, and many other perſons, in order that we might bring about this matter by their means, if Oxford ſhould fail us.

Gautier returning into France in 1713, after the peace with England, I preſſed him very ſtrongly upon the ſlowneſs, irreſolution and coldneſs of the Lord Treaſurer.

Treaſurer. At laſt, determined to give him no opportunity of evading, after ſeveral propoſals I opened to him, I commiſſioned him to make one, which appeared to me eaſy and ſecure, and even the only that could be made, though at firſt view it appeared rather chimerical. I recommended that ***** † ſhould go privately, and by himſelf, to the Queen his Siſter, who ſhould then go to the Parliament; that ſhe ſhould there explain her Brother's inconteſtible right, and the reſolution ſhe had taken to reſtore what belonged to him by all laws divine and human; but ſhe ſhould aſſure them, at the ſame time, that ſhe had taken proper meaſures with him to prevent the Church of England from being expoſed to any kind of danger from ſuch a ſtep; that it was ſettled between them, ſhe ſhould peaceably enjoy the crown during her life, and that ſhe ſhould educate him as her ſon; that ſhe would paſs ſuch acts as were thought neceſſary for the ſecurity of their religion and their liberty: ſhe was then to introduce him 1714.

† The Pretender.

in

1714. in full Parliament, and tell them, "Gen-
"tlemen, here he is, ready to promiſe
"you himſelf, religiouſly to keep all
"I have engaged for him, and to ſwear
"to the obſervance of it; I therefore
"require of you, inſtantly to repeal
"all the acts paſſed againſt him, and
"acknowledge him immediately as
"my heir, and your future ſovereign,
"that he may owe you ſome good-
"will for having concurred with me,
"in what your conſcience, your duty,
"and your honour, ſhould already have
"prompted you to do." An unexpected ſtep of this ſort, would ſo much have aſtoniſhed the factious, and delighted the well-affected, that there would not certainly have been the leaſt oppoſition. There is no reaſon to doubt, but that every thing would immediately have been executed agreeable to the Queen's orders; for no perſon would have doubted but that the Queen had taken her meaſures to inſure obedience; ſo that, on one hand, the fear of puniſhment, and on the other, the hope of taking advantage of a new change, would have determined

determined the Parliament immediately to reſtore all things to their natural order, according to the fundamental laws of the kingdom. Gautier, being made thorough maſter of this propoſal, ſet out from my houſe, in Picardy, for England; but although he wrote regularly to me, I could never get any anſwer from him upon this head. 1714.

At length, finding the time ſlip away without obtaining any plan from Oxford, and being moreover informed that Queen Ann's health was daily on the decline, I ſuſpected more than ever that the Lord Treaſurer was deceiving us, eſpecially as I knew he had written to the Elector of Hanover, and had juſt ſent his Couſin Harley to that Court. I therefore opened myſelf upon this point to M. de Torcy, Miniſter of foreign affairs, and through whom all my correſpondence with Gautier and Oxford was carried on. He agreed with me, that the Lord Treaſurer's conduct was very extraordinary; and we reſolved to write to him, to repreſent that, as Queen Ann's death might happen very ſhortly, it was neceſſary

1714. neceſſary he ſhould inform us what meaſures he had taken in that caſe to ſecure the intereſt of ***** ‡, as well as the ſteps that Prince ought to take. His anſwer was, that if the Queen were to die, the affairs of ***** †, and their own, were ruined without reſource. This was all we ever could get out of him, which was a clear proof that he impoſed upon us; for if he had really had the intentions he declared to us, he would not have been ſo long without thinking of the means of carrying them into execution; nor would he have neglected, for his own ſake, and that of the Tory party, to ſecure himſelf againſt the rage of the Whigs, who, he knew, would never forgive him, if once they got the power in their hands. This lethargy could not proceed from his want of underſtanding or courage, for no man had more of them than he: it was therefore morally certain, that his only motive in all the advances he had hitherto made to us, had been his own intereſt in endeavouring to join the Jacobites

‡ The Pretender. † The Pretender.

with

with the Tories, and by that means ſe- 1714.
curing to himſelf a majority in Parliament, that the peace might be approved of. As ſoon as he had compaſſed this end, he thought of nothing but to be upon good terms with the Houſe of Hanover; and as to *****‡, he amuſed him from time to time with ſome new propoſal of changing his religion, or at leaſt pretending to do ſo. The Court of France, as well as we, were then perſuaded that Oxford was impoſing upon us; but as they had concluded their principal buſineſs by his means, they were eaſily comforted.

As for me, I ſtrongly ſolicited the Duke of Ormond and many other perſons; I adviſed them to awake from their lethargy, and take their precautions againſt the misfortunes that would befall them, if the Queen ſhould die: I repreſented to them that their private intereſt was the ſame as that of *****†; that there was no longer any time for them to heſitate; and that they muſt chuſe the alternative, either

‡ The Pretender. † The Pretender.

of

1714. of being ruined, they and their party, or of reſtoring that Prince. Convinced by what we were continually repreſenting to them, they exerted themſelves, and by means of Lady Maſham, prevailed upon the Queen to remove the Lord High Treaſurer, as it was not poſſible to conduct the affair properly while he remained in office. She therefore diſmiſſed Oxford in the beginning of Auguſt 1714. The other Miniſters did not doubt of being able to carry on their projects without oppoſition; but unfortunately, before the new Miniſtry could have time to concert their meaſures together, every hope of ſucceſs was precluded by the death of the Queen, which happened on the 12th of Auguſt, 1714, four days after the Earl of Oxford's diſmiſſion. The Elector of Hanover was inſtantly proclaimed King, agreeable to the act paſſed ſince the revolution, and by his orders every thing was changed.

I WAS then in Catalonia, at too great a diſtance to be able to act, or even to give advice; and had I been at Paris, I ſhould have been much embarraſſed, conſidering

conſidering the ſituation of affairs at that time. It was not our fault, that we had not concerted any arrangements, in caſe of the event which had juſt happened; and France, however well inclined ſhe might be, was not in a condition to riſk a new war to ſupport the intereſts of the young **** †. No meaſures had been taken, nor indeed could they have been, on our ſide of the water; it was the buſineſs of the well-affected party in England to preſcribe to us what we ought to do, and they having not yet the entire aſcendant, had not had opportunity to ſettle their plans. 1714.

As ſoon as ***** ‡ learned the death of his ſiſter, he ſet off poſt from Bar in Lorrain, where he reſided ſince the Peace of Utrecht, and went incognito to Paris, to conſult the Queen his Mother and his other friends, fully reſolved to go over afterwards into the iſland of Great Britain, to lay claim to his right. The Court of France, informed of this ſtep, ſent M. de Torcy

† The Pretender. ‡ The Pretender.

1714. to perſuade him to return from whence he came; and if fair reaſons did not prevail, he had orders to declare, that they ſhould be indiſpenſibly obliged to compel him. * * * * * † therefore, receiving no comfortable intelligence from his friends in England, where univerſal conſternation prevailed, and not knowing where he could land in ſafety, determined to go back to Bar.

KING George ſet out from Hanover in the month of September or October, and on his arrival in London, was received with every poſſible demonſtration of joy. It would have been an eaſy matter for him, in the beginning, to conciliate the minds of the people, at leaſt to prevent their animoſity from being prejudicial to him. For this purpoſe, he had nothing to do but to avoid declaring for any party, to look upon all the Engliſh as being equally his ſubjects, and only to diſtinguiſh thoſe who were of ſuperior birth, or were moſt attached to his perſon; but, prepoſſeſſed in favour of the Whigs, he

† The Pretender.

began firſt by removing the Tories from all offices, and diſſolved the Parliament, which had juſt acknowledged him ſo unanimouſly. From hence the Tories took occaſion to exclaim upon the danger that menaced the Church of England; the clergy were continually ſpeaking of it in the pulpit, and the people, excited by theſe diſcourſes, and by the intrigues of the Jacobites, began to aſſemble on all ſides, raiſing a variety of tumults, and refuſing to obey the orders of Government. Defamatory libels were alſo publicly diſperſed againſt King George, his ſon, and all his family. At my return from Spain, I was of opinion, that the occaſion ſeemed favourable to the intereſts of ***** †, and for this purpoſe we ſent emiſſaries to the Duke of Ormond, and other Tory noblemen. Money was diſtributed among all the diſbanded officers, and we neglected nothing on our parts, that might caſt an odium upon King George, or conciliate the affections of the nation to us. Ormond, Marr, &c. aſſured us, that the 1714.

† The Pretender.

1714. people had never been ſo well diſpoſed; that there were nine out of ten againſt George, and conſequently for **** †; ſo that if an enterprize were but fixed upon, there was reaſon to be aſſured of its ſucceſs. Upon this, I propoſed that a day ſhould be agreed upon for making a general inſurrection throughout the whole kingdom, and that a place ſhould be pointed out to which ***** ‡ ſhould repair. We were ſure of the Scotch, who had already provided themſelves with arms, and waited only for the ſignal to riſe. My deſign was to take advantage of the preſent conjuncture, when there were but few regular troops in the whole iſland, and I had no doubt but that George, when he ſhould ſee the flame kindled in the four corners of his kingdom, would find himſelf ſo dreadfully embarraſſed, that he would not know what to do. I was moreover perſuaded, that our deſign could not ſucceed but by a ſudden revolution; that is to ſay, that in three weeks time, George muſt

† The Pretender. ‡ The Pretender.

be

be driven away, or the affair would fail; 1714.
becauſe France, not being willing to give any ſuccours of troops, and the whole being to be concluded by the Engliſh alone, George would ſoon be in a condition to cruſh all * * * *'s † party, if he were allowed time enough to bring over troops from Holland or Germany; beſide, George being maſter of all the towns, would have a conſiderable advantage over the Royaliſts, if the affair were in the leaſt protracted. In vain did I preſs Ormond and the reſt; they always anſwered me, that notwithſtanding all their good-will, and the favourable diſpoſition of the people, they neither could nor would take up arms, till * * * * * ‡ had landed with a body of three or four thouſand men. In vain did I repreſent to them, by letters, and by perſons ſent on purpoſe, that notwithſtanding all the reaſons we had been able to alledge to the Court of France, they ſtill perſiſted in their reſolution of not giving any aſſiſtance publicly, and therefore no troops were to be expected.

† The Pretender. ‡ The Pretender.

1714. To theſe repreſentations I always received the ſame anſwers.

1715. In the beginning of the year 1715, Lord Bolingbroke, againſt whom the Houſe of Commons had juſt brought an impeachment for high treaſon, at the ſame time as againſt the Duke of Ormond and the Earl of Oxford, thought proper not to expoſe himſelf to the animoſity of the party, and made his eſcape into France. On his arrival at Paris, I ſaw him in private, and he confirmed to me the good diſpoſition of affairs in England; but judging it not right that he ſhould interfere publicly in the affairs of the young **** †, he retired to Lyons, from whence, in a few months, our friends ſent him word, that he muſt return to Paris, which he did, and we then tranſacted every thing in concert. ***** ‡, whom he had ſeen at Bar, had given him the ſeals of Secretary of State.

In the mean while the diſturbances continued in every part of England; and the people not only exclaimed pub-

† The Pretender. ‡ The Pretender.

licly

licly againſt the government, but in many 1715.
places went ſo far as to ſpeak in favour of the Pretender, which was the reaſon that numbers of perſons, both at St. Germains and in England, were continually preſſing us to undertake ſome enterprize, and blamed the indolence of * * * * * †: upon this I wrote a memorial, which I ſent by Lord Bolingbroke to Bar; it will be proper to inſert it here, as it will clearly ſhew the ſtate of affairs.

"MANY people blame the * * * * ‡ "of * * * * for not riſking his per- "ſon in the preſent ſituation of af- "fairs, and conclude, that if this op- "portunity be loſt, ſo favourable a one "will never offer again, eſpecially as "George will not fail of providing "himſelf with a good army; by which "means the Tories will be cruſhed, or "forced to ſubmit.

"I agree, that at firſt ſight this rea- "ſoning ſeems juſt; but as it does not "belong to ſenſible men to give their "opinions, or to decide, without hav- "ing firſt thoroughly examined matters,

† The Pretender. ‡ The Pretender.

1715. "I will explain them in a few words, "and then frankly give my opinion.

"THE **** † has no friend or "ally, from whom he can expect any "assistance; this is not for want of "having taken the necessary steps for "that purpose; but because, in general, "Princes do not interest themselves in "favour of each other, unless their own "private advantage be concerned. Dur- "ing these last twenty-six years, Eu- "rope has been engaged in a bloody "and burdensome war, which has drain- "ed the finances, ruined the trade, and "even diminished the population of "every country; so that all being tired "of war, think only of living in peace; "which nothing but absolute neces- "sity can induce any Prince to break. "***** ‡, therefore, has only the "assistance of his own subjects to de- "pend upon for the great work of his "restoration. Let us see what he has "to expect from them.

"I will begin with Scotland, which, "ever since the Revolution, has always

† The Pretender. ‡ The Pretender.

"shewn

" ſhewn itſelf attached to the * * * * Fa- 1715.
" mily, and of whoſe principal nobility,
" many have actually taken meaſures
" for an inſurrection, as ſoon as they ſhall
" receive orders. They engage to bring
" into the field eight thouſand High-
" landers, and ten thouſand foot ſoldiers
" from the other counties; but for theſe
" laſt they are in want of arms: they
" are alſo in want of money for the ſub-
" ſiſtence of theſe troops, without which
" they could not keep them in order:
" the country would ſoon be plundered,
" and the army would of courſe diſperſe.
" They cannot raiſe at moſt above a
" thouſand horſe or dragoons, and thoſe
" very indifferent. They are in ſome
" hopes of being able to ſeize upon the
" caſtles of Edinburgh, Sterling, and
" Dunbarton, but the ſucceſs of this
" kind of projects is always very un-
" certain.

" THE majority of the Engliſh nation
" is ſo well affected, that we may ven-
" ture to ſay, five out of ſix are for
" * * * * * †. It is true this is not ſo

† The Pretender.

" much

1715. " much on account of his inconteſtable
" right, as from hatred to the houſe of
" Hanover, and to prevent the total ruin
" of the church, and the liberties of the
" kingdom; but whatever may be the
" motives, it is certain that numbers
" of noblemen, clergy and gentlemen,
" have given aſſurances of their good
" intentions. Many perſons of the
" greateſt conſideration, intereſt and abi-
" lities, have aſſembled, to concert the
" means of reſtoring the ***** †;
" but hitherto they have concluded,
" that without the aſſiſtance of four
" thouſand men at leaſt, of a quantity of
" arms, and of a conſiderable ſum of
" money, it would be raſh and even im-
" poſſible to commence an inſurrection
" in his favour. They alledge, that not
" being able to collect any thing but a
" mob without arms, and without diſ-
" cipline, the regular troops, though
" few in number, will ſtill be ſufficient
" to diſperſe them, as ſoon as they ſhall
" have thrown off the maſk. Add to
" this, that there are no arms in any part

† The Pretender.

" of

" of England, except in the public maga- 1715.
" zines, of which George is in poſſeſ-
" ſion.

" THE Duke of Ormond, Lord Bo-
" lingbroke, and ſeveral others, have
" exerted themſelves with the court of
" France, to engage them to furniſh the
" ſuccours required: no argument has
" been omitted to perſuade them, but
" they have not been able to ſucceed;
" ſo that the ***** † can only reckon
" upon what he has been able to borrow
" on his own credit: the whole of which
" conſiſts in ten thouſand ſtands of arms,
" and one hundred thouſand crowns.
" I aſk therefore, whether any man of
" ſenſe can adviſe the **** ‡ to riſk
" his perſon, as well as the lives and for-
" tunes of his friends, with ſuch trifling
" preparations, againſt a Prince who is
" in poſſeſſion, who has on his ſide the
" preſent laws, though unjuſt, who has
" actually an army compoſed of Whigs,
" and who has powerful neighbours for his
" allies, from whom he may obtain what
" number of troops he pleaſes, beſides

† The Pretender. ‡ The Pretender.

" thoſe

1715. " thoſe he can bring over from his own
" dominions.

" THE **** † has not arms enough
" to ſupply Scotland, and the ſeveral
" parts of England that require them.
" He has no places of ſufficient ſtrength
" to aſſemble his friends in ſafety; and
" if he had time to form an army, he has
" not wherewithal either to furniſh them
" with arms, or to pay them.

" I CONCLUDE that the **** ‡
" ought to run ſome riſks, but not to
" precipitate himſelf into certain ruin.
" If he had an army of Highlanders,
" Scotch and Engliſh mob, he muſt ne-
" ceſſarily come to an engagement at laſt
" with an army of regulars, and I think
" he would then run a ſufficient riſk:
" but I do not ſee that he can even ex-
" pect this chance; for at preſent there
" is no agreement upon this in England,
" nor is there any inclination to act with-
" out foreign ſuccours. Is it reaſonable,
" notwithſtanding this, that the ****
" § ſhould ſet forward, or can we give

† The Pretender. ‡ The Pretender.
§ The Pretender.

" the

" the name of greatneſs of ſoul, or he- 1715.
" roiſm, to a ſtep that can only produce
" a fruitleſs tumult? The ſame perſons
" who now accuſe him of timidity,
" would call him raſh and unadviſed,
" were he to miſcarry. In a word, I
" can never be of opinion that he ſhould
" embark, till the moſt conſiderable
" perſons in England have promiſed him
" to be at a fixed time, and at a fixed
" place, with a number of their friends
" to receive him; for I ſhall always
" conſider it as a folly, to think that he
" will be able to ſucceed in his under-
" taking with the Scotch alone."

In the month of July, Father Calaghan, a Dominican, in other reſpects a man of good ſenſe, went to * * * * * † from the Duke of Ormond, to deſire him to ſet out immediately for England. That Prince, without conſulting Lord Bolingbroke, or the court of France, or me, reſolved immediately to depart, and fixed the 30th of the ſame month for his arrival at Havre de Grace, where he immediately ſent to prepare a veſſel,

† The Pretender.

having

1715. having ſent word at the ſame time to Bolingbroke, to be at the rendezvous on the day appointed. Bolingbroke went immediately to give advice of this to M. de Torcy, who inſtantly, by order of the King, wrote to me expreſs to repair with all expedition to Marly. When I came there, his Majeſty told me that * * * * * † had haſtily taken a reſolution which appeared to him hazardous, and to which he would not give his conſent, without being previouſly acquainted with my opinion. I then repreſented to him that I could not imagine the Duke of Ormond had ſent ſuch a meſſage, for he did not name the place where * * * * * ‡ was to land, which was a very eſſential point; ſo that I thought it neceſſary to defer his departure, till we had received other information from the Duke of Ormond upon this point. M. de Torcy and Bolingbroke received orders to write in conſequence to * * * * * §.

ABOUT a week after, a man of family came from England, ſent by Ormond,

† The Pretender. ‡ The Pretender.
§ The Pretender.

Marr,

Marr, and ſeveral others, with a memo- 1715.
rial in anſwer to thoſe we had ſent them before: it contained nearly the ſame things they had already written to us; that without a ſupply of men, arms and money, they did not think it poſſible to induce the nation to take up arms; that, however, if * * * * * † ordered them poſitively, they would do it, but that it could not be before the middle of September, the time when it was reckoned the Parliament would be prorogued, and the members gone into their reſpective countries.

A LITTLE time after this, towards the beginning of Auguſt, we were much ſurprized to hear that the Duke of Ormond had landed in France. That nobleman, having been accuſed of high treaſon, had retired to Richmond, where he lived in great magnificence, and kept open table. Numbers of people reſorted there in crowds, for he was the idol of the Tory party, and ſeemed to have ſet up the ſtandard againſt King George. He had aſſured us in his letters, that he had re-

† The Pretender.

ſolved

1715. ſolved to ſtay as long as he could with ſafety; that he ſhould afterwards retire towards the North or the Weſt of England, and would put himſelf at the head of his friends, and a number of reduced officers, whom he had diſtributed for this purpoſe in different counties: he had even already ſettled relays of horſes, in order to proceed with more expedition, when the time was come. He had moreover ſet on foot ſome correſpondences in Plymouth, Briſtol and Exeter, which he meant to ſeize, and make them his places of arms. It is certain, he was ſo well beloved at that time, that if he had openly declared againſt King George, for the Church and the liberties of the nation, people would have flocked to him from all parts, and he would have been at the head of ſo conſiderable a party, that George would have been much embarraſſed, more eſpecially as the Scotch would have riſen at the ſame time, and perhaps part of the regulars would alſo have joined Ormond: but the execution of ſuch a project, required a man of ſuperior genius; ſuch great deſigns can

only be conducted by a hero, and that is what Ormond was not; for though perſonally very brave, and for ſome time paſt well affected, he had few of the talents neceſſary for ſuch an enterprize, and very little knowledge of the art of war. The great expence he lived at, his liberality, his natural affability and his rank, had ſecured him the affections and eſteem of the people. The Tories, who in the preſent conjuncture, ſaw that it was neceſſary for them to have an apparent head, had all united in following, and praiſing him; but all the great expectations that had been founded upon him were in an inſtant diſſipated by his precipitate retreat. Having been informed that King George had ſent ſome guards to ſurround his houſe, and ſeize upon his perſon, he made his eſcape towards the coaſt, and croſſed the ſea in a ſloop, without leaving any kind of inſtructions for thoſe who were waiting for him elſewhere. 1715.

BOLINGBROKE and I concerted all our affairs with him, and made freſh and ſtrong ſolicitations to the court of France, to

1715. obtain a ſupply of troops: but beſides that his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, notwithſtanding his good will, adhered ſtrictly to his firſt principle, the retreat of Ormond confirmed him the more in it; for it was not reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that a man ſo much beloved, and on whoſe credit our beſt hopes were founded, would have retired, and abandoned the cauſe, if the nation had really been in ſuch diſpoſitions as we had often repreſented to him. We therefore wrote back to England, to preſs them again not to inſiſt upon a body of troops, but to reſolve to take up arms, and to ſignify to us the time and the place to which they wiſhed that the * * * * * † and Ormond ſhould repair: their anſwer was always ambiguous.

The repugnance I had experienced, not without reaſon, in the Tories, joined to the certainty I was in, that France would not alter its reſolution, had determined me to apply ſome months before to the King of Sweden, whoſe intereſts ſeemed entirely oppoſite to thoſe of

† The Pretender.

King George. That extraordinary Prince, 1715.
after having attracted the reſpect and attention of all Europe, by the moſt brilliant ſetting out, was fallen, by the loſs of the battle of Pultawa, into a ſeries of misfortunes, of which his enemies and his neighbours took ſuch advantage, that he was then almoſt entirely ſtripped of all his dominions in Germany. Every one would have a ſhare in the ſpoils; and without any regard to treaties, or even to guarantees, he was attacked on all ſides. Far from being depreſſed by ſo much adverſity, he ſeemed on the contrary to become more haughty, and more obſtinate in rejecting every propoſal of peace, in which the ceſſion of any province or city was concerned; being reſolved rather to periſh, than ſubmit ignominiouſly to the law of the conqueror.

THE character of this Prince, whoſe views were always great, and the private intereſt he would have in dethroning King George, led me to hope that he would aſſiſt us in the execution of our projects, more eſpecially as there was no other

1715. apparent method of relieving him from the critical ſituation in which he was in. I repreſented to him the juſt pretenſions of * * * * * †, the glory there would be in reſtoring an oppreſſed Prince, and the advantageous conſequences which he muſt neceſſarily acquire from it, not to mention the eternal gratitude of the * * * * * ‡ for ſo great a benefit. The affair appeared to me ſo much the more eaſy, as there was not even a ſuſpicion that it had entered into our thoughts, and as there were at the time ſeven or eight thouſand Swedes encamped about Gottenburg: add to this, that there were ſeveral tranſports in that harbour, deſigned to convey thoſe troops to Stralſund, and that from Gottenburg, one might ſail, with the ſame wind, ſtraight into Scotland or England, the paſſage not being more than eight and forty hours.

When I propoſed this idea to the court of France, it was conſidered as chimerical; but after we had ſpoken of it to the Baron de Spaar, the Ambaſſador from

† The Pretender. ‡ The Pretender.

Sweden,

Sweden, and it was ſeen that he ſeemed 1715.
inclined to approve of it, I was permitted to negotiate. M. de Torcy and I held ſeveral conferences with Spaar upon this ſubject; and to facilitate the enterprize, it was agreed that his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty ſhould pay the arrears of ſubſidies due to the King of Sweden, and that * * * * * † ſhould give immediately fifty thouſand crowns for the coſts of embarkation. Spaar ſent off a courier with the diſpatches for his maſter, and ſent at the ſame time an officer into Holland, with the remittance of the fifty thouſand crowns I had given him, that if the anſwers from Sweden were favourable, that ſum might be forwarded without loſs of time to Gottenburg. Unfortunately the King of Sweden was then in Stralſund, beſieged both by ſea and land, ſo that it was a very long time before the courier could deliver his letters. The King's anſwer was couched in very polite terms; but he ſaid, that in the preſent ſituation of his affairs, he could not part with any of his troops, as he

† The Pretender.

1715. was ſo much in want of them for the defence of his own dominions; beſides, that King George had not yet declared againſt him. However, he aſſured * * * * * † of his friendſhip, of which he would hereafter give him proofs.

It is certain that the King of Sweden miſſed a glorious opportunity of advancing his own affairs, or rather, of relieving himſelf from oppreſſion; for * * * * * ‡ being once reſtored, he would have drawn ſupplies of money, men, and ſhips from him, ſufficient to enable him to reconquer all he had loſt. According to the rules of good ſenſe, the revolution in England could not then have failed, if the well affected had been ſupported by a body of regular forces. King George was univerſally hated, and had but very few troops on foot in Great-Britain; but the King of Sweden, who was then taken up with the thoughts of ſaving Stralſund, in which he flattered himſelf unſeaſonably, had no perſon near him, to ſhew him the utility of our project, and the fallacy of his own deſigns.

† The Pretender. ‡ The Pretender.

He

HE afterwards intended, in 1716, to undertake a deſcent in England; but the face of affairs was then totally changed; and if he had made it, there is reaſon to think, conſidering the large army King George had in England, and the ſuccours which the Dutch would not have failed to ſend him, that it would have miſcarried. 1715.

ABOUT the 20th of Auguſt, Lewis the XIVth King of France, fell ſick, and died on the 1ſt of September 1715. No man ever ſhewed greater ſteadineſs, and leſs fear of death; ever ſubmiſſive, and reſigned to the will of God. He gave all the orders he thought neceſſary, and then waited quietly for the hour of his diſſolution. He had been a long time engaged in theſe ſerious reflections; and he had often ſaid to the Queen of England, he was aware, on account of his age, that he ſoon muſt die, and therefore he was every day preparing for death, that he might not be ſurprized by it. A very different opinion was entertained of him in the world, for it was imagined that he could not bear to be ſpoken to about death. But I have been told what I have

1715. juſt mentioned by the Queen herſelf, a Princeſs of great veracity.

IT muſt be owned that no Prince was ever ſo little known as this Monarch. The Proteſtants made him paſs throughout Europe for a man of difficult acceſs, cruel and falſe. I have frequently had the honour of audiences from him, and have been very familiarly admitted to his preſence; and I can affirm that his pride was only in his appearance. He was born with an air of majeſty, which ſtruck every body ſo much, that one could not approach him without being ſeized with awe and reſpect; but as ſoon as any one was going to ſpeak to him, he ſoftened his countenance, and had the art of putting you in the inſtant quite at your eaſe with him: he was the moſt polite man in his Kingdom; and his anſwers were accompanied with ſo many obliging expreſſions, that if he granted any thing, the value of it was doubly enhanced; and if he refuſed, one could not complain. There never was a more humane King ſince the commencement of the Monarchy. There was no blood ſpilt among the great

great during the courſe of his reign, except 1715.
that of the Chevalier de Rohan; and he loſt his life only becauſe no one had the friendſhip or courage to ſolicit his pardon; for the King, in going to, and returning from maſs on the morning of the execution, turned himſelf round on every ſide, to ſee if there were not ſome of his relations or friends ready to throw themſelves at his feet.

WITH reſpect to his good faith, I know that every thing he has done in violation of treaties will be urged againſt it; but I dare affirm, that he never violated any treaty, till after he had been perſuaded that his enemies had firſt infringed it; and without approving of theſe infractions, what Prince, or what nation, can boaſt of having always preferred truth and juſtice to their intereſts? The diſpute will be reduced to the greater or leſs degree of injuſtice; for it may be confidently aſſerted, that religion, equity and kindred ſeem no longer to be the motives that actuate us; and that we think every thing allowable to ſatisfy our ambition, and procure us any advantage.

THE

1715. THE day after the King's death, the Duke of Orleans went to the Parliament, with all the Princes of the blood, and the Peers of France. Two thouſand men of the regiment of guards, had been placed about the avenues of the palace, to prevent any commotions: beſide, almoſt all the officers that were in Paris attended the Duke of Orleans, who had been perſuaded that he ſhould meet with oppoſition in being appointed to the Regency: his intention was to declare himſelf Regent, if the Parliament ſhould make any difficulty, for he pretended that his birth gave him an inconteſtable right to this title. As ſoon as he had taken his ſeat in the grand chamber, he began by deſiring the Peers to ſuſpend, for the preſent, the intentions they had againſt the Preſidents *à mortier* reſpecting the cap, promiſing that he would put an end to that conteſt in a fortnight; he alſo required in private of the Princes of the blood, not to attack, at that time, the legitimate Princes, to whom the King had not only granted the rank, but alſo the quality of Princes of the blood, and the power of ſucceeding

ſucceeding to the crown, in default of the real Princes of the blood. It was with reaſon the Duke of Orleans wiſhed, that nothing ſhould interrupt the affair of the Regency, upon which depended the quiet and tranquility of the State, as well as his own private intereſt. The Peers conſented to the requeſt of the Duke of Orleans, and contented themſelves with making the Archbiſhop of Rheims read aloud their proteſt againſt every thing that had been done, or might be done againſt their rights. 1715.

THE Duke of Orleans afterwards made a long harangue, in which he repreſented that the reigning King being a minor, the Regency belonged to him by right; and he therefore deſired that the King's people ſhould ſpeak, and that the opinions ſhould afterwards be taken. He alſo entered into a detail of the form he meant to give the government, and concluded with aſſuring, that to ſhew his intentions for the public good, and his eſteem for the Parliament, he would reſtore to them the liberty of making remonſtrances,

1715. remonſtrances, which the late King had long ſince taken from them.

His ſpeech being ended, it was reſolved, before they proceeded upon any declaration, that the will, which the late King had depoſited with the Parliament the year before, ſhould be opened. The firſt Preſident and the King's people went to fetch it; and being opened before the aſſembly, it was read. The ſubſtance of it was, that there ſhould be a Council of Regency, compoſed of the Duke of Orleans, the Princes of the blood who were fully arrived to the age of four-and-twenty, the Chancellor, four Secretaries of State, the Chief of the Council of Finances, the Comptroller-General of Finances, the Marſhals Villeroy, Villars, Uxelles, Tallard and Harcourt. Every thing was to be determined by a majority of votes. The command of the King's Houſhold troops was given to the Duke of Maine, without any ſubordination to the Regency; Marſhal Villeroy was appointed Governor to the King; Meſſ. de Saumery and Geoffreville Sub-Governors; but the Duke of Maine, and in caſe of his de-

ceaſe, the Count of Thouloufe, were to 1715.
have an inſpection and a ſuperior authority over every thing that concerned the perſon and education of the King. The codicil was afterwards read, by which they ſhould have begun; it contained little, except that the young King was to be preſent in Parliament at the opening of the will, and that, in the mean time, Marſhal Villeroy ſhould order every thing relating to the young Prince, and ſhould command the troops of the Houſhold.

THE firſt Preſident took great care to mention ſeveral times to M. de Dreux, Counſellor in Parliament, to read the will diſtinctly, and with an audible voice; ſaying, *this is our law.* It was not, however, judged to be ſo. As ſoon as the reading was over, the Duke of Orleans having only ſaid, that there were ſeveral things in the will, to which he could not, in honour, conſent, and which he would hereafter explain, deſired that they ſhould proceed to determine upon the Regency, which he claimed as his right. He was immediately declared Regent

1715. gent without oppoſition. The will was no longer attended to, and they proceeded to ſettle ſeveral other things agreeably to the wiſhes of the Regent. The Duke of Maine and the Count of Thouloufe, who, as well as the reſt of us, had given their vote for the Regency, endeavoured to diſpute the article of the command of the King's Houſhold troops; but no one joined them; ſo that the Duke of Maine, perceiving that he was deprived of every thing, which the late King had ſettled in his favour, requeſted, that at leaſt they would grant him ſome titular advantage for the ſake of his honour. Upon this, the King's people propoſed the title of Superintendant of the King's education, to which the Court conſented; but with the clauſe, that it ſhould not give him any authority over the officers of the King's Houſehold, nor over the troops; it having been clearly ſpecified, that no ſuperior authority was acknowledged in the kingdom, except that of the Duke of Orleans, Regent.

On

On the twelfth of the ſame month, 1715. the King went to the Parliament to hold his bed of juſtice, where every thing that had been ſettled on the 2d inſtant, was publiſhed and regiſtered.

The Duke of Orleans began his Regency, by eſtabliſhing Councils, in which the affairs were to be tranſacted, inſtead of being left at the ſole diſpoſal of the Miniſters, which is undoubtedly ſubject to great inconveniences; but, at the ſame time, it is to be feared that this multitude of Counſellors may retard expedition, eſpecially in the war department, where, in order that things ſhould go on well, it is neceſſary that one man ſhould be charged with the execution, after the points have been previouſly ſettled in the Council: however this may be, the Regent had promiſed to be governed by the majority of votes in the Council, reſerving only to himſelf the power of diſtributing favours, in the entire diſpoſal of offices, employments, and eccleſiaſtical preferments.

The Duke of Bourbon was declared Chief of the Council of the Regency, the

1715. the Count of Thoulouſe Chief of the Council of the Navy, having under him the Marſhal d'Eſtrées, as Preſident; Marſhal Villeroy was Chief of the Council of Finances, and the Duke de Noailles Preſident; Marſhal d'Uxelles, Preſident of the Council of Foreign Affairs; Marſhal Villars, Preſident of the Council of war; the Duke D'Antin, Preſident of the Council of the Internal Affairs of the kingdom; and the Cardinal de Noailles Preſident of the Council of Conſcience.

THE Regent propoſed to me to be of the Council of War; but as the firſt place was filled, I did not think it proper, on any account, to be ſecond under my comrade, eſpecially as the reſt of the Council was compoſed of Lieutenant-Generals. If I had been inclined to act as other people, who, even before the King's death, had made their bargain with the Duke of Orleans, I ſhould, perhaps, have been treated as advantageouſly; but, I thank God, I have not to reproach myſelf with ever having entered into any cabal. I have always held it as a principle to attach myſelf inviolably

lably to the Sovereign, and to juſtice; 1715.
it is for this reaſon I conſtantly avoided liſtening to any thing reſpecting future objects: however, as ſoon as there were no hopes of the King, I declared for the Duke of Orleans, as it was conſiſtent with right, and the intereſt of the State. I preſſed the Regent to appoint me of the Regency, but he excuſed himſelf upon the terms he was obliged to keep with King George, and told me, that till he could give me that appointment, and ſhew the eſteem he had for me, he would beſtow on me ſome conſiderable command in the kingdom. I own that his reaſons did not ſatisfy me, but I was obliged to have patience.

The Earl of Stair, Miniſter from England, had, before and after the death of the King, given aſſurances to the Duke of Orleans of the friendſhip of his Maſter, and told him, that if there were any oppoſition in France, to his juſt rights, he would aſſiſt him with all his forces: the Regent had liſtened with pleaſure to ſuch offers, and had alſo given King George aſſurances of the deſire he had

1715. to do any thing that was agreeable to him; all in the view of taking precautions againſt a cabal which he knew was formed againſt him. It is, indeed, certain, that moſt of thoſe who had acceſs to the late King, by conſtantly repreſenting to him the danger that was apprehended from the Duke of Orleans, if he ſhould have the power in his hands, had convinced his Majeſty, that it was proper ſome meaſures ſhould be taken to prevent it. Upon this he had made his will, dictated by the Chancellor Voiſin; and it is thought that the Duke de Mayne, and other perſons of the greateſt influence, had never ceaſed to torment the King, till he had depoſited this will in Parliament, with a declaration. I know, however, from the Queen of England, of what little uſe the King thought this would be; for that Princeſs having been to pay him a compliment upon the prudent action he had been doing, the King anſwered in the following terms, "They would abſolute-"ly make me do it; but as ſoon as I "am dead, it will be juſt the ſame as "if I had not done it."

"As

As ſoon as the Duke of Orleans was acknowledged Regent, Stair never failed paying his court aſſiduouſly; and knowing that the flame of rebellion was ready to be kindled in the iſland of Great Britain, he preſſed the Regent ſtrongly to prevent the Pretender from paſſing through France in his way there. But as the Duke of Orleans had learned, that King George and the Whigs were continually giving it out that they would not ſtick to the peace of Utrecht, he was deſirous of availing himſelf of this opportunity for diſcovering the truth; he therefore anſwered, that he was ready to enter into the ſtricteſt alliances, provided that England would, at the ſame time, give aſſurances of her adherence to the laſt treaty of peace; and for this purpoſe, that it was proper a defenſive alliance ſhould be made, to which the Dutch ſhould be invited to accede. Stair replied, that the beſt way to enter upon ſuch a negociation, was to begin by taking joint meaſures againſt the Pretender. The Regent perceiving by this, that 1715.

1715. Stair only wiſhed to amuſe him, made him ſome very vague anſwers, and reſolved not only not to oppoſe the deſigns of * * * * * †, but even to aſſiſt him underhand as much as he could, without letting it appear; for as he knew the bad ſtate of the kingdom, it was his intention to avoid every kind of war. Stair, however, having diſcovered that we had ſome ſhips laden with arms at Havre, and having made his complaint of it, the Regent could not avoid ſtopping thoſe arms; which was a great prejudice to the affairs of * * *, * * ‡, who could not get any elſewhere, to ſend where they were wanted, as much from his want of money, as from the impoſſibility of buying up arms in any country without the permiſſion of the Sovereign.

The Earl of Marr, who had been Secretary of State for Scotland, in the time of Queen Ann, and had been removed from that poſt by George, received, in the month of September, a

† The Pretender. ‡ The Pretender.

ſecret

ſecret order from ***** †, to go im- 1715.
mediately into Scotland and take up arms. Neither Bolingbroke nor I knew any thing of this, although we were his principal Miniſters, through whom all the correſpondences in England, and all the plans paſſed: this circumſtance gave us no favourable opinion of the enterprize, ſince there could have been nothing concerted without our knowledge. Marr, however, ſet out by ſea from London, and took with him Lieutenant-General Hamilton, who had long ſerved with diſtinction in Holland and Flanders. He landed in the North of Scotland, and in a few days after, having aſſembled his friends and vaſſals, he publicly proclaimed ***** ‡, ſummoning every good ſubject to join him, in order to re-eſtabliſh their lawful Sovereign upon the throne of his anceſtors, and deliver the nation from the tyranny of George Duke of Brunſwick, uſurper of the monarchy. A great number of Highlanders and principal noblemen having joined him, he marched forward and ſeiz-

† The Pretender. ‡ The Pretender.

1715. ed upon the town of Perth, by which means he was maſter of all that part of Scotland which is beyond the river Tay.

SOME officers had, at the ſame time, attempted to ſurprize the caſtle of Edinburgh, which would have made Marr maſter of all Scotland, and would have obliged his enemies to quit the poſt of Stirling; but this project failed. As ſoon as King George was informed of the revolt of Marr, he ſent the Duke of Argyll from London, who, without ſtopping at Edinburgh, advanced to Stirling with all the troops he could collect, which did not amount to more than fifteen hundred men. George, at the ſame time, cauſed ſome regiments to march from England into Scotland, and gave orders that ſeveral ſhould be brought over thither from Ireland; he alſo ſent to demand of the States General the ſix thouſand men they were bound to give by the treaties made by the late King, in favour of the proteſtant ſucceſſion.

MARR,

MARR, in the mean time, amuſed 1715.
himſelf with forming his army, and ſettling all his affairs, as if he were ſure of having all the time he wanted. Had he marched forward as ſoon as he had collected eight or ten thouſand men, he certainly would not have met with any oppoſition, and Argyll would have been obliged to quit Scotland, to retire to Berwick. He might then have been able to put his army in order, to aſſemble a Parliament, and to march to the frontiers, either to defend them againſt King George's troops, or to advance into England, and join the friends of ***** †, in caſe they ſhould form a party there, as there was reaſon to expect; but his little ſkill in military affairs made him loſe this opportunity, and he gave time to the troops that were marching from all quarters to join the Duke of Argyll. A man may have a great deal of underſtanding, a great deal of perſonal bravery, and be a very able Miniſter, without having the talents requiſite for an enterprize of this nature. It is certain

† The Pretender.

1715. that Marr had them not; and we muſt not therefore wonder that he did not ſucceed. After he had drawn the ſword, he did not know in what manner to proceed, and by that means miſſed the moſt favourable opportunity that had preſented itſelf ſince the Revolution in 1688.

Soon after Marr had ſeized upon Perth, M. Foreſter, a reſpectable gentleman in the county of Northumberland, the Lords Derwentwater, Widrington, and others, took up arms there, and proclaimed *****†; but their principal force conſiſting in cavalry, they aſked of Marr a reinforcement of infantry; upon which he detached Brigadier M'Intoſh, to join them with eighteen hundred Highlanders. M'Intoſh paſſed the Firth, near Edinburgh, in ſpite of ſome of the enemy's ſhips, which happened to be there; and inſtead of marching the neareſt way to join Foreſter, he drew near to Edinburgh. The Duke of Argyll haſtened thither from Stirling, and M'Intoſh retired into an old ruined fort, called

† The Pretender.

Leith,

Leith, at a mile diſtance from the town; 1715.
he would not have been able to maintain his ground there for want of proviſions, if the Duke of Argyll had not been obliged to return immediately to Stirling; to oppoſe Marr, who was marching thither. As ſoon as M'Intoſh was relieved from the ſituation he had fooliſhly got himſelf into, he made what haſte he could towards the frontiers of England; and was joined in his way by the Lords Kenmure, Nithſdale, &c. with five hundred horſe from the ſouth of Scotland; but he loſt a great many of his Highlanders, who went back into their own country. After they had all joined Foreſter, inſtead of marching directly into Scotland, to attack Argyll on one ſide, while Marr attacked him on the other, which was the only wiſe ſtep they could take, they advanced into the biſhoprick of Durham, having ſome hopes that the town of Newcaſtle would declare for them; but General Carpenter having got there before them, and having poſted himſelf with one battalion and ſome dragoons, they took the road towards

1715. towards Lancaſhire, where their army was increaſed by numbers of Catholics. They advanced as far as Preſton, thinking that the neighbouring counties would alſo take up arms; but General Wills, whom King George had ſent there, having got together ſome infantry, with ſeveral regiments of cavalry and dragoons, marched ſtraight to them, and arrived near Preſton, before they had the leaſt intelligence of it. They put themſelves in a poſture of defence, and even repulſed the troops vigorouſly in their firſt attacks, ſo that conſidering the ſuperiority of Foreſter, and the few troops Wills had with him, it is probable the latter would have been, if not defeated, at leaſt obliged to retire; but all of a ſudden Foreſter, and moſt of the chiefs of his party, loſing their preſence of mind, offered to capitulate. The enemy conducted the matter ſo well, that they ſubmitted at diſcretion to King George, being ſatisfied with the aſſurances Wills gave them, of employing his good offices in their favour. Foreſter had with him about two thouſand men,

and

and Wills not more than one thouſand 1715.
at moſt.

In the mean while Marr, after having amuſed himſelf a long time at Perth, began his march to attempt the paſſage of the river Tay, above Stirling. Argyll being appriſed of it, marched up to him, and they met at Auchterardire. *****'s † army might conſiſt of nine or ten thouſand men, and that of King George of three or four thouſand.

ARGYLL, at firſt, broke the left of Marr's army, but the latter totally routed the reſt of the enemy's forces, of whom he made a conſiderable ſlaughter; but he did not purſue them, and ſuffered Argyll, with his right wing, to retire in good order to Stirling. The next day, inſtead of availing himſelf of his advantage, he marched back to Perth: the reaſon he gave for this, was his want of proviſions, his troops having thrown them away before the battle, and moreover the Highlanders would not fight any more. He ought, however, to have tried to induce them to it; for it

† The Pretender's.

was

1715. was of great conſequence to him to puſh on, and to hazard every thing to beat Argyll, before he could be joined by the Dutch. This battle happened nearly at the ſame time as the unfortunate engagement of Preſton.

MARR having been informed that Lord Sutherland, notwithſtanding the engagements he had entered into upon his word of honour, that he would not ſtir any more againſt ***** †, had riſen again in the North, and had even ſeized upon Inverneſs, detached the Marquiſſes of Huntly and Seaforth, with their vaſſals, which amounted to five or ſix thouſand men, to reduce Sutherland to obedience; but theſe noblemen, inſtead of coming immediately to action, ſuffered themſelves to be amuſed by negociations, and Huntly, even upon an offer of pardon, accepted it. This put the finiſhing ſtroke to the ruin of *****'s ‡ affairs; Seaforth was not ſtrong enough by himſelf to attack Sutherland, ſo that he con-

† The Pretender. ‡ The Pretender's.

tented

tented himſelf with defending his own country, without committing hoſtilities. 1715.

* * * * * †, upon the news he received of Marr's inſurrection, ſet out in the month of October from Bar, and repaired, incognito, to St. Maloes, where he was detained ſome days by contrary winds; during which time, having received advice that the partizans of King George had ſeized upon Dunſtaffnage, a place in the Highlands deſigned for his deſcent, he took the road to Dunkirk, where he embarked, and landed at Peterhead, towards the end of December. Never was a voyage longer than this, for two whole months elapſed between his departure from Lorrain and his arrival in Scotland. This gave occaſion to much murmuring among the Scotch, and many unfavourable reports among other people; beſides, that the Earl of Stair, who was at length informed of it, complained to the Regent, and required that he ſhould not be ſuffered to paſs through France. The Regent anſwered, that as ſoon as they would inform him in what

† The Pretender.

part

1715. part he was, he would ſend there, and have him conducted back to the place from whence he came; but that he was not obliged to be either the ſpy or the executioner of King George. A few days after this, Stair aſſured the Regent that the Pretender was to arrive on ſuch a day at Chalons, in Champaigne. Upon which Contades, Major of the French Guards, was ſent that way, in order to try to find him, and conduct him back to Bar: but there was no poſſibility of meeting with him; for, beſides that he had been gone ſeveral days before, he had alſo taken a bye road. At his return, Contades made up a fine account to Stair of what he had done, with which the latter ſeemed to be ſatisfied, although in the main he judged very properly, that the Regent had no very great mind to prevent the paſſage of the Pretender, and that Contades had not been very deſirous of ſucceeding in his commiſſion.

STAIR had alſo ſent emiſſaries on all ſides, to endeavour to find out the rout of the Pretender; but he was too well diſguiſed, and had with him ſo few

attendants, that he could never receive intelligence time enough to make any uſe of it. 1715.

It has alſo been ſaid that Stair had employed people to aſſaſſinate * * * * * †. I owe this juſtice to truth, to declare, that after having thoroughly examined all the reaſons alledged in proof of this accuſation, I found them frivolous; and though Stair was a great Whig, and conſequently a ſworn enemy to the Jacobite party, yet I believe him too much a man of honour ever to have had ſuch a thought. The Duke of Marr, whoſe intereſt was very oppoſite to that of Stair, always ſpoke of him in that light, and when he ſpoke well of his enemy he ought to be believed.

The Duke of Ormond had ſet out from Paris, about the ſame time that * * * * * ‡ went from Bar: he embarked in Normandy, with twenty officers, and twenty-five horſe of Nugent's regiment, which then happened to be in theſe quarters. A ſtorm obliged him to put back; and when he afterwards came again off the

† The Pretender. ‡ The Pretender.

Engliſh

1715. Engliſh coaſt, he returned without venturing to land there, upon receiving intelligence that King George, informed by Colonel M'Leane of the plots concerted in the Weſt, had ſent a body of troops there, and had cauſed many perſons to be arreſted. This M'Leane was the confidential man whom the Duke of Ormond had employed to conduct all his meaſures; it was he, who, in concert with the moſt reſpectable noblemen of the country, had laid the plan of a general inſurrection, and who had alſo agreed with the officers of the garriſon at Plymouth, upon the manner in which they were to ſeize on that place. George began by changing the garriſon at Plymouth, ſent a regiment of infantry into Briſtol, and made all the proper diſpoſitions to prevent the execution of Ormond's deſigns. This was not difficult, as he was thoroughly informed of them by M'Leane: moreover Lord Landſdown, and Sir William Wyndham, the principal ſupporters of all this buſineſs, having been diſcovered and arreſted, there remained no chief capable of remedying

this unfortunate event; and all the gentlemen of the country being greatly alarmed, ſignified to the Duke of Ormond that they could not join him as they had engaged to do. 1715.

I CANNOT avoid making another obſervation, upon the abſurdity of Ormond's project. When he left Richmond, why did he not go immediately into the Weſt? His friends were then at liberty; they were in the beſt diſpoſition in the world: there were two or three hundred reduced officers waiting for him, and George had not any troops to oppoſe to him. Did he imagine that by paſſing through France, he would acquire an additional credit? And ſhould he not have conſidered, that in caſes of inſurrection, men's minds muſt not be ſuffered to cool; that every moment is precious, and that the one we have loſt can never be found again?

* * * †, at the ſame time that he gave orders to the Duke of Ormond, to ſet out from Paris for England, ſent me a commiſſion, with a formal order to go into Scotland, and take the command of

† The Pretender.

1715. the army. As I had cauſed myſelf to be naturaliſed a Frenchman, with the conſent of this Prince, and was conſequently become a ſubject of his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty; as I was moreover an officer of the Crown of France, engaged by ſeveral oaths, not to go out of the kingdom, without leave in writing, which far from being given me upon this occaſion, the late King, and the Regent, had expreſsly forbidden; I did not think myſelf at liberty either in honour or conſcience to obey the order I had received.

Lord Bolingbroke was to ſtay at Paris to attend to the intereſts of * * * †, and endeavour to furniſh him with every thing he might want. This matter was ſo much the more difficult, as the Regent, notwithſtanding his good intentions, would not appear in it: he had entruſted it to the care of Le Blanc, and Renault. Theſe gentlemen gave Bolingbroke hopes that they would ſupply him with arms; but it was in vain that he ſolicited them underhand, (for he could not venture to ſee them), he never got

† The Pretender.

any thing but fair promiſes from them; 1715.
and to ſay the truth, I believe the Regent beginning to have a bad opinion of this enterpriſe, was not much inclined to perform what he had given reaſon to expect: beſide which, there were cabals among our people, which contributed not a little to the ill ſucceſs of affairs. Bolingbroke was hated by the Iriſh, who were continually exclaiming againſt him. The Duke of Ormond, a weak man, ſuffered himſelf to be influenced by the jealouſies they endeavoured to inſpire him with, as if Bolingbroke did not pay him ſufficient reſpect. The Queen and thoſe in whom ſhe placed the greateſt confidence at St. Germains, were much diſcontented that he did not conſult them continually, and that he did not acquaint them regularly with all he was doing. Even ſome women at Paris, who would be Miniſters, and who had found means to inſinuate themſelves privately into the confidence of the Duke of Orleans, contributed by their importunities to prejudice that Prince againſt Bolingbroke: accordingly I found, in ſeveral converſa-

1715. tions I had with him, that he was diſſatiſfied with Bolingbroke; and what will appear more extraordinary, the only reaſon he gave for it, was, that he applied to thoſe women to torment him from morning till night. I aſſured him that he did it only becauſe he did not know how to get at his Royal Highneſs by any other means. Upon this he told me that he muſt apply to Marſhal d'Uxelles, and to no other perſon, and that then he would liſten to him readily. Bolingbroke immediately broke off every connection with theſe women; who being already ill diſpoſed towards him, and irritated by this change in his conduct, became outrageous againſt him. The Regent told me of it himſelf, and ordered me at the ſame time to aſſure Bolingbroke that he approved of his conduct. In the mean while nothing was done for * * * † on the part of France, and every thing ended in hopes, which never produced any effect.

The King of Spain acted with more frankneſs; for upon our repreſenting to

† The Pretender.

him,

him, the want *** † was in of a ſum of money, he ſent us a hundred thouſand crowns in ingots of gold, which we ſent off immediately by my ſon, the Chevalier Erſkine, and M. de Bulkley; but every thing ſeemed to conſpire to ruin our project: the veſſel they were in was ſhipwrecked on the coaſt of Scotland, and they had but juſt time to eſcape by night in the boat, without being able to carry off the ingots, which they had concealed in the bottom of the veſſel. 1715.

I HAVE already obſerved, that upon the repreſentations of Stair, the arms embarked at Havre had been ſtopped: we had, beſides theſe, three thouſand fuſils, which were luckily in a veſſel at the lower part of the Seine: we wanted to ſend them into Scotland; but the Duke of Ormond, who had nothing elſe in his head but his expedition into England, kept them in ſpite of all we could do, ſo that they never were of any uſe.

*** ‡, on his arrival in Scotland, found his affairs in a deplorable ſtate. His army, which the Earl of Mar, in his

† The Pretender. ‡ The Pretender.

1715. letters, made to amount to ſixteen thouſand men, conſiſted at that time of no more than five or ſix thouſand, ill armed, in bad order, and in want of every thing. This did not prevent him from going to Perth, to ſee what effect his preſence would have there: he ſent word to the Marquiſſes of Huntley, and Seaforth, to come and join him; but the former having already made his peace, excuſed himſelf upon the impropriety of the ſeaſon, and upon his not being able for ſome time to re-aſſemble his vaſſals, who were gone to their reſpective homes. The ſecond alledged the ſame reaſons; beſides that he could not leave his country expoſed to the invaſions of Sutherland. * * * ‡ not being able to induce theſe noblemen to join him, ſent them officers and money to keep them in his intereſt.

1716. In the mean time Argyll, notwithſtanding the rigour of the ſeaſon, was making all the preparations neceſſary to march forward, as ſoon as he ſhould be joined by ſix thouſand Dutch; he had alſo ſent for a great number of pioneers,

† The Pretender.

to

to open the ways for him through the prodigious quantities of ſnow that had fallen; he had collected all the carriages of the country, to convey, not only his ammunition and proviſion, but alſo ſome wood, and coal, to keep his troops warm. He had a very large train of artillery; in a word, all that was neceſſary for his ſubſiſtence, and for a conſiderable ſiege. On the 9th of February he marched from about Stirling, and encamped the firſt day at Dumblain, the next day at Auchtarardire, the ſcene of the late engagement, and on the 11th arrived at Tullibardine, eight miles from Perth. This laſt town had no other fortification than a ſimple wall; and though Marr had been at work there, the want of tools, materials, money and intelligent perſons, joined to the badneſs of the weather, had prevented him from raiſing any fortifications of conſequence. It is true there was oppoſite to it a poſt very good in itſelf, as it was covered by the river, which is very broad, and not fordable but at ten miles above, in a mountainous country, difficult of acceſs. Unfortu- 1716.

1716. nately the cold was ſo exceſſive, that all the rivers were completely frozen over; ſo that the enemy croſſed as if it had been ſolid ground. This reaſon, and the bad condition of his little army, which was inferior by one half to that of Argyll, determined *** † to quit Perth; he abandoned it on the 11th, and retired to Dundee, from whence he repaired to Montroſe with part of his troops, and ſent the reſt to Brechin. The Chevalier Erſkine, who came into France from him, to give intelligence of this ſtep, poſitively aſſured me, that the ** ‡ intended retiring towards the North, as the enemy ſhould advance, and that a little on this ſide of Aberdeen, he was reſolved to make a ſtand, as there was an excellent poſt, which five hundred men, could defend againſt ten thouſand. The right of this poſt adjoined to the high mountains, and the left to the ſea, while all the front was covered by an impracticable moraſs, which could not be paſſed but by the cauſeway. Two days however after the arrival of the Chevalier

† The Pretender. ‡ The Pretender.

Erſkine,

Erſkine, we learned, that on the approach of Argyll, *****† had cauſed his troops to march towards the North; that he himſelf, with Marr and ſome others, had embarked, and was arrived in France. He left the command to General Gordon, ordering him to endeavour to obtain terms of the enemy, for thoſe who were of his party. It may readily be imagined, that as ſoon as the Highlanders and others were acquainted with the departure of their ****‡, they thought of nothing but diſperſing and concealing themſelves. 1716.

THUS ended, in an inſtant, this enterprize; all the country ſubmitted to the Duke of Argyll, who had advanced to Aberdeen; and thoſe who thought they could not obtain their pardon, retired into the iſlands, from whence they afterwards came to France. My Son and M. de Bulkley, whom ***** § had not brought to France along with him, and who could not think of hiding themſelves in the mountains as others did, ran

† The Pretender. ‡ The Pretender.
§ The Pretender.

the

1716. the riſk of coming from the North of Scotland to Edinburgh. No one diſcovered them; and after they had ſtaid a week in that capital, they hired a veſſel which landed them in Holland, from whence they proceeded as faſt as poſſible to France. The Regent, at the ſolicitation of Lord Stair, cauſed them to be removed from their employments, as well as all thoſe who had been in Scotland. When the regiment was taken away from my Son, it was reſtored to me.

ONE may, perhaps, be curious to know why ***** † returned ſo ſoon from Scotland, and why he did not, as the Chevalier Erſkine had aſſured us, retire to the poſt on this ſide of Aberdeen. All I have been able to diſcover on this matter, is, that Marr had perſuaded him that it was no longer poſſible to ſupport the enterprize; that it would be the total ruin of all his party; and therefore it was neceſſary, by his retreat, to give them an opportunity of coming to ſome accommodation, which his preſence ren-

† The Pretender.

dered

dered impracticable. This reflection might indeed have been made before Erſkine's departure; but I am convinced, that if there was a fault committed, it proceeded only from the too great deference that young Prince paid to the counſels of others. 1716.

THE **** † came privately to Saint Germains, where he ſtaid a few days: from whence he went to paſs a week near Neuilly, and afterwards proceeded to Chalons, in Champaign, to wait for an anſwer from the Duke of Lorrain. That Prince made ſome difficulty of permitting him to return into Lorrain, on account of the conſideration he thought himſelf obliged to have for King George; he therefore adviſed him to go to Deux-Ponts, aſſuring him, however, that if the King of Sweden would not allow him to ſtay there, he would receive him in his own dominions, at the riſk of every conſequence that might happen from it. *****‡ being much diſſatisfied with this anſwer, as well as becauſe the Prince de Vaudemont adviſed

† The Pretender. ‡ The Pretender.

him

1716. him the ſame thing, went to Avignon, where the Duke of Ormond and Marr, with ſeveral other noblemen, came to join him.

DURING the ſtay which **** † made about Paris, he had diſmiſſed Lord Bolingbroke in the moſt diſgraceful manner.

AT his return from Scotland, he received that nobleman very graciouſly, and ſhewed him an entire confidence: at length, after having given him his orders reſpecting ſeveral matters he intruſted him with, and having particularly deſired that Bolingbroke would make haſte to follow him, he pretended to ſet out from Malmaiſm for Chalons; but inſtead of that, he went to Mademoiſelle de la Chauſſeraye, near Neuilly. In two days after this, he ſent the Duke of Ormond to require the ſeals from Lord Bolingbroke, who was very much ſurprized at the meſſage, and gave them up immediately. The reaſon ***** ‡ alledged for this ſtep was, that Lord Bolingbroke had

† The Pretender. ‡ The Pretender.

entirely neglected to ſend him any ſup- 1716.
plies of arms, money, &c. into Scotland, and that this had been the cauſe of the ill ſucceſs of his affairs. The pretended politicians at St. Germains added, that it depended entirely upon him to attain any kind of ſuccours from the Regent, but that he purpoſely neglected it, with a view of ruining the Pretender, whom he clandeſtinely betrayed; but the true reaſon of his diſgrace proceeded from other motives; one might even ſuppoſe that ******†, who was deſirous of exculpating himſelf from all that the malice of his enemies could invent againſt him, was not ſorry that all the blame ſhould be thrown upon Bolingbroke. On the other hand, the Duke of Ormond had always been jealous of Bolingbroke, whom he conſidered as a man of ſuperior genius, and conſequently as being always likely to have more intereſt than himſelf. A number of petty politicians, who found that they made no figure with ſo enlightened a miniſter, and who thought themſelves

† The Pretender.

certain

1716. certain of enjoying the reputation of univerſal knowledge, and of doing every thing if Ormond were at their head, were continually irritating that nobleman againſt Bolingbroke, and repreſenting his moſt trifling actions in the moſt odious light. Marr had alſo his private intereſt in view; he wiſhed to impoſe upon the public the idea, that if he had been aſſiſted by Bolingbroke, his enterprize would have ſucceeded: beſides this, he wanted to be the ſole Miniſter, and to govern every thing; for which purpoſe it was neceſſary that Bolingbroke ſhould be diſmiſſed; for, as he was well acquainted with the Duke of Ormond's ſlender talents, he was under no apprehenſion of any oppoſition from him. Mademoiſelle de la Chauſſeraye and ſeveral other women, who, as I have before obſerved, were angry with Bolingbroke, becauſe he did not conſult them any more, joined themſelves to the reſt of the aſſailants, and it is probable, that the Miniſters of St. Germains, if they did not concur in promoting this diſmiſſion, did not at leaſt oppoſe it. One muſt be entirely deprived

deprived of common ſenſe, not to ſee 1716.
that * * * * * † committed an enormous fault in diſmiſſing the only Engliſhman capable of conducting his affairs; for notwithſtanding what may be ſaid of ſome perſons more guided by paſſion than ſenſe, Bolingbroke was univerſally acknowledged in England, one of the moſt able Miniſters they ever had. He was born with ſuperior talents, which raiſed him, when very young, to the higheſt employment. He was moreover in very high eſteem among the heads of the Tory party, of which he was, as it were, the life. It was therefore a fault of the firſt magnitude to get rid of ſuch a man at a time when there was moſt need of him, and when it was highly improper to create any new enemies. Had he even been to blame, prudence required that ſome more gentle method ſhould have been deviſed to take the management of affairs out of his hands, which might eaſily have been done. They had only to inſinuate to him, that on account of the coolneſs ſubſiſting be-

† The Pretender.

tween

1716. tween Ormond and him, it was not proper they ſhould be together; and that beſides, his preſence at Paris was neceſſary, to watch more narrowly into every thing that was paſſing there. They might have told him frankly, that for particular reaſons it was not thought adviſeable to employ him any longer. I am ſufficiently acquainted with his temper and character, to affirm, that he would immediately have aſked leave to quit; but to put a public affront upon him, and endeavour to blacken his reputation in the world, was a moſt unaccountable ſtep; and indeed ****† loſt many more friends by it than he imagined.

As I have been partly witneſs of what Bolingbroke did for *****‡, while he had the direction of his affairs, I owe him the juſtice to declare, that he omitted nothing that was in his power to do. He ſtirred heaven and earth to obtain ſuccours, but the Court of France did nothing but amuſe him; and though he ſaw this, and complained of it, yet

† The Pretender. ‡ The Pretender.

there

there was no other power to which he could apply. Beſide, the cabals I have before-mentioned thwarted him in every thing. Some time after this, * * * * * * † demanded from him all the letters he had written to him, and Bolingbroke returned them all immediately without keeping a copy of them. The Duke of Marr ſerved him rather a ſcandalous trick; he told Bolingbroke, that being embarraſſed with buſineſs, he had not taken any minutes of his letters, and therefore deſired he would lend them to him, that he might take copies of them; Bolingbroke gave them to the Duke, and was never able to get them returned. 1716.

In the month of April, I was appointed to command in Guyenne, in the the room of Marſhal Montreval, who was to go into Alſace. The occaſion of this change was, that the Duke of Orleans was very glad to have a perſon in that part of the country, upon whom he could depend, more eſpecially as he had no reaſon to place any confidence

† The Pretender.

1716. in the Duke of Maine, whoſe ſecond ſon was governor of that province. He had even intended, with the ſame view, to give me likewiſe the command of Languedoc, and my reſidence was then to have been at Toulouſe, which is ſituated in the center of thoſe two provinces; but I repreſented that this might poſſibly expoſe me to the envy of ſome perſons; and moreover, might give riſe to ſome reflections which it was better to avoid; and that there would always be time enough to ſend me that commiſſion if it ſhould be found neceſſary.

THE Duke of Maine, diſpleaſed, that the Duke of Orleans had deſigned me for Guyenne, without having previouſly ſpoken to him of it, did all he could to prevent it; and not being able to ſucceed, he took it into his head, in order to mortify me, to have inſerted in my patents, *under the authority of his ſon the Count d'Eu.* He pretended that this was a privilege belonging to Princes of the blood. As ſoon as I was informed of this, I declared, that I would not accept of the office upon thoſe conditions, unleſs

leſs he could produce vouchers for the cuſtom; for I would not be the firſt to eſtabliſh a precedent ſo derogatory from the dignity of a Marſhal of France; that we knew very well the diſtance there was between us and Princes of the blood, and accordingly would always ſhew them every kind of reſpect; but that in point of command, we could not obey any abſent perſon except the King or the Regent. M. de la Vrilliere, Secretary of State, came to me from the Duke of Orleans, to ſhew me the inſtances upon which the Duke of Maine founded his pretenſions, and to acquaint me that his Royal Highneſs expected I ſhould make no difficulty of complying. I anſwered, that the inſtances alledged were in my favour; and I ſhould therefore have the honour to ſpeak of it myſelf to his Royal Highneſs. Accordingly, I went to the *Palais Royal*, and ſhewed the Prince clearly that he had been impoſed upon: however, as the Regent had in ſome meaſure engaged with the Duke of Maine in this affair, he knew not how to extricate himſelf; he employed the Duke de Noailles, and ſeveral other perſons, to perſuade me to 1716.

1716. give up the point; but I perſiſted in my reſolution, ſo that for the ſpace of two months I was uncertain whether I ſhould be employed. At length, the Regent finding me immoveable, and, beſide, moſt of my brethren, the Marſhals of France, openly taking my part, he had my patents made out in the uſual way, and in the month of July I ſet off for Bordeaux. Marſhal Montrevel might have put an end to the diſpute the firſt day, by ſhewing his letters patent, which had been renewed three months before the death of the late King, and conſequently ſince the legitimated Princes had obtained the rank and title of Princes of the blood: but in order not to be at variance with the Duke of Maine, he did not mention this, till after the affair was decided. The Marquis de la Vrilliere, who had diſpatched the patents to Marſhal Montrevel, ought alſo to have told the Regent of it; but the deſire of paying his court to the Duke of Maine, made him conceal the truth, and neglect upon this occaſion the duties of his office.

END OF THE MEMOIRS.

AN ABRIDGED CONTINUATION OF THE MEMOIRS, TAKEN FROM THE LETTERS OF THE MARSHAL OF BERWICK, AND PRINCIPALLY FROM HIS CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE MINISTRY.

THE Marſhal of Berwick, at forty-four years of age, had already made twenty-ſix campaigns, and accompliſhed a great career. The long war, from which Europe was juſt emerged, had furniſhed him with opportunities of diſplaying, at the head of armies, his talents for an art, the art of Heroes, which, to excell in it, requires more talents than any other; and theſe he had exerciſed through the eleven laſt campaigns, in which he commanded, with glory and ſucceſs: a circumſtance the more remarkable in that unfortunate war, when victory, which hitherto had been accuſtomed conſtantly to follow our banners, ſeemed in every other part to have aban-

doned them. Another career now began to open itſelf to the Marſhal of Berwick.

He arrived at Bourdeaux in July 1716, to take upon him the command of the Province of Guyenne. The Regent, who was thoroughly acquainted with his abilities, and meant to employ them for the ſervice of the ſtate, was deſirous, as has been already ſeen, that they ſhould not be confined to the command merely of that province. In the year 1705, the Marſhal had ſhewn in Languedoc, where he commanded at a difficult and critical period, that he was not leſs qualified for the adminiſtration of civil government, than for the command of armies: men of genius are ſuch almoſt in every thing. The Regent, in a letter written to him on his arrival at Bourdeaux, ſays: "Nothing is difficult in your hands, and "I beg you will always depend on my "friendſhip." This friendſhip was founded on the perfect eſteem and confidence, with which that Prince honoured the Marſhal, from the perſonal knowledge he had acquired of his probity and

talents, in the campaign they had made together in Spain in 1707; an opportunity, which ſerved to unite them for ever. The Regent was not much inclined to believe the exiſtence of honeſt men; but he uſed to ſay, that, if there was ſuch a thing as a perfectly honeſt man in the world, it was the Marſhal of Berwick*

THE

* The Abbé Millot aſſerts, p. 2. vol. 4. of his Memoirs, that the Marſhal of Berwick made himſelf diſagreeable to the Duke of Orleans, and that this was the cauſe of his being recalled from Spain in 1707. If he ſays this upon the authority of the Duc de Noailles, it is inconceivable, where he, who ought to have been well informed, could have picked up this falſe anecdote. Nothing is further from the truth. The Marſhal of Berwick frequently declared, that this very campaign of 1707, had been the occaſion of bringing him into the Duke of Orleans's favour. The Abbé Millot himſelf, vol. III. p. 395, ſpeaking of the ſiege of Lerida, which happened at the cloſe of that campaign, acknowledges that "Ber-"wick, by his ability and courage, contributed greatly "to the ſucceſs of it." In fact the ſucceſs was chiefly owing to the reſources he found out, in the ſtraits to which they were reduced, and the infinite pains he took, (though the ſiege had been formed contrary to his opinion) having nothing more at heart than the glory of the King's arms, and the perſonal re-

THE different parts of the adminiſtration, during the Regency, were conducted by councils, which engaged the commandants of the provinces in a very voluminous correſpondence. We need only read that of the Marſhal of Berwick, to be convinced of the extraordinary reſpect the ſeveral members of theſe councils had for him. Many of

putation of the Duke of Orleans. Was this making himſelf diſagreeable to him? That Prince had too much magnanimity and perſonal merit to be jealous of the Marſhal of Berwick, or even to be ſuſpected of it: his whole ſubſequent conduct is a proof of the contrary. The ſolidity of the Marſhal, and the ſtrictneſs of his morals, were not always ſuitable to the taſte and amuſements of the Duke of Orleans; but they were attached to each other by firmer ties, thoſe of eſteem and friendſhip. Lewis XIVth, to the great regret of Philip Vth, and of the Spaniards, recalled the Marſhal of Berwick from Spain, becauſe the affairs of that country were re-eſtabliſhed, and there was no longer any fear about them; beſides that they were in very good hands, being in thoſe of the Duke of Orleans. The frontiers of the Rhine and Dauphiny, required more attention, and able generals were wanted in thoſe parts. The command of one of the two armies then aſſembling was intended by Lewis XIVth, for the Marſhal of Berwick, as hath been ſeen in theſe Memoirs.

them

them were united to him by the ties of friendſhip, and all held him in the higheſt eſteem.

THOUGH his character for ſeverity had, before his arrival in Guyenne, diſpoſed the province, and particularly the town of Bourdeaux, to dread his adminiſtration, and though, during the whole time he commanded there, he had continual diſputes with the Parliament; yet he was ſoon known, and then (ſays the Preſident Monteſquieu) "he was beloved "by every body, and there was no place "in which his great talents were more "admired." The nobility placed an entire confidence in him, and the gentlemen frequently referred their differences to his arbitration.

IN all his diſputes with the Parliament he was always in the right; but though the Miniſter decided in every inſtance agreeable to his views, which were always found to be manifeſtly the beſt, yet, afterwards, in the execution of the King's orders, he uſed ſo much prudence and moderation, that it was impoſſible even for the officers of the Parliament

not

not to acknowledge, that his conduct had not in any reſpect been influenced by vanity, but only by motives of juſtice, order, and the public good. If he determined always upon his own judgment, it was becauſe he thought that the perſon, with whom the conduct of affairs was intruſted, was more intereſted than any other in the ſucceſs of them, and for that reaſon it was more his intereſt to adopt right meaſures: but he never failed to liſten to thoſe, who ought to be, and were capable of informing him, before he took his reſolution; and after having taken it, no man was more firm. This firmneſs, as it was the fruit of the moſt diligent examination, and the moſt unbiaſſed integrity, ſo was it entirely free from any tincture of obſtinacy.

We ſhall not enter into a detail of many intereſting matters, in which the Marſhal of Berwick was employed: it is ſufficient to have marked his principles, from which his conduct never deviated.

1718. The Parliament of Bourdeaux, in April 1718, were diſpoſed to avail themſelves of the privilege of remonſtrating, which the

the Regent had reſtored to all the Par- 1718.
liaments, by the declaration of 15th September 1715. They refuſed to regiſter the letters patent granted to the general Hoſpital of St. Andrew. Their debates had been carried on with much warmth. It was judged, that they had tranſgreſſed the rules preſcribed by the declaration, which had reinſtated them in their former functions; by that declaration *, they were only to exerciſe them in matters which concerned the general good of the kingdom; whereas the preſent was only a private buſineſs. Monſieur d'Argenſon, Keeper of the Seals, however wrote to the Firſt Preſident and Attorney-General, that his Royal Highneſs would conſent to receive the remonſtrance of the Parliament, provided it was made within the time preſcribed by the declaration, and without a deputation. In the mean time the Preſident Lebreton had been deputed, and was ſet out for Court without aſking leave. This ſtep, which he could not

* M. d'Argenſon's, Keeper of the Seals, letter, 10th April, 1718.

avoid,

1718. avoid, would in ſome meaſure have taken off the irregularity of his appointment.

THE Marſhal of Berwick thought it incumbent upon him to give an account of all that paſſed to his Royal Highneſs. Monſieur de la Vrilliere, Provincial Secretary of State, on his part, informed the Marſhal *, that the Regent was determined not to pay any regard to the repreſentations of the Parliament, as they appeared to him not to deſerve any; and that he had diſpatched to Monſ. de Courſon, Intendant of the Province, a *lettre de cachet*, for the Solicitor-General Dudon, baniſhing him to Auch. The Court conſidered him as the moſt culpable, becauſe he had oppoſed the letters patent with more warmth than any member of the Parliament, contrary to the duty of his office as the King's Solicitor, which ought rather to have engaged him to ſupport them. M. d'Argenſon, in his anſwer to the Marſhal of Berwick upon this buſineſs, concludes thus: "It is not to "be preſumed, that the aſſembly, on

* M. de la Vrilliere's letter, 10th of April 1718.

" this occaſion, will adopt any other 1718.
" meaſures but what are conformable
" to the views of his Royal Highneſs;
" who, at the ſame time, does not doubt
" that your authority, and perſevering
" attention, which are uſed to provide
" againſt the ſlighteſt incidents, will pre-
" vent the conſequences that might ariſe
" from this." The Regent alſo writes to the Marſhal with his own hand: " I have given the moſt preciſe orders " for putting a ſtop to the proceedings " of Parliament on this point; and I " agree with you, that it is of great " importance to ſuppreſs attempts of this " nature in the beginning."

LE *Parlement*, ſays Paſquier, ſomewhere, *eſt une bonne piece dans l'etat*; and we may add, that their remonſtrances are of excellent uſe; but they ſhould take care to employ them with prudence and reſerve. The abuſe of this privilege is even dangerous in its tendency, and the Miniſtry cannot keep too ſtrict an eye over them: it is of theſe abuſes the Regent is to be underſtood as ſpeaking in his letter.

THE

1718. THE Preſident Lebreton, on his arrival at Court, was reprimanded by the Keeper of the Seals, and ordered to return to Bourdeaux. The Court thought proper to ſend mandatory letters: the Marſhal of Berwick was preſent in Parliament when they were read; he gave his vote for ſubmiſſion, demonſtrating, at the ſame time, a ſtrong zeal for the Parliament. The Regent was obeyed; the letters patent, in favour of the hoſpital of St. Andrew, were regiſtered purely and ſimply, and thus the affair ended. The lettre de cachet, for the Solicitor-General Dudon, was revoked at the inſtance of the Marſhal of Berwick, and the order was given through his hands. The whole affair had been conducted by his advice, and the Keeper of the Seals wrote to him in theſe terms: "The "orders of H. R. H. are exactly con-"formable to your advice, which is "always dictated by prudence and zeal "for the King's ſervice."

FRANCE had but juſt begun to taſte the ſweets of a peace, which ſhe yet ſtood in extreme need of, when the ambition

bition of Cardinal Alberoni, the Prime Miniſter of Spain, interfered, to diſturb it with projects of his own conceiving. He wanted to recover to that crown, all the poſſeſſions it had ceded by the treaty of Utrecht. Sardinia he had already got poſſeſſion of; from five-and-twenty to thirty thouſand Spaniards were landed in Sicily, to reduce that iſland; he was equipping a fleet at Cadiz, and every thing was in motion in the different ports of the kingdom. 1718.

It was foreſeen, in the year 1718, that France would be forced to come to an open rupture with Spain, and even to carry on an offenſive war againſt that kingdom, in purſuance of the engagements ſhe had entered into with her new allies the Emperor, England and Holland, to oblige Philip Vth to renounce his projects, which tended to nothing leſs than deſtroying the tranquillity of all Europe, and introducing revolutions every where. War however was not declared till January 1719: all the preceding year was paſſed in negotiating with Cardinal Alberoni, who amuſed

France

1718. France and England, in order to defer the rupture with thoſe two courts, and to give himſelf time to prepare every thing he thought neceſſary for the ſucceſs of his projects. He went ſo far as to flatter himſelf, that by his intrigues, and by inſurrections, he ſhould be able to deprive the Duke of Orleans of the Regency, and to transfer it to Philip V. who, by that means, would be armed with the whole power of France: his views extended likewiſe to produce a revolution in England, to reſtore **** † to the throne of his anceſtors, and by driving out his rival, to ſecure him for an ally. The other inſtruments, which he was to make uſe of, and which he had no doubt of engaging in his intereſts, were the Turk on one ſide, and the King of Sweden on the other. It is apparent, that all the hopes of Alberoni were built upon an imaginary foundation, and on the concurrence of a variety of events ſo improbable in themſelves, that he ought not to have flattered himſelf with an expectation of bringing them

† The Pretender.

about;

about: he had, however, the addreſs 1718.
to perſuade the King of Spain to adopt his vaſt projects, unjuſt as they were, as well as raſh; and yet that Prince, though ſingular in ſome reſpects, was not naturally wanting either in integrity or judgment.

THE whole plot was diſcovered by intercepting ſome letters written to Cardinal Alberoni by Prince Cellamar, Ambaſſador from Spain at the Court of France. The Regent thought proper to diſmiſs the Ambaſſador immediately, and had him accompanied as far as the frontiers by one of the King's Gentlemen. The intercepted letters were printed, and the tenor of them was too clear to leave the ſmalleſt doubt, reſpecting the practices of Prince Cellamar and Cardinal Alberoni. The Duke of Maine was ſeized, and ſent to the caſtle of Dourlens; his Dutcheſs to that of Dijon; and ſeveral of their dependants were put into the Baſtile. The Prince de Dombes, and the Count d'Eu, were ordered to retire from Court; and Cardinal Polignac was confined to his Ab-

1718. bey at Anchin. From this time preparations were made, with the utmoſt expedition, for opening the campaign.

THE Marſhal of Berwick was pitched upon to command the army, from the extraordinary confidence placed in him on every account by the Regent; yet there was not a Frenchman more affected with this breach, however juſt and neceſſary on the part of France. Beſide the reaſons which he had in common with every Frenchman, there were others, peculiar to himſelf: he had been twice the inſtrument of preſerving Spain; and the favours he had received from Philip V. attached him more immediately to that Prince. On the other hand, he had obligations to the Regent, who was perſonally attacked in this war; but all theſe were inferior conſiderations with the Marſhal of Berwick, and were made ſubſervient to the great line of duty. He thought himſelf bound indiſpenſably, as Governor of Guienne, upon the frontiers of Spain, to execute, without remonſtrance, the orders he received for invading that kingdom. A refuſal

refuſal to ſerve, would have been a breach of an immediate duty, from which he had, at that time, no right to excuſe himſelf: it would have been a dangerous example, and might even have admitted a conſtruction of criminality, if it had been followed by others: he obeyed therefore, becauſe it was his duty to obey. 1718.

He had been ſent for to Court in September; in order to make the arrangements for the campaign; and had been ſome time returned to Bourdeaux, when he tranſmitted his plans for his Royal Highneſs's deciſion and final orders.

No man had an underſtanding better qualified than the Marſhal of Berwick to comprehend, at one view, the whole of an object, how vaſt ſoever the extent of it might be. He had made uſe of this talent in the four defenſive campaigns he had made on the frontiers of Italy, in the war of the ſucceſſion; he found occaſion for it again this year. 1719.

The frontier of France and Spain occupies an extent of more than one hundred leagues from Bayonne to Per-

1719. pignan and Collioure. As it was impoſſible to attack Spain at once in every part of a line of ſuch length, it became neceſſary, in making an attack on one ſide, to provide at the ſame time for the defence of the reſt. This object was the more eſſential, as Alberoni was known to be bold and enterprizing to exceſs. The Marſhal had therefore recourſe to calculation, comparing the ſtrength of the enemy with his own; repreſenting to himſelf the different views they might have, and the various movements they might poſſibly make; and upon theſe ſeveral combinations, he formed his plans of attack and defence. His letters and diſpatches to the Miniſtry ſhew that he had foreſeen and prepared for every thing: he points out in them beforehand what he ſhall do in the courſe of the campaign, according to the different ſituations he ſhall be in; and the events ſeemed to be governed by his prediction.

THE Marſhal of Berwick would have wiſhed to commence hoſtilities by the ſiege of Pampeluna; for which he had ſtrong

ſtrong reaſons. The object of the war with Spain was to intimidate her, in order to bring her back to her engagements; for this purpoſe it was neceſſary ſhe ſhould be convinced, that France was acting againſt her ſeriouſly, and without any regard to the ties of blood, which the King of Spain and his Miniſter were not inclined to believe. Nothing was more likely to convince them of their error, than the taking of that important fortreſs, which would open a paſſage for the army to Madrid; beſide that it would bring them into a country abounding with proviſions, where they might find ſubſiſtence during the campaign, and afterwards take winter quarters at the enemy's expence. And further, as this point was the neareſt to the center of the frontier, it was the moſt convenient for the defence of the other parts. The ſiege, however, could not be undertaken; the preparations for ſitting down before a place of ſuch importance as Pampeluna are immenſe, and the Court had not iſſued the neceſſary orders in time. The 1719.

1719. whole would not have been ready till the cloſe of the campaign, and it would have been riſking too much to have undertaken the ſiege when the ſeaſon was ſo far advanced. This enterprize, therefore, was reſerved for the next campaign, (which happily did not take place, peace being made in the mean time) and the ſieges of Fontarabia and St. Sebaſtian were determined on.

DURING theſe expeditions, which were to be made on the right, there remained Navarre, Bearn, and all the reſt of the frontier to be covered. The Marſhal had had the precaution to go himſelf, during the winter, to viſit all the paſſes. For the defence of them, he now appointed M. de Geofreville, giving him, for that purpoſe, fifteen battalions and twenty ſquadrons, which he extended along the Pyrenees, ſo as to be ready to aſſemble at the firſt order, and to ſupport each other. This corps was deſigned to occupy ſome good poſt, in caſe the enemy ſhould paſs the mountains with a ſuperior force, by which it might ſtop their progreſs till the Marſhal

ſhal could come up with a ſufficient 1719.
reinforcement to drive them back.

To make the different parts of this defenſive line more ſecure, Major-General de Bonas was ordered, with ſeven battalions, to make himſelf maſter of the caſtle of Caſtel-leon, which, though under the Spaniſh government, is ſituated at the foot of the Pyrenees, on the French ſide. He was obliged to open trenches againſt it on the 30th of May, to erect batteries, and to make a breach. It was the 12th of June before he took it.

DURING this time the army was aſſembled, and marched about the 15th of May to Iron, from whence it proceeded to inveſt Fontarabia. The firſt buſineſs of the Marſhal of Berwick, was to reconnoitre the place, in order to determine on which ſide he ſhould make his attack, and where he ſhould place his park of artillery. As the cannon, however, which was brought from Bayonne, was not ſufficient for the ſiege, and that which was to be ſent from Bourdeaux could not arrive for ſome

1719. days, the trenches were not opened till the evening of the 27th. They broke ground very near the place, by means of a hollow not more than a hundred and fifty toiſes from the covered way; the attack was directed againſt the polygon, formed by the baſtions des Innocens and la Reine. They ſet to work immediately on the batteries; but theſe were not in readineſs to play till the 5th of June; becauſe it was thought proper to wait till they were all completed, that they might be opened and played off together, ſo as to defend each other, and to anſwer more fully the plan of attack.

As ſoon as the artillery of the place was ſilenced, they endeavoured to make breaches in the left face (towards the beſiegers) of the baſtion de la Reine, the curtain between the two baſtions and the right face of the half-moon; they extended their lodgment on the covered way, where they had already fixed themſelves; and on the night of the 15th, the breaches being very fair, the half-moon was attacked and carried at once without much reſiſtance. A lodgment

was

was made from one ſhoulder to the other, 1719.
but it coſt them dear; they loſt about one hundred and fifty men. They proceeded next to make their way into the ditch, and to finiſh the openings, that they might give the aſſault to the body of the place. The enemy prevented them by beating the chamade on the 17th; the Marſhal of Berwick did not inſiſt upon making the garriſon priſoners of war; retarding the capitulation would have prolonged the ſiege, and it was of conſequence, in the preſent ſituation of things, not to be reſtrained in his movements.

On the 18th the garriſon marched out with the honours of war, and was conducted to Pampeluna, by St. John Pie de Port. Two battalions were ſent into the place; and the next morning they ſet about levelling the works and filling up the trenches; the rubbiſh of the breaches was removed, and the breaches themſelves ſtopped up with faſcines, and put into a ſtate of defence.

While the ſiege was carrying on, the King of Spain, attended by the Queen, had

1719. had put himſelf in motion from Pampeluna, where he arrived on the 11th of June, giving out, that he was going to give battle to the French, and oblige them to raiſe the ſiege. Dom Blaiſe de Loya ſent this information to the governor of Fontarabia in a letter, which was intercepted. In fact, the Spaniſh army marched to San Eſtevan, and the King repaired in perſon, on the 16th, to the camp of Leſſaca, two leagues and a half from Iron. But receiving intelligence on the 17th, that the place was capitulating, he cauſed his equipages on the 18th to return to San Eſtevan, from whence he went back to Pampeluna. His Catholic Majeſty was not well adviſed in this march: it was but little to his honour to have advanced within ſight of Fontarabia with his army, to be a witneſs of the capitulation, and to march back immediately to Pampeluna.

NOT to interrupt the account of the ſiege, we have deferred mentioning till this time, an action, which, though of little importance in itſelf, yet deſerves to be related, on account of the bravery ſhewn

ſhewn in it by our troops. M. de Ca- 1719.
drieux had been ſent forward, with a corps of troops, on the road to Pampeluna, to diſcover the motions of the enemy. They learned that the ſame Dom Blaiſe de Loya, who commanded in Guipuſcoa, had aſſembled two thouſand militia, to which he had added ſix or ſeven hundred regular troops, and with theſe had advanced to Ernani, not above two leagues from M. de Cadrieux's poſt. The Marſhal of Berwick, not chooſing to ſuffer this little corps of the enemy to remain ſo near him, diſpatched M. de Cilly with a ſufficient detachment to attack Dom Blaiſe. His vanguard, under the command of M. de Verceil, fell upon the troops Dom Blaiſe had ſtationed in an advanced poſt, and without any aſſiſtance drove them in. Our people purſued them as far as to Ernani, where they attacked Dom Blaiſe himſelf, beat the regulars, and diſperſed the militia, ſo that they were not heard of after.

THE ſuperior ſtrength of the French army was ſuch, that the Marſhal of Berwick would have had no cauſe to fear that

of

1719. of Spain, had they been brought in a body againſt each other: but the great extent of frontier, through which he was under a neceſſity of acting offenſively, left him conſtantly in ſome degree of fear for the center, which was entirely deſtitute of fortreſſes, whenever he meditated any enterprize at the extremities to the right or left, in the face of an enemy like Alberoni, who had the utmoſt confidence in his own projects. He might poſſibly flatter himſelf, that he ſhould find in Guienne, as he had already in Brittany, diſaffected perſons ready to join the Spaniſh army, if it could penetrate any where into France; and it muſt be acknowledged that there were malcontents in the kingdom. Cardinal Alberoni was the man to hazard every thing, be the conſequence what it might. There would have been no difficulty in obliging the Spaniſh army to repaſs the Pyrenees; but many malcontents would have joined it on its firſt appearance; and the King of Spain's entry into France, at the head of an army, was enough to excite a ferment in the minds of the people through-

out

out the kingdom, and to create a great 1719.
diſturbance; which ought by all means to be avoided. It is true, that the Marſhal of Berwick had foreſeen all this, and had arranged his marches and counter-marches in conſequence; but it was neceſſary that every thing ſhould co-operate with exactneſs. If the ſucceſs had depended ſingly on the Marſhal, there would have been no cauſe of apprehenſion; but a General cannot be every where: ſuch great movements required the concurrent operations of ſeveral perſons, who might not all of them deſerve the ſame degree of confidence. Theſe reflexions induced the Marſhal of Berwick to aſk for ſome additional battalions and ſquadrons, which were granted him. He ſaid, that in the circumſtances they were in, nothing ought to be left to chance; prudence required that the event ſhould be ſecured. It hath been ſeen in his campaigns in Dauphiny and Provence, that he was not the man to aſk for an unneceſſary reinforcement; ſince, of his own accord, he ſent back to Lewis XIVth twenty battalions, which he thought he could

1719. ſpare from the defence he was to make: and which were very ſerviceable in reinforcing the other armies. The King of Spain, on his ſide, had augmented his army with twenty-ſix ſquadrons, ſo that it was now compoſed of ſixty-two ſquadrons, and twenty-one battalions.

THE Marſhal of Berwick, having reſolved to lay ſiege to St. Sebaſtian, and to improve his conqueſts, puſhed forward to cover the convoys and preparations neceſſary for his undertaking. Intelligence being given him, that Prince Pio had advanced to Toloſette with a ſtrong detachment, he ſent M. de Cilly againſt him with three regiments of dragoons, two hundred horſe, twenty-two companies of grenadiers, and as many of piquets. On his way the General met with three hundred of the enemy's dragoons, whom he attacked with great vivacity, and took the commandant, two Captains, and five or ſix dragoons priſoners, beſide killing ſeveral. On his arrival at Toloſette, he fell in with an advanced poſt of infantry, which he cauſed to be attacked: near thirty of them were killed, and ſixty made

priſoners, among whom were three of- 1719.
ficers of the Spaniſh and Walloon guards. Prince Pio had retired very early in the morning of the ſame day, taking the road to Pampeluna, to which place his troops followed him.

On the 30th of June the Marſhal encamped before St. Sebaſtian, and inveſted the place, having his right to the ſea and his left to the river Gurumea, which runs by Aſtiaraga. The Spaniſh army, which was encamped a league from Pampeluna on the road to Toloſette, remained in its poſition; and the Marſhal of Berwick had nothing for the preſent to take off his attention from the ſiege.

He determined to carry on his attack by the river Gurumea, on account of the opportunity it afforded of erecting batteries on the oppoſite ſhore, about two hundred toiſes diſtant from the body of the place, by means of which he might make an opening in the wall, it being of no great thickneſs, and having nothing to flank it in that part. Between the town and the river, was a ſpace ſufficient to get at the breach from the right of the trenches,

1719. trenches, which were to be cloſe upon the river. It was however ſtill neceſſary to attack the horn-work in front on the left, which flanked all that part, but this was only to ſilence the guns, and to deſtroy the defences. Any other plan of attack would have been ineligible, particularly of the horn-work, as it was ſo much ſunk, as was likewiſe the body of the place on that ſide, that no breach could be made, without having batteries on the covered way. Of courſe we muſt have taken it, before we could attempt to raiſe batteries on it to batter in breach, and open the works attacked: and the ſame ceremony muſt have been obſerved with the body of the place, as with the horn-work.

THE heavy rains had retarded the convoys of artillery for the ſiege, and of conſequence the opening of the trenches: but on the return of fair weather, the neceſſary ſtores having been brought up, the trenches were opened in the night between the 19th and 20th of July, at the diſtance of two hundred toiſes from the covered way: the loſs on this occaſion

ſion was inconſiderable. They had al- 1719.
ready been at work for the batteries of cannon and mortars on the other ſide of the river; and the next morning they were to make others on the new parallels to batter the horn-work. The whole was finiſhed and the batteries began to play on the 25th. In the night between the 26th and 27th they made a lodgment on the ſalient angle of the covered way to the right [of the beſiegers]: this was the principal point to be gained, to enable them to get up to, and attack the breach they were making in the body of the place, by means of the batteries mounted on the other ſide of the river. As theſe fired from a diſtance of not leſs than a hundred and eighty toiſes, the breach was not ſoon made; it was not practicable till the firſt of Auguſt. The Governor, fearing that the place would be taken by aſſault, beat the chamade the ſame day. The Marſhal of Berwick obliged the whole garriſon to retire into the caſtle, with a view of cooping them up, conſuming their proviſions, and by this means haſtening the reduction of

1719. it. The firſt ſtep they took towards making themſelves maſters of it, was to open ſome trenches in the front of it; but on attempting to carry them forward, they ſoon found what difficulties the attack would be attended with. The caſtle ſtood ſo much above the town, and all the ground about it, that it was next to an impoſſibility to get at the works by trenches, though they were not more than thirty toiſes diſtant from them. Beſide this, they could not find a level fit for their batteries of cannon; the ground was ſo low, that they would have had no effect: they were therefore obliged to content themſelves with bomb-batteries, which are not of much uſe in deſtroying out-works, and of none at all in making a breach. With theſe, however, they made themſelves maſters of the caſtle. In order to maintain themſelves in their trenches, they were forced to cover them with blinds, to prevent the enemy cruſhing them to pieces with bombs, grenades, and ſtones which they rolled down upon them.

THE only method of carrying the place by force, was to undermine it all the way to the caſtle; but this, if they met with never ſo little of the rock in their way, would have been a work of infinite time. The only reſource they ſeemed to have, was that of blockading it, and it was what they were forced to confine themſelves to. 1719.

IN the mean time they continued the bombardment, for the purpoſe of deſtroying the houſes and what magazines they could; and it was attended with a ſucceſs they had no right to expect. The bombs ſpoiled the proviſions, and threw the garriſon into ſuch deſpair, that they capitulated on the 19th of Auguſt. The Marſhal of Berwick made no difficulty of granting them the honours of war, being glad to get rid of them at ſo eaſy a rate.

DURING the blockade, the Engliſh fleet had taken on board ſeven hundred and fifty men of our army, with which it ſailed for Santona. Here our troops were diſembarked, and took poſſeſſion of that little port, after driving out ſe-

1719. ven hundred of the Spaniſh militia. They then burned three large ſhips of war on the ſtocks, and reimbarking, came and rejoined the army without the loſs of a ſingle man.

THERE now remained only the ſieges of Urgel and Roſes to conclude the campaign agreeable to the plan projected. The Marſhal of Berwick, while he was waiting for final orders from H. R. H. made his troops file off on the ſide of Navarre and Oleron. The King of Spain was at Tudela with his army, and Prince Pio ſtationed ſo as to cover Pampeluna; but upon our troops filing off by our left, Philip V. determined to make a conſiderable detachment from his army to march into Catalonia, where the people appeared inclinable to revolt; and as to himſelf, he returned to Madrid. His army fell back to Sangueſa, and ſoon after marched for Catalonia, which they found was to be the ſcene of our operations.

THE Marſhal of Berwick having received his final orders for the expeditions of the Lampredan and Cerdagna, fixed

fixed the rout of his army over Mount Lewis, and went forward himſelf, in order to expedite the neceſſary preparations. He arrived at Mount Lewis on the 11th of September: the ſiege of Urgel could not be undertaken ſo ſoon as he wiſhed, becauſe the roads were ſo bad, that it took up almoſt a fortnight to bring the artillery from Mount Lewis. Part of it came up on the 2d, and the reſt on the 4th of October. M. de Bonas occupied an advanced camp at la Pobla, on the Noguera Pallereſa, with ten battallions and two regiments of dragoons: he was in poſſeſſion of the heights, and his poſt was ſo good, that he could not be attacked, even by the whole Spaniſh army, which was at Ager, five or ſix leagues from his camp. A detachment of them however fell upon our mountaineer chaſſeurs, and drove them from the bridge of Montagnano. M. de Bonas reſolved to puniſh this inſult; and marching with ten companies of grenadiers, attacked the party of the enemy and defeated them; he afterwards made himſelf maſter of Conques and Tremp, after having attack- 1719

1719. ed and put to flight four hundred men, whom they had left on Mount Sec.

THE ſiege of the caſtle of Urgel was not finiſhed by the 10th of October, and the Marſhal of Berwick, who was anxious about the expedition to Roſes, quitted it, and repaired to Boulou, where the army was to rendezvous on the 17th, and to march immediately into Lampredan and to Roſes. He left M. de Coigny, with ſeventeen battalions, to puſh the ſiege, which did not continue long after his departure; for on the 12th, he received intelligence at Mount Lewis, by an officer diſpatched to him expreſs, that the caſtle of Urgel had ſurrendered, and that the garriſon were priſoners of war. M. de Coigny put himſelf in march on the 13th, with eleven battalions, to join the grand army, and left M. de Bonas to defend the new conqueſt and the adjacent country, with nine battalions and two hundred chaſſeurs.

THE Marſhal of Berwick obtained conſiderable rewards for the officers of his army, after the ſieges they had been employed in; but, at the ſame time, he thought.

thought it neceſſary to have M. de Champier puniſhed in an exemplary manner. This officer had, at firſt, ſhewn great activity and knowledge of his profeſſion: after the taking of Caſtel-leon, the Marſhal of Berwick thought he could not do better than to give him the command of it; but M. de Champier was not long before he began to abuſe his authority in this confidential poſt. He harraſſed the country, raiſed contributions, and carried off the corn to diſpoſe of it for his own profit. He had even the folly or impudence to give an account of his exploits to M. de Bonas. The Marſhal having the proof of his crime under his own hand, reported it to the Duke of Orleans. The manners of the age were even then, it is true, very corrupt, but yet there remained a ſenſe of ſhame, and no one dared to protect an avowed criminal. M. de Champier was broken, and declared incapable of being reſtored: he was impriſoned in the citadel of Mount Lewis, and afterwards in that of Perpignan. 1719.

1719. ALL the troops that were to compoſe the army, deſtined for the ſiege of Roſes, which conſiſted of forty battalions and ſixty ſquadrons, being aſſembled at Boulou, were put in motion on the 22d of October, and in two days came and encamped at Caſtillon, in order to inveſt Roſes on the land ſide; but they could not begin any of the works of the ſiege, excepting the faſcines, till the convoy of artillery, ammunition and proviſions arrived. Theſe were expected to be brought by ſea in tartans, which were to bring every thing to ſhore, under an eſcort of two French galleys and ſix ſhips of war, two of them French, and four Engliſh.

OUR French men of war appeared in the gulf of Roſes on the firſt of November; but the badneſs of the weather kept back the tartans, which were obliged to wait till the ſea was more calm. The ſtorm in ſome degree abating, part of them arrived on the 4th of November in the bay of Roſes. The next day, though there was ſtill a conſiderable ſwell, they began to diſembark the artillery and ſtores: however,

however, they could land but little that day. The day after, the ſea ran ſo high, that the ſloops could not be worked ſo as to continue the unlading. On the 6th the wind grew ſo violent, that twenty-eight of our tartans were driven on ſhore; ten of them were wrecked, the reſt ſunk. Aſſiſtance was immediately ſent to ſave as much of the cargoes as poſſible. Many of the ſailors periſhed; the remainder of the tartans, to the number of twelve or fifteen, put in, where they could, on the coaſt. 1719.

THIS misfortune deprived us of the greateſt part of what we had occaſion for to carry on the ſiege; and after an accurate examination, we found ourſelves under a neceſſity of abandoning it. The ſeaſon was ſo far advanced, that nothing more was thought of than ſeparating the army, and ſending it into quarters. We decamped on the 17th from Caſtillon, and each corps marched off to the quarter aſſigned for it. The Marſhal of Berwick remained ſome days at Perpignan, and ſet out for the Court on the 27th.

1719. THE proceedings of this campaign were ſufficient to convince Philip V. that France was ſincerely acting in concert with her allies, and did not mean to keep any meaſures with Spain; conſequently that it was impoſſible for him to continue a war, which he muſt ſupport ſingly againſt the formidable powers he was attacking. In fact, Spain found none of thoſe ſupports ſhe had reckoned upon. The Turk had made peace with the Emperor; by this ſhe loſt the means of a powerful diverſion, and the Emperor was entirely at liberty to employ his whole force againſt her. Charles XII. King of Sweden, had been killed before Frederickſchals: and his death deprived Spain of a ſupport, the hope of which had made part of the calculation in her plans. The intrigues of Alberoni, to excite troubles and revolutions in France and England, had entirely failed. All theſe events at length opened the eyes of Philip V; he ſaw the precipice, to the brink of which he had been brought by the raſhneſs of his Miſter. To ſave himſelf, he made prudent

and pacific reſolutions; there was no need of more than one, he diſmiſſed his turbulent Miniſter, and peace followed. 1719.

THE Marſhal of Berwick, as a mark of confidence and approbation, was admitted into the Council of the Regency; but it was not intended that he ſhould give up the government of Guienne. This arrangement was not leſs conformable to the views of the Duke of Orleans, who was deſirous of having a perſon he could depend upon at the head of that great province, than to the fortune of the Marſhal, who was not rich, and had occaſion for the appointments of that command to ſupport his dignity. He ſtaid at Court till June, when he repaired to Bourdeaux, to take upon himſelf again the adminiſtration of the province.

IT was a principle with the Marſhal, that, in every ſtate, whatever might be the political form of it, there muſt be a ſupreme and abſolute authority, to which every citizen and every ſociety ought to yield a paſſive obedience. Accordingly, no perſon paid greater reſpect

to

1719. to that authority than himſelf; and when it was veſted in him, no one could make it more reſpectable, becauſe, uſing it only agreeable to the dictates of juſtice, he never expoſed it to be called in queſtion. His natural integrity, candour, knowledge, and great diſcernment, prevented his deviating from it; and if he knew how to preſerve the dignity of government and the ſhare of authority, with which he was entruſted, he was not leſs acquainted with the boundaries of that authority, and took care never to exceed them; being particularly attentive not to encroach in any reſpect upon the adminiſtration of juſtice; for he was fully ſenſible, that his authority and that of the Parliament, though both derived from the ſame fountain, were yet different in their objects and independent of each other; but upon their harmony depended order and the good of the public. When this harmony ſeemed to be interrupted, it was always contrary to the Marſhal's inclination, and endeavours to preſerve it: to this effect the Chancellor d'Agueſſeau wrote to him

on

on the affair we are going to ſpeak of: 1719.
"I am well perſuaded, Sir, that if the
"Gentlemen of the Parliament will not
"live upon good terms with you, it
"muſt always be their own fault. With
"you the uſe of power is regulated by
"juſtice."

In the month of September 1720, the 1720.
Jurats and Bailiffs of the Bakers being ſent for by the Parliament to give an account of the corn and meal, declared, that there were in the town more than two thouſand buſhels ſpoiled. The Parliament appointed two Commiſſaries to make a ſearch in Bourdeaux; the ſearch was made with great parade, even in the King's magazines; this was the place, which inflammatory perſons, under pretence of the public good, ſeemed to have pointed out as the principal object of the ſearch. At their inſtigation, the commiſſaries themſelves cauſed a conſiderable number of buſhels of corn and meal to be thrown away, without a particular examination, and without conſulting the Marſhal of Berwick, and the Intendant, which they ought to have done in whatever

1720. whatever related to the Adminiſtration, and particularly when the matter in queſtion was the deſtroying of the King's ſtores. The Marſhal, in affairs of this conſequence, where the King's ſervice and the public good were equally concerned, always made it his buſineſs to obviate difficulties as much as poſſible, without attending to any caſual breaches of the reſpect which was due to himſelf. Upon this principle, therefore, he propoſed to the Parliament to have their own ſeal put upon ſuch ſacks of corn and meal as might be ſpoiled; then to report the matter to the Court, and to wait for the King's anſwer: but this prudent advice was neither taken nor even liſtened to. The conduct of the Parliament was ſuch, that it could not but be cenſured by the Regent and Council; above all, they diſapproved the forwardneſs and imprudence of the two Commiſſaries in the execution of the decree, who ſeemed to have endeavoured, by indiſcreet remarks*, to excite commotions among the people.

* Chancellor d'Agueſſeau and M. de la Vrillier's letters, 16th September 1720.

Theſe

Theſe Gentlemen were ordered to attend the Council at Court, to give an account of their conduct. The Chancellor d'Agueſſeau, in a letter written by him to the Firſt Preſident, blames the Parliament for not having acceded to the moderate propoſal made by the Marſhal of Berwick. The orders given by the King and Regent were *, that "every "thing reſpecting the ordinary police "ſhould be left in the hands of the "Jurats, ſubject to an appeal to the "Parliament, and if any extraordinary "caſes ſhould occur, requiring the in-"terference of that body, as Superin-"tendants of the general police, they "ſhould confer with the Marſhal of "Berwick, and the Intendant of the "province, before they took any ſteps in "it, even before the appointment of "Commiſſaries." The Parliament ſhewing a diſpoſition to ſubmit and conform to the King's orders, the affair was dropped. 1720.

* Chancellor d'Agueſſeau's letter, 16th September, 1720.

THE

1720. THE Miniſtry had followed in every thing the advice and opinion of the Marſhal. M. d'Agueſſeau, in a letter of the 28th of September, writes to him: "You ſee too with how much defe-"rence your views are adopted here; "it is looked upon as the beſt me-"thod of promoting the intereſts of "the province under your command." M. d'Agueſſeau, at the time of writing this letter, received freſh diſpatches from the Marſhal of Berwick, acquainting him, that he had changed his opinion with reſpect to the letters of reprimand he had deſired to be ſent to four officers of the Parliament; that body ſeemed to him now to be in ſo good a diſpoſition, that he did not think there was any neceſſity for the letters. M. d'Agueſſeau adds, with his own hand, in a PS. "I laid it before the Regent this morn-"ing; H. R. H. approves your indul-"gence at this time, as he formerly "did your ſeverity; and leaves it to "you to give theſe four officers pro-"per advice for their future conduct. "I cannot do better than to follow his example;

" example; accordingly I ſhall not 1720.
" ſend you my letters, being perſuaded
" that we cannot be wrong in follow-
" ing your ſuggeſtions." One ſhould ſuppoſe, that the Parliament would be more circumſpect in future, and that there would be leſs violence and more moderation in their proceedings; but the moſt reſpectable bodies of men, when the intereſts, privileges, or authority of the ſociety are ſuppoſed to be concerned, are apt to forget their wiſdom and prudence. The pride of this body was hurt by the appearance of humiliation they had undergone; and the reſentment they preſerved was not long before it broke out.

On the 14th of January 1721, the 1721.
Marſhal of Berwick found himſelf under a neceſſity of acquainting M. d'Agueſſeau of a new diſpute between the officers of the Criminal Court of the Parliament of Bourdeaux and the Jurats, relative to ſome ſervants he had cauſed to be impriſoned for a diſturbance they made at the play-houſe, and for reſiſting the guard.

1721. It muſt be acknowledged, that this affair, of itſelf, would not deſerve notice; but the importance it derived from the interference of the Parliament, makes it intereſting, as it ſerves to ſhew the ſpirit and manners of the time, as well as the conſtant prudence and moderation of the Marſhal of Berwick. The Criminal Court ſummoned the Jurats, and reprimanded them for not proceeding againſt the ringleaders of the riot. They replied, that it was not in their power to proceed againſt them; that the officers had been impriſoned by orders from the Governor, and continued under the ſame authority. The Judges of the Criminal Court, however, claimed the juriſdiction of this affair, and ordered it to be examined into. The Marſhal, being informed of their proceedings, ſignified to the Jurats, that they had only to demand the offenders of him, and he would order them to be delivered up to the uſual courſe of juſtice. The Magiſtrates of the Criminal Court would not adopt this expedient, though it was natural and conformable to law and reaſon; they

they even refuſed to ſubmit to the direc- 1721.
tions of the Chancellor, who himſelf preſcribed to them the ſame expedient. In a letter to the Marſhal of Berwick, dated 29th June, he ſays: "But if the "Criminal Court do not make a better "uſe than hitherto of the attention we "have had for them, we muſt take other "meaſures to put an end to the buſineſs "of the footmen, without the interpo- "ſition of a parliament, which ſets itſelf "even againſt all that is done in its fa- "vour. For the reſt, I cannot but "commend your wiſdom; and wiſh it "may at laſt find ſome who will endea- "vour to imitate it in the country where "you reſide." The Chancellor wrote, at the ſame time, in the ſame terms, to the Firſt Preſident. The firmneſs of this ſecond letter had its effect, and the affair ended in the manner propoſed by the Marſhal.

THE plague had for a long time raged with great violence in the town of Marſeilles. The firſt infection was ſuppoſed to have been communicated through the negligence or avarice of the perſons em-

1721. ployed in the Lazaretto. They were accuſed, or, at leaſt, violently ſuſpected, of having, in the courſe of their contraband traffic, introduced into the province goods that were infected with the contagion, which afterwards ſpread into the province. It had likewiſe been attempted to penetrate into ſome of the neighbouring provinces for want of proper precautions being taken by thoſe who were intruſted with the adminiſtration of them; whether it were through indolence, incapacity, or fear of injuring the trade carried on with the infected province, by laying it under ſuch reſtraints as were neceſſary to preſerve their own from contagion.

THE Court was informed that it had got into the Gevaudan; it was barely ſuſpected to be in the town of Mende; but it had broke out with violence at Canourge and the adjacent villages on the borders of Rouergue and Auvergne. The miniſtry, juſtly alarmed at the progreſs of ſo cruel a ſcourge, thought they could not exert themſelves too much to protect the nation againſt its advances,

and that it was neceſſary to take the moſt 1721.
ſpeedy and effectual meaſures to put a ſtop both to the evil and the contagion. The ſureſt remedies were to be adopted, at the ſame time care was to be taken that commerce ſhould ſuffer as little as poſſible: the medium was not eaſy to be preſerved. The Regent caſt his eyes on the Marſhal of Berwick, as the perſon whom he knew to be moſt capable of executing properly a commiſſion of ſuch delicacy and importance. The Marſhal was at that time in a very indifferent ſtate of health; he was juſt ſetting out for the waters of Barege, when he was called upon to ſacrifice the care of his own health to that of the nation: he repaired without delay to Montauban, in order to be nearer to the infected provinces, as well as to thoſe which he was to preſerve from infection. To his government of Guienne were added, at this time, thoſe of Auvergne, the Bourbonnois, and Limouſin.

THE methods he propoſed were at firſt thought too ſtrong, though it was afterwards found that they were the only ones

1721. capable of putting a certain ſtop to the contagion: they were oppoſed by thoſe, who from too great a re[illegible] to commerce, or, perhaps under that pretence too great an attention to th[illegible] intereſts, had ſuffered the [illegible] to ſpread, and were unwilling to acknowledge their miſtake. Their argumen[illegible] were plauſible; and in the beginning the greater part of the miniſtry were perſuaded by them.

THE Chancellor d'Agueſſeau, who was placed by the Regent at the head of the *Council of Health*, eſtabliſhed on account of the plague, and ſome others of the greateſt ability in that council, agreed in opinion with the Marſhal of Berwick, whoſe advice was, to cut of all communication with the infected provinces. This was the moſt efficacious plan, and he purſued it as far as his government extended; but the majority of the council, having different views, prevailed; in conſequence of which, thoſe provinces which were not within the department of the Marſhal of Berwick, were regulated by other principles.

All

ALL the Governors of provinces which 1721.
were either attacked or threatened with the plague, kept an exact correſpondence with the Council of Health. It was impoſſible, therefore, to conceal the progreſs of the evil from them; the danger, which grew more preſſing every day, increaſed their fears; and thoſe fears working ſtrongly on the minds of the Council, brought them to more ſerious reflections. Every one then perceived that the Marſhal of Berwick had ſeen the object in its true light. The Regent, more convinced of this than any one, directed, that his arrangement ſhould be followed in every inſtance: his regulations were approved and adopted, and an order of the King's Council was formed upon them, which was publiſhed and ſent into the provinces that were infected with the peſtilence, and thoſe that bordered on them, with ſtrict injunctions that it ſhould be obſerved with the utmoſt exactneſs. The Chancellor d'Agueſſeau wrote to the Marſhal in theſe terms: "I have long ſaid, that we had "only to leave you to your own judg-

1721. "ment, and we ſhould be well taken "care of."

BUT it was not enough [illegible] regulations, unleſs they [illegible] carried into execution. [illegible] continued to rage in [illegible] ſpread itſelf more and [illegible] ferent parts of that [illegible] Auvergne and Rouvergue, [illegible] contagion at their door, as it were, were entirely preſerved from it by the wiſe orders of the Marſhal of Berwick, and particularly by his vigilance and activity.

THE Regent, ſtruck with this difference, and alarmed at the dreadful conſequences reſulting from it to the whole kingdom, determined to entruſt the Marſhal with the preſervation of all the provinces in the neighbourhood of the contagion. M. le Blanc, Secretary for the War department, wrote to him, by H. R. H.'s direction, to form a general plan of a line, ſuch as he had already propoſed, which H. R. H. was determined to purſue, and to confide in him alone for the execution of it: accordingly

ingly the neceſſary orders were diſpatch- 1721.
ed. It was recommended to him, however, at firſt, to keep them ſecret till the inſtant of their operation, on account of the Duke de Roquelaure, who was Governor of Languedoc; but there was little occaſion for a hint of that kind to him. A principle of caution and juſtice, by which he governed himſelf in all matters of buſineſs, had hitherto prevented his interfering in the preſervation of Languedoc, out of reſpect to the Duke of Roquelaure: and in the preſent circumſtance, there was more need of compulſion than reſtraint. In fact, the Regent, finding afterwards that his own management and the delicacy of the Marſhal might be attended with ill conſequences, thought it neceſſary to take a more decided part. "You (ſays "M. le Blanc, writing to him on the "part of H. R. H.) are much above "the ſuſpicion of encroaching upon "M. de Roquelaure's command; and "an apprehenſion of that nature ought "by no means to weigh with you againſt "the

1721. " the public good, which hath always " been your chief object."

THIS was touching the Marſhal in the part that was moſt ſenſible, and moſt capable of moving him; he felt that he could not, on any conſideration, refuſe to comply with what was required of him, the intereſt of the whole kingdom being ſo deeply concerned. In conſequence, he determined to ſend the Regent the plan he had conceived of a line guarded by troops, to cut off all communication between the provinces infected, or ſuppoſed to be ſo, and thoſe which the diſtemper had not yet reached. In this he propoſes, in order to ſupply the wants of the incloſed provinces, that care ſhould be taken on every ſide to ſend them all ſorts of proviſions, which ſhould be conveyed to the line, there to be diſtributed to the perſons who had demanded them, but ſo as that there ſhould be no communication, the commodities being depoſited by thoſe who carried them, at a certain ſpot within the line, to which thoſe who were to receive them were not to approach till the others had

had retired. This line was drawn from 1721.
the Mediterranean on the right, along the canal of Languedoc as far ar Beziers; from thence up the river Orbe to Rouergue, (an extent of about ten or twelve leagues); it was then continued by the frontiers of Rouergue, Auvergne, and Forez, and extended through Velay, on the left, to the Rhone. The Marſhal propoſed alſo, that the ſame orders ſhould be given on the other ſide of that river, to prevent all commerce and communication with Languedoc and Provence; and that theſe two provinces ſhould be ſupplied with neceſſaries from Lyons and Dauphiny, inſtead of Vivarais.

ALTHOUGH the Regent had expreſſed to the Marſhal of Berwick an earneſt deſire that he would take upon himſelf the whole command of this line, the Marſhal, notwithſtanding, propoſed to the Duke de Roquelaure, to have a conſultation with him at Beziers, intending to leave to him the honour of commanding that part of the line which ſhould be in Languedoc. Upon this occaſion M. le Blanc writes to the Marſhal, "Few

"perſons

1721. "perſons poſſeſs ſo elevated a mode of "thinking as you have ſhewn in this "inſtance. H. R. H. highly com- "mends your ſentiments; but has been "too long acquainted with you to be "ſurprized at them."

THE affair became ſo ſerious, that the Regent ſaw it would be quite unreaſonable to pay any reſpect to perſons that might put it in their power to defeat the precautions neceſſary to be taken for putting a ſtop to the evil; he therefore gave poſitive orders that the Marſhal ſhould command in Forez, and as far as the Rhone, in Velay and Vivarais, which conſtituted part of the government of Languedoc.

THOUGH no man was more firm than the Marſhal of Berwick in his adherence to principles he had once adopted upon mature deliberation, yet he was entirely free from obſtinacy; he never failed to relax from his ſtrictneſs as ſoon as he thought he might do it without prejudice to the ſervice he was employed upon: of this he gave a proof on the preſent occaſion. He thought that the abſolute

prohibition of all communication, which he had at firſt ſuggeſted, might be ſo far diſpenſed with, as that, the commerce between Lower and Upper Languedoc might be continued, provided it were confined to Beziers, and a month's quarantine eſtabliſhed. He ſtated this to the Regent; and accordingly the King iſſued an Order of Council agreeable to this new arrangement. 1721.

In the midſt of all theſe cares, he met with a freſh diſturbance on the part of the Parliament of Bourdeaux. He had eſtabliſhed in that city an Office of Health, conformable to the King's orders, to ſee that the proclamation he had iſſued for preſerving the province from contagion was duly executed. The Parliament complained to the Chancellor, that none of their body had been appointed to this office. The Chancellor wrote to the Marſhal of Berwick on the ſubject. His anſwer is remarkable.

"I did not think it proper (ſays he) "to appoint any officer of the Parlia- "ment, becauſe it appeared to me to be "neceſſary that there ſhould be no delay "in

1721. "in a buſineſs of this nature. The "extraordinary conduct of theſe Gentle- "men, on many occaſions, made me "judge, that they were not well qua- "lified for ſocieties, where union, con- "cord, and expedition are required; "and as long as I ſhall have the honour "of being Governor of that province, I "ſhall carefully avoid every opportunity "of entering into a diſpute with them. "Inſtead of deſiring to be concerned in "matters which the King hath thought "proper to commit to other hands, they "ought to apply themſelves to their "immediate functions, and not ſuffer, "by their abſence, that languor in the "courts of juſtice which conſumes the "parties for want of judges to deter- "mine their ſuits."

It would be forming a very falſe idea of the Marſhal of Berwick to ſuſpect him of having written this letter to indulge a peeviſh humour, or a ſpirit of cenſure. He thought it his duty to acquaint the Head of the Law with what might require to be redreſſed, and was of conſequence to public order in the Parliament

liament of the province, of which he 1721.
was Governor. The purity of his intentions and actions was ſuch, that all, without exception, who knew him, were convinced of this.

THE Chancellor, in his anſwer to this letter, ſays, "It muſt be acknowledged "that you would have had a very diffi-"cult taſk in concerting matters (with "the gentlemen of the Parliament).— "Beſides, the ſucceſs which Providence "ſtill continues to grant to your zeal "and vigilance, for the preſervation of "the country where you command, is "a ſufficient pledge not only of the "uprightneſs of your intentions, but of "the wiſdom and firmneſs of your con-"duct: we have therefore only to let "you act agreeable to your uſual pru-"dence."

THE diſtemper being confined to the infected countries, diſappeared in time; and through the arrangements and vigilance of the Marſhal, did not communicate itſelf to any of the neighbouring provinces.

THE

1721. THE whole country being purified, and no ſymptoms of the plague appearing in any part, the Marſhal of Berwick thought he might quit his command to go to Paris and the Court on his private affairs, which the public buſineſs had obliged him to neglect. Having obtained leave for this purpoſe, he arrived at Court in June 1722. He continued Governor of Guienne till the beginning of the year 1724.

1723. THE Duke of Orleans dying of an apoplexy on the ſecond of December 1723, the Duke of Bourbon immediately demanded the poſt of Prime Miniſter. Though care had been taken to inſtil into the young King a prejudice againſt that office, yet in his embarraſſment what anſwer to give, he did not dare to refuſe him. The Duke was no ſooner placed at the head of affairs, than a variety of changes took place in the different departments of adminiſtration: among other things, the provincial governments were ſuppreſſed, and of courſe that of Guienne.

RETIRED

RETIRED from affairs, and in the ſtate of idleneſs to which he was reduced, the Marſhal of Berwick paſſed the greater part of his time at his country-ſeat, and divided the reſt between the Court and the capital. He lived at Fitz-James, with his family and a few friends, employing himſelf in laying out his gardens. They had been planted by himſelf, and were the picture of his mind; every thing in them was in a grand ſtyle and in the beſt taſte. One of the firſt connoiſſeurs in this branch * walking in them one day, was in admiration. He aſked himſelf where this Engliſhman had acquired ſo much taſte. He might have been anſwered, *from his mode of conſidering objects, and the juſtneſs of his ideas.* In his manner of living, there was no oſtentation; all was uniform and ſimple. All his hours were fixed and appropriated: reading and walking were his chief occupations. He played but little, preferring converſation, in which he was gentle, amiable, and copious: he had ſeen 1724 to 1732.

* The Duke d'Antin, Superintendant of ſtructures.

ſo much; his life had been paſſed in the higheſt ſcenes of buſineſs; till this time, he had no repoſe. His ſoul, therefore, was now, for the firſt time, given up, as it were, to itſelf. The recollection of his paſt life, in which he had never had any other principle of action but the public good, gave ſo much ſerenity to a mind ſo well compoſed, that it was impoſſible for thoſe who lived in intimacy with him, not to ſee that he was happy. The ſight was an encouragement to virtue, and a ſurer recommendation of it than all the diſcourſes and writings of the moſt eloquent and pathetic moraliſts.

It was from this peaceful and happy life that he was called in 1733, to take upon him the command of the army then aſſembling on the Rhine. Lewis XV. not being able to ſend one into Poland to ſupport the lawful election of his father-in-law againſt the Emperor and Ruſſia, thought it equally juſt and glorious to revenge the inſults he had ſuſtained from thoſe two powers. He attacked the Emperor on the Rhine and in Italy; and the Kings of Spain and Sardinia

dinia joined their arms to his. The Emperor, indeed, ſucceeded in his deſign of placing the Elector of Saxony on the throne of Poland; but it coſt him the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily; and France, as a recompence for its generoſity, got Lorrain, which Lewis XIV. even in the height of his victories, could never obtain. Lewis XV. did, what his Great Grandfather could not have attempted to do without alarming all Europe, and drawing upon himſelf the united arms of its different Potentates. He attacked and overcame the Emperor: the Engliſh and Dutch, the natural allies of that Prince, took no part in the quarrel; they remained neuter, and friends to Lewis XV. who owed both that neutrality and his ſucceſs to the reputation he had acquired during the adminiſtration of Cardinal Fleury, of being a juſt and pacific Prince, and which he preſerved even when crowned with victory, by the moderation he diſplayed in it.

THE Marſhal of Berwick repaired to Straſburg in the beginning of September:

there was not yet any actual preparation for the buſineſs of a campaign. The Miniſter was even divided, among the different objects, what plan to fix upon; the Empire had not yet declared in favour of the Emperor; and it was thought proper to keep on good terms with that body. The queſtion therefore was, whether they ſhould fall upon Briſſac, which belonged to the Emperor, or upon the Imperial towns, Kell and Philipſburg. The Court had alſo another object very much at heart; this was the ſiege of Luxemburg: but the ſeaſon was already too far advanced to admit of the preparations, neceſſary for a ſiege of that importance, being made time enough to enable them to get poſſeſſion of the place before winter. Beſides, the Marſhal of Berwick looked upon the taking of Luxemburg to be leſs advantageous than the conqueſt of Philipſburg and Kell, which would ſecure the paſſage of the Rhine, and give us a more favourable opportunity of attacking the Emperor and the Empire, if it ſhould think fit to declare in his favour, which it did, and of ſup-

plying ourſelves with proviſions in a plentiful country, where we might live at the enemy's expence. The Marſhal's advice was followed.

The preparations for opening the campaign, and forming a ſiege, took up conſiderably more time than was expected. The army could not paſs the Rhine till the 13th of October. The next day Kell was inveſted, and on the 20th the trenches were opened. In the mean time the King cauſed a declaration to be made at Ratiſbon, that he intended to live upon good terms with all the Princes of the Germanic Body, who ſhould not enter into engagements contrary to his intereſt; that neceſſity obliged him to poſſeſs himſelf of the fortreſs of Kell, in order to ſecure a paſſage over the Rhine, as well for the purpoſe of offering more effectual aſſiſtance to the Empire againſt the oppreſſive meaſures of its Head, as to attack his enemy, the Emperor. The ſiege of Kell was not of long duration: the ordinary methods were employed, and the place capitulated on the 29th. The ſeaſon was too far advanced to think of

making further conqueſts, and the ſiege of Philipſburg was reſerved for the opening of the next campaign.

Two different memorials had been preſented to the Marſhal of Berwick, containing plans, as they were called, for covering Champagne, and preventing the enemy from levying contributions in that province: but the defence of it, according to theſe propoſed plans, would have coſt infinitely more both to the King and the province, and have proved more vexatious to the people, than even the contributions themſelves. For theſe reaſons, and ſeveral others, the Marſhal of Berwick rejected them: it was difficult not to ſuſpect the perſons who propoſed them of being influenced by other views than thoſe of the public good. No act of hoſtility had been committed on that ſide by either party; and a reciprocal neutrality was preſerved the year after, with reſpect to the countries of Luxemburg and Champagne. The Marſhal acquainted the King of the arrangements he had made in order to march his army to the Maeſe, the Moſelle and the Sarre, in caſe the enemy

ſhould

ſhould chooſe to attack us in that part; but throughout this firſt campaign, which was very ſhort, no enemy appeared. Towards the latter end of October, the bridge of Fort Lewis and the fortifications of Schelingen were repaired; and another bridge was built over the Rhine, at Hunninguen, it being thought proper to have a paſſage in Upper Alſace. In the firſt week of November the army repaſſed the Rhine, and went into winter quarters.

THE Marſhal of Berwick propoſed to open the campaign very early with the ſiege of Philipſburg. The poſſeſſion of this new paſſage, which he meant in the firſt inſtance to ſecure, over the Rhine, was the baſis of all his projects; but before he could get to it, it was neceſſary either to force the lines of Etlingen, which the enemy had formed during the winter, above Philipſburg, and which, by covering that place, ſhut up the country from the river to the mountains; or to render them uſeleſs by paſſing the Rhine below them. This project could not be executed without great difficulty, unleſs by being before-

hand with the enemy, and taking the field before they had aſſembled all their force. Beſide this, there was another reaſon; the place muſt be beſieged either in ſpring or autumn, on account of the overflowing of the Rhine, which uſually happens in ſummer from the melting of the ſnow, and makes a ſiege, if not impracticable, at leaſt highly difficult and dangerous in that ſeaſon. The Marſhal of Berwick accordingly ſet out at the latter end of March 1734, for Straſburg, where he arrived on the 30th; but he found nothing in readineſs; whether it were, that the Court had too long delayed iſſuing the orders, or that the execution of them had been neglected. This delay, however, had the appearance of not being the effect of chance, but of intrigue. The horſes for the artillery and proviſions were not yet at their place of deſtination; nay, the greateſt part of them were not yet purchaſed, though M. d'Angervilliers, Secretary for the War Department, had aſſured the Marſhal, that they ſhould be got together in Alſace by the beginning of April,

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to the number of eighteen hundred for the artillery, (without reckoning the piquet horſes) and five thouſand for the proviſions. The Marſhal, however, had continued all the winter to preſs the Miniſters upon the ſubject of preparations for the campaign, repreſenting to them always in the ſtrongeſt terms, how eſſential it was not to loſe a moment, if they meant to inſure ſucceſs to the important ſiege of Philipſburg; but it is the misfortune of Courts to be governed, for the moſt part, by intriguing perſons and favourites, to whom they liſten more readily than even to perſons of the moſt acknowledged merit.

FOURTEEN years of command, with uninterrupted ſucceſs and glory, were not ſufficient to induce the Miniſtry to place an entire confidence in the Marſhal of Berwick, for the operations of this campaign. The Count de Belleiſle, afterwards Marſhal of France, had, beſide the favour of the Court, the credit to be liſtened to, and by his enthuſiaſm and peremptory aſſeverations, even to ſeduce Cardinal Fleury and the reſt of the Miniſters,

who

who were either Churchmen or of the long robe, and conſequently little capable of forming a right judgment on military projects. He oppoſed thoſe of the Marſhal of Berwick in a multitude of memorials, which he was continually pouring into the cloſets of the Miniſters; and in which his own intereſt generally appeared to ſtand foremoſt, becauſe he never knew how to diſguiſe it. Though he ſhewed more ambition than real talents, yet it muſt be acknowledged, that he was capable of the moſt extenſive details; but as he carried every thing to exceſs, he entered ſo deeply into the minutiæ, that he was overwhelmed with them: his ambition miſled him in almoſt every inſtance, becauſe his views were always perſonal and intereſted; his head, which was always in a flame, carried him beyond the truth into the boundleſs region of chimeras. He uſed ſuch vigour and activity in his endeavours to have his plans adopted, that he often carried his point with the Miniſters almoſt in ſpite of themſelves; yet he could not ſucceed this time in the

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manner he wiſhed. In the month of January, this year *, he had made a ſerious propoſal to the Miniſtry for conducting the army through all Germany, carrying it as far as Saxony and Bohemia, and even ſtill further. Of conſequence he endeavoured to overturn every other plan for the campaign, and gave in, at the ſame time, a memorial againſt the ſiege of Philipſburg. The Marſhal of Berwick diſapproved of theſe projects: it was raſhneſs, in his opinion, to think of leading an army above an hundred and fifty leagues from the frontiers, eſpecially without any certain communication with France; and he had no difficulty in convincing the King of the abſurdity of the project, when he explained to him his reaſons. The King alludes to them in his letter to the Marſhal of Berwick of the 8th of May. "It is "certain, ſays that Prince, that the "conqueſt of Philipſburg is to be pre-"ferred to every other object, for many "reaſons, with which you are acquaint-

* M. d'Angervilliers' letter of 24th January, 1734.

"ed

" ed as well as myſelf." The project, therefore, of the Count de Belleiſle was rejected *. He then contented himſelf with propoſing the ſiege of the caſtle of Traerbach, and obtained an order to undertake it. From that time this became the firſt ſtep, notwithſtanding the ſtrong reaſons aſſigned by the Marſhal of Berwick, who had made it appear, that we ought to begin with Philipſburg. The Court had occaſion more than once to repent of not having followed implicitly the more deliberate and conſiſt-

*It was better received in 1741, at the dea thof the Emperor Charles VI. but the ſucceſs, as every body knows, was not anſwerable to the expectations and promiſes of the Count de Belleiſle, then Marſhal of France: which clearly proves how unreaſonable it muſt have been in 1734, when we had to engage the power of the whole Houſe of Auſtria, joined to that of the empire, which declared for the Emperor; whereas in 1741, we had at firſt only the forces of the Queen of Hungary to combat with for the execution of the project, and we had for allies the two moſt powerful Princes of the Empire, the King of Pruſſia and the Elector of Saxony; without reckoning the Emperor and the influence of the Imperial Authority. The Engliſh, Dutch, and the King of Sardinia did not declare againſt us till 1743 and 1744.

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ent plans of the Marſhal of Berwick, and of having, in ſome inſtances, given the preference to the ſcholar inſtead of the maſter. The Count de Belleiſle, lately promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General, had ſcarcely yet ſerved, in time of war, in a higher capacity than that of Brigadier, and had not been employed on any enterprize of moment.

M. D'ANGERVILLIERS, in order to remove the difficulties which the Marſhal of Berwick objected againſt putting off the ſiege of Philipſburg till ſummer, ſent him word in his letter of 5th of April, that as there had been but little ſnow that year, there would be no inundation. But the ſeaſon and the elements were not ſo complaiſant to the Miniſters. The heats were violent, and occaſioned an unuſual melting of ſnow in the black-mountains; the quantity, which accumulates on their ſummits, never being thoroughly exhauſted, however great the melting may be. The Rhine ſwelled and overflowed this year more than uſual, and the Court had determined to run the riſque. The Miniſter

ſter acquainted the Marſhal, that the King was extremely deſirous the ſiege of Philipſburg ſhould be undertaken, although in the ſummer ſeaſon, and that he would be greatly mortified if it could not be purſued. It became neceſſary, therefore, to reſolve upon it. From that moment the Marſhal of Berwick thought of nothing but how to ſurmount the obſtacles he had himſelf foreſeen and foretold, and which he muſt expect to meet with.

It was to be ſuppoſed, that Prince Eugene would have time enough to aſſemble the forces of the Emperor and Empire, before the concluſion of the ſiege, in order to march to Philipſburg, and try to attack us, or endeavour to draw us off from the ſiege, by making a diverſion on the Moſelle, or on the Upper Rhine, that he might be able to engage us with all his forces united, while ours would be weakened by the troops we ſhould have left at the ſiege, and thus by obtaining a victory, oblige us to raiſe it. It was likewiſe neceſſary to provide againſt an inundation of

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the Rhine. The Marſhal of Berwick was never ſurprized by events; becauſe his active foreſight had always thought of ſome remedy among the accidental circumſtances that might attend them. He communicated to the King his plans and diſpoſitions. Thirty-five battalions and twenty ſquadrons were deſtined for the ſiege: with the reſt of his force, conſiſting of ſeventy-five or eighty battalions and a hundred and twenty ſquadrons, he formed an army of obſervation, ready to move on any ſide, and to oppoſe Prince Eugene wherever he might appear. He meant to draw lines of circumvallation round Philipſburg, and to make them impregnable; they were to be manned with a hundred battalions: in this ſituation he was determined to receive Prince Eugene, if he came with his whole force, which he did.

Some of the General Officers were of opinion that he ſhould not waſt for the enemy in his lines: they were for marching out to meet Prince Eugene, and continued in great anxiety during the whole time of the ſiege. It is however agreed, that

that the ſoldiers were not under the leaſt apprehenſion: they ſeemed even to wiſh for an attack, relying upon their own courage, and believing themſelves perfectly ſecure in a poſition choſen for them by a General, in whom they had an entire confidence. The Marſhal of Berwick thought, with M. de Luxemburg *, that intrenchments, formed with every advantage that art could give, and of ſo ſmall an extent, as to admit of being defended throughout by two lines of infantry, could not poſſibly be forced. It appeared by the event, that Prince Eugene's opinion was the ſame, as he never ventured to attack our lines; for, critical as the ſituation of the French army might then be conſidered, he would not have heſitated to engage them in their intrenchments, if he had had the leaſt hope of ſucceeding.

THE Marſhal of Berwick, though too prudent ever to promiſe any thing lightly, was ſo aſſured of the effect of his operations, that he did not ſcruple to write to the King in the moſt poſitive

* See the Memoirs, Vol. I. p. 84.

terms,

terms, and like a man who had no doubt of the ſucceſs of the ſiege: "When we "are got before the place, ſays he, we "will endeavour to remove the obſtacle "of the waters, either by making drains "to reduce them as we can, or by em-"ploying a quantity of faſcines for car-"rying on our trenches: the worſt that "can happen, is, that we may be obliged "to ſuſpend our operations for ſome "time, in order to renew them with "more vigour, when the waters are "ſunk." In a word, Sire, we will wait "patiently in our well-intrenched camp, "till the difficulties are removed, and "we will make ourſelves maſters of "Philipſburg, even though we ſhould "be obliged to wait till the month of "October."

NOTWITSTANDING theſe abſolute aſ-ſurances, the Court was thrown, a ſhort time after, into the moſt terrible alarm; and at the critical moment when it happened, the Marſhal of Berwick, on whom they would have had an entire reliance, was no longer exiſting.

But to return to the operations at the opening of the campaign. The Marſhal of Berwick aſſembled part of the army in April, and went to encamp on the 9th at Spires and Little Holland, from which he covered the road to Philipſburg: he extended his troops as far as Frankendal and Worms. By this movement, he made the enemy apprehenſive for the Lower Rhine, and kept them in doubt with reſpect to our deſigns. The operations of the army being put a ſtop to by the ſiege of Traerbach, where the Count de Belleiſle could not open his trenches till the night between the 25th and 26th of this month, they remained in the ſame poſition till the end of April. They were then put in motion, and coaſted along the Rhine up to Fort Lewis, where they croſſed the river, and marched immediately to the lines at Etlingen. As ſoon as the enemy got intelligence of our march, they were convinced that our deſign was upon their lines, and they brought up accordingly all their force. But, notwithſtanding the delay we had ſuffered

in our operations on that ſide, we were ſtill before-hand with them. They had not been able, in their hurry, to collect more than thirty thouſand men, under the command of the Duke of Bevern. The lines had been formed with a good deal of care; they were furniſhed with a good ditch, redans at certain diſtances, which flanked each other, and an excellent parapet. On the left, they were continued along the mountain to which they extended; from thence they croſſed the plain, and their right was carried on to the Rhine, near Mulberg. Though they occupied a ſpace not leſs than four leagues, the Princes of the Circles of the Lower Rhine looked upon them as a ſufficient barrier to keep us out. This conſideration had even been ſuggeſted by the Emperor's Miniſters as a motive to determine the Diet of the Empire to declare againſt France, as it had done.

Lieutenant-General the Duke de Noailles, and Major-General Count Saxe (both of them afterwards Marſhals of France) were ordered to turn the lines by

the mountains, which they performed. But what the Marſhal of Berwick depended moſt upon for obliging the enemy to abandon their lines, was a body of twenty thouſand men he had left near Spires, under the command of the Marquis d'Aſfeld. That General had inſtructions, as ſoon as he ſhould be informed that the enemy had brought up their whole force to the lines, in order to defend them againſt the grand army, to march to the iſle of Nekerau, below Philipſburg, to throw a bridge over the Rhine at that place, and to paſs it: for this purpoſe he carried one along with him upon ſledges. By this manœuvre, combined with the motions of the grand army, the Marſhal of Berwick was certain, that, as ſoon as the enemy knew that d'Aſfeld had paſſed the Rhine, and could be reinforced with as many troops as he ſhould want to attack them with advantage in the rear, they would think of nothing but quitting their lines and retreating. Accordingly, upon the news of M. d'Aſfeld's having croſſed the Rhine, they retreated

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on the 4th of May, the very day we turned their lines, and with ſuch expedition, that it was impoſſible to come up with their rear-guard, at leaſt to make any impreſſion upon it. They retired to Hailbron, and during theſe movements, Prince Eugene joined his army. Traerbach had juſt ſurrendered to the Count de Belleiſle. Our army marched from the lines to Bruchſal, where M. d'Asfeld rejoined us on the 11th, with the corps under his command.

On the 13th M. d'Asfeld was detached with thirty battalions and two regiments of dragoons to inveſt Philipſburg, whither the army followed him. The trenches were opened between the 3d and 4th of June, and the attack was carried on along the Rhine againſt the horn-work: ſome days before an attack had been made by the Swiſs on the work that covered the draw-bridge of the town, upon the left bank on the other ſide of the Rhine. The taking of that work was attended with this ſingular advantage, that we could erect batteries on that ſhore, which would

command the backs and interior parts of the works of the town, which lay on the Rhine, and beat them to pieces. This was what had partly determined the Marſhal of Berwick in his choice of directing his attack along the ſide of the river. It was on the ſame ſide, that this place, when beſieged by the Dauphin and M. de Vauban in 1688, had been taken. Of the three attacks made at that time, this was the moſt ſucceſsful.

It might be ſuppoſed by officers, whoſe moderate talents and ill-digeſted notions lead them almoſt always into falſe applications of great models, that the Marſhal of Berwick, in imitation of M. de Vauban, ought to have made three attacks; but the Marſhal, who was known to be one of the moſt enlightened Generals in the ſcience of engineering, was too ſkilful and too deliberate to depart from a plan laid down by Vauban without good reaſons. It was eaſy for him to conceive that Prince Eugene, as ſoon as he had collected all his force, might march to Philipſburg, with a view of attacking his lines; on ſuch a ſuppoſition,

poſition, it was of importance to confine himſelf to one attack, that he might not have three intrenchments to defend, and too great a number of troops employed, which would weaken the army that was to face Prince Eugene, if he ſhould come to a reſolution of attacking the lines. The Dauphin and Vauban, in 1688, had not the ſame reaſons: they were not at that time in fear of any enemy in the field that could come to interrupt the ſiege: beſides, it was formed at the end of October, and the troops, after this ſervice, had nothing more to do but to go and take their eaſe in winter quarters. The three attacks, under theſe circumſtances, appear to have been well imagined for the purpoſe of fatiguing the garriſon, and making its reſiſtance weaker at each attack, by dividing its forces. It muſt, however, likewiſe be acknowledged, that this method has its inconveniences in ſome caſes; it increaſes the labour and fatigue of the beſiegers, and even much more in proportion than that of the beſieged. It may alſo be ſuppoſed, that it is fre-

quently expedient to employ a little more time in a ſiege, than to haſten the concluſion of it by over fatiguing the troops; and bringing on, by that means, diſorders, which are deſtructive to an army. Every body knows that the labours of a ſiege are immenſe, and that they are multiplied by every additional attack. The ſiege of Philipſburg, in 1734, was formed at the opening of the campaign; and it was of the utmoſt conſequence to preſerve the health of the army as much as poſſible, to keep it upon a footing with that of the enemy, which was quite freſh, newly come out of quarters, and againſt which they would have to act for four months in the field, after the concluſion of the ſiege.

THE Marſhal of Berwick never depended upon any perſon for what he could ſee or do himſelf. It was he, properly ſpeaking, who directed the ſiege. He never failed to viſit the trenches very early every morning, where a report was immediately made to him of the progreſs during the night. He then repaired to the extremity of the Sap, to make his

his own obſervations on the ſtate of things, after which he ſettled with the chief Engineer the operations of the following night. On the 12th of June, he went as uſual to the trenches, viſited the Saps, and placed himſelf on the raiſed ground to take a general view. One of our batteries was pointed at the bank on which the Marſhal ſtood; ſome ſoldiers had been killed there by our own cannon; and a ſentinel had even been placed near the ſpot, to hinder any perſon from ſtopping there, and particularly from getting upon the bank. Whether the ſentinel did not dare to ſpeak to his General, or whether the Marſhal, influenced by his natural intrepidity, which always led him to deſpiſe danger too much, had not paid ſufficient attention to the notice, this was preciſely the ſpot he choſe for his obſervations. The poſition was exactly between our battery and the oppoſite one of the enemy; they both fired at an inſtant; and a ball carried off the Marſhal's head, but from which ſide it came could never be thoroughly aſcertained. The report of his death was ſoon

ſpread through the army, and cauſed a general conſternation: it had the ſame effect at Court and in Paris; for he was poſſeſſed of the confidence of the army, the King, the Miniſtry, and the nation. The enemy feared him as a General, who had accompliſhed great things, and had ever been fortunate. His death left the army in a ſituation, which many thought critical; it was encloſed within lines, encompaſſing a ſtrong place, to the aſſiſtance of which Prince Eugene was coming up with all poſſible ſpeed at the head of a formidable army *. The ſecret of his plans died with him; it was only known in general that they were very great. Notwithſtanding his uſual moderation, he had, during the expedition of Traerbach, diſcovered his impatience at the delay that ſiege occaſioned in his grand operations.

THE Marquis d'Asfeld, who, immediately after the death of the Marſhal of Berwick, took upon him, as the eldeſt Lieutenant-General, the command of the

* The number was ſaid to amount to a hundred thouſand men.

army,

army, lay quiet in his lines facing Prince Eugene. He continued the operations of the ſiege in ſpite of that General and of the overflowing of the Rhine, and made himſelf maſter of Philipſburg on the 18th of July. The campaign cloſed with this conqueſt.

THOUGH Lord Bolingbroke, in what he ſays of the Marſhal of Berwick, has pretended to no more than ſketching out ſome of the principal features of his portrait, and the Preſident Monteſquieu was prevented by death from finiſhing that which he had begun, we ſhall not attempt to draw a picture of him after two ſuch able maſters: we ſhall only deſire permiſſion to deſcribe ſome features, which they have omitted, leaving to ſome other and more ſkilful hand, the buſineſs of collecting them together, and making a finiſhed piece.

WE have ſeen the Marſhal of Berwick, in the long courſe of a laborious life, atchieving memorable exploits; but he appeared each time ſo ſuperior to what he was before, however great, that he was ſtill believed capable of greater things.

It

It may therefore, with truth, be ſaid of him, that he had more greatneſs in him than he had opportunity of ſhewing, acting as he always did by the moſt ſimple proceſs, and never endeavouring to diſplay himſelf to advantage.

THE Marſhal of Berwick poſſeſſed all the requiſites for a warrior; but it would take up too much time to enter into a detail of them; it would be, in a manner, writing a treatiſe on the art of war. Every military man, who will ſtudy his campaigns, will admire, in the plans of them, the juſtneſs of view, the extent of combination, and the character of genius throughout: he will not diſcover the leaſt fault in the execution of them; he will ſee, that the meaſures were ſo ſkilfully taken, that the ſucceſs was almoſt always inſured beforehand: no General had the coup d'œil quicker or more accurate, whether in action to diſcover the means of advantage, and make thoſe deciſive movements which carry victory with them, or in a campaign to obſerve and take advantageous poſitions, upon which the ſuc-

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ceſs of the whole depends. He was more than any man maſter of the art of ſubſiſting an army; we have ſeen the care and pains his activity enabled him to employ, and the reſources he found out to ſupply his own with proviſions in 1709, when they were in want of every thing; but he was moſt remarkable for his extraordinary ſkill in the arrangement of his proviſions, and the judicious choice of depôts, by which, and the conſequences reſulting from it, the event of campaigns is often determined. Thoſe, in which he commanded, were not without that brilliancy which attracts the admiration of mankind in general; but to diſtinguiſh and feel the whole merit of them, requires profeſſional knowledge and a nice examination: they bear the characteriſtic mark, which is always found in the works of great maſters; the more one dwells on them, the more one ſeparates and examines the minuter parts, the more perfection is diſcovered; they have in them, for the moſt part, peculiarities, which diſtinguiſh them from the campaigns of other Generals;

Generals; one can ſcarcely caſt an eye over them without obſerving, almoſt in every inſtance, a particular ſtroke of genius which marks them for his own.

How many ſtriking examples, in proof of what we have advanced, might we produce from theſe Memoirs? It would be ſufficient to call to mind the four campaigns he made in Dauphiny. In the protection of that frontier he carried the art of defence further perhaps than any General had ever done. Marſhal Catinat had been employed in 1692 to conduct the ſame kind of war in the ſame country; but he did not ſupport the reputation he had before acquired in Piedmont in the offenſive war he had carried on againſt the Duke of Savoy. We cannot even but remark a wide difference between the method he took of defending the frontier at that time, and the plan upon which the Marſhal of Berwick defended it ſeveral years after. Beſides this, Marſhal Catinat was ſuperior in force to his enemy; the Marſhal of Berwick always inferior. M. de Catinat had, according to M. de Feuquieres,

eres *, an army compoſed of a hundred battalions and forty ſquadrons diſperſed along the frontier; yet, in ſpite of ſo large a number of troops, and the acknowledged ability and vigilance of M. de Catinat, the Duke of Savoy, with a force greatly inferior in infantry, contrived to penetrate into France. He took Embrun in the rear of our army; and would even have proceeded further into Dauphiny, if he had not been ſeized with the Small-pox at Embrun, which attacked him ſo ſeverely that it put a ſtop to his expedition. From this inſtance, and ſeveral plauſible arguments, M. de Feuquieres concludes, in his Memoirs †, that "it "is not poſſible to maintain a defenſive "war in that part without ſuſtaining "ſome inconveniencies annually."

MARSHAL Villars did not ſucceed better than Marſhal Catinat in the defence of this ſame frontier in 1708, though he alſo had an army ſuperior in infantry to that of the Duke of Savoy; he could not

* Mem. de Feuquieres, tom. ii. p. 192, 12mo, 1750.

† Ibid. p. 147.

hinder

hinder that Prince from beſieging and taking Exilles and Feneſtrelle, the garriſons of which places he even made priſoners of war.

We may therefore conſider that which the Marſhal of Berwick ſent to Lewis XIV. in 1709, as a certain plan of defence for our Italian frontier. In fact, it was by purſuing uniformly the ſame plan through four ſucceſſive campaigns, that he checked the advances of the Duke of Savoy during that whole period, and kept him from penetrating into the kingdom in any part, notwithſtanding the projects he had formed, and in ſpite of the ſuperiority of his forces at that time, in infantry as well as cavalry. Accordingly that Prince, ſince King of Sardinia, who was, no doubt, well qualified to decide upon the merit of Generals and campaigns, was uſed to ſay, in ſpeaking of thoſe which the Marſhal of Berwick had made againſt him, "that he "had never ſeen ſo good manœuvres, "nor ſo ſkilful and noble a method of "making war."

As it is our intention to point out whatever may beſt contribute to a thorough knowledge of the Marſhal of Berwick's military talents, we ought not to omit two circumſtances. This defenſive plan, the greateſt perhaps and moſt difficult to be deviſed, on account of the extent and nature * of the country to be covered by it, and, when diſcovered, the ſafeſt and moſt eaſy to be executed, was the reſult of a ſingle journey the Marſhal took from one end to the other of the frontier, before the opening of the firſt campaign. The ſecond circumſtance, which is not leſs remarkable, is, that this plan, which, from the immenſity of its combinations, ſeems to be a prodigy of calculation, was ſo complete from the inſtant it was conceived, that he had not occaſion to make the ſmalleſt change in it afterwards; he ventured conſtantly to aſſure Lewis XIV. of the goodneſs and ſafety of his defenſive plan; the ſucceſs of which, repeated each campaign againſt an able general, was the beſt proof that could be given of it. The experience

* More than 60 leagues in length acroſs the Alps.

he acquired in theſe four campaigns we are ſpeaking of, furniſhed him with the knowledge, that upon his plan an army of forty-five battalions and twenty ſquadrons were ſufficient to defend the whole frontier againſt an army of ſixty or ſeventy battalions and fifty ſquadrons.

THE difference we find, upon a compariſon between the defenſive plan of the Marſhal of Berwick and thoſe of the other Generals, with reſpect to the number of troops each of them required, in proportion to what he ſuppoſed the enemy to have for the offenſive, may reaſonably ſurprize us: Marſhal Catinat had always demanded one third more infantry than the enemy had; the Marſhal of Berwick limited himſelf to one-third leſs at the end of the four campaigns he made. This great difference can proceed only from the new and ſuperior manner of defence which the Marſhal of Berwick invented, and which had eſcaped the penetration of the greateſt Generals. M. de Feuquieres was well apprized of the advantage of a central poſition for moving to any point of the circumference,

and preventing the attack of an enemy; but he did not, like the Marſhal of Berwick, conceive the application of it to the defence of that frontier by means of ſuch a line as the latter formed an idea of, and the extent of which is aſtoniſhing.

His campaigns in Spain may equally ſerve as models for military men to copy after; he was there alternately upon the offenſive and defenſive. It would be more than uſeleſs to recite his manœuvres; he has done it himſelf in his Memoirs much better than it could be done here; we ſhall only obſerve, that he ſhewed in that ſituation that he was never greater than in misfortunes, and when matters were thought deſperate: in unforeſeen and critical events he was, as it were, the man of the moment, the reſource of the Court, and even of the Generals. He was ſent from Spain in the middle of the campaign of 1707, to the Duke of Burgundy, in Provence, who was marching to the relief of Toulon, then beſieged by the Duke of Savoy. After the battle of Malplaquet in 1709, he received orders to repair from

Brianzon, where he had juſt finiſhed the campaign, to the army in Flanders, which was commanded by Marſhal Boufflers, ſince the wound of Marſhal Villars. Lewis XIV. at the inſtance of Marſhal Villars, diſpatched him into Flanders to ſuccour Douay. At the end of the year 1712, he was but juſt arrived at Court from Dauphiny, when they ſent him ſtrait into Catalonia to preſerve Gironne, which was blockaded by Count Staremberg, and reduced to the laſt extremity.

In the hurry of the moſt difficult operations, and the heat of the warmeſt actions, the Marſhal of Berwick preſerved that tranquillity and coolneſs which is the effect of natural intrepidity, and a perfect knowledge of that art, which in ſhewing us all we have to fear from an enemy, points out at the ſame time what we have to oppoſe to him. This tranquillity of mind was likewiſe the conſequence of that firmneſs and reſolution which places the wiſe man ſo far above the reach of accidents, becauſe he never has any thing to reproach himſelf with. In all his enterprizes he had

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likewiſe that ſucceſs which, for the moſt part, attends a great man, becauſe his enlarged underſtanding enables him to comprehend the whole of his object; nothing eſcapes him; the accuracy of his judgment forms true combinations, and never fails to point out the proper path; in a word, becauſe the diligence he uſes in the execution of his deſigns, and which is the guarantee of ſucceſs, is always under the direction of prudence.

FEW men had ſeen ſo much ſervice as the Marſhal of Berwick; he had made twenty-nine campaigns; in fifteen of which he had commanded in chief; he had however been preſent at but ſix battles, of which there was only one, that of Almanza, where he commanded. It may perhaps be matter of ſurprize, that in the great number of campaigns, where he was at the head of armies, and eſpecially with that diſtinguiſhed bravery he had always ſhewn, there ſhould be but one battle fought under his command; he explains this himſelf. He ſaid, in order to come to an engagement both the Commanders muſt be of a mind, and

that no General ought to fight but when he could not do otherwiſe, becauſe the iſſue was always uncertain; and that it was not right to endanger the ſucceſs of a campaign, or a war, perhaps even the fate of a nation, when one might by good diſpoſitions and able manœuvres equally accompliſh the object without riſquing a battle. He did not however avoid battles in ſuch a manner as to draw upon himſelf the imputation of timidity, becauſe the honour of an army requires that there ſhould be no ſigns of fear, becauſe he held honour above every thing; becauſe he was not afraid of engaging (which he fully ſhewed in the field of Almanza); and finally, becauſe an appearance of timidity in the General would have been realized in the ſoldier. If therefore we do not find him courting battles, which is too often the caſe of heroes, and if he placed himſelf above the ſplendor which the lives of great Captains derive from them, it was, if we may venture to ſay ſo, the conſequence of a ſuperior heroiſm. He conſidered it as a duty to avoid the ſpilling of

blood

blood unneceſſarily, and to prefer at all times a ſure game, with reſpect to the general good, to any private honour he might flatter himſelf with an expectation of, from battles, in which his ſkill would generally have given him every advantage againſt his adverſary.

THIS grand principle of humanity ſwayed him equally in ſieges. He was always attentive to ſave the lives of his men; he choſe, for their preſervation, rather to carry on the ſap inch by inch, and to prolong the duration of a ſiege ſeveral days, than to cut it ſhort by thoſe violent and deſtructive attacks which are made at the expence of ſo much valuable blood.

No man exerciſed command with greater dignity. He was, indeed, taxed with ſeverity; but thoſe who knew him well, ſaid, that he was rather exact than ſevere. Being entirely free from pedantry, he was, in fact, ſevere only from a ſenſe of duty, ſo far as reſpected others, and was more rigid to himſelf than to them. This exactneſs was likewiſe, in ſome degree, the reſult of a love of order and

diſcipline, which he poſſeſſed in the higheſt degree; knowing all the importance and neceſſity of keeping up both the one and the other, particularly in armies. Hiſtory, which will ſhew that he knew how to command, can likewiſe atteſt, that he knew how to obey; two qualities very rarely to be found in the ſame perſon. Educated in the principle of paſſive obedience, he was the moſt ſubmiſſive of ſubjects to his Prince, and the moſt zealous for his ſervice. This ſubmiſſion, however, which was the invariable rule of his conduct, was neither mean nor blind; he would oppoſe the Miniſters of the greateſt Princes with a firmneſs not to be ſhaken, and even bordering upon obſtinacy, when the points in queſtion related merely to war; becauſe he thought the advantage muſt evidently be on his ſide in the diſcuſſion of matters, with which he was much better acquainted than thoſe who endeavoured to overrule his judgment.

The ſame firmneſs he ſhewed alſo upon ſome occaſions, when in particular operations of war he differed from the great

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maſters of the art, becauſe he had a ſtrong and clear conviction that they were miſtaken. He was too great an adept in every part of war, and of too ſolid a judgment, to ſubmit to their deciſions with that blind confidence by which the generality of men are governed. Senſible that men of the profoundeſt ſkill may ſometimes err, he examined as well his own opinions as thoſe of others, with that impartiality, which, when joined to a ſagacity and reflection like the Marſhal of Berwick's, always leads to truth. For this reaſon, in beſieging the caſtle of Nice in 1705, after having thoroughly inſpected and reconnoitred the place, he was not afraid of deviating from the advice of Marſhal Vauban, communicated to him by Lewis XIV. and to attack that fortreſs on the very ſide which Vauban had declared could not be attacked. The ſucceſs, and the lights which were acquired in this ſiege, proved that the Marſhal of Berwick's judgment and choice in the ſide of his attack were preferable; that he had diſcovered what had eſcaped the no-

tice of profeſſors of the art, and that his genius ſometimes made him ſuperior to the greateſt maſters. But there was ſo much ſimplicity and ſo little ſelf-ſufficiency in his manner of oppoſing the ſentiments of thoſe he differed from, that it was not eaſy to be offended with him.

ALTHOUGH the life of the Marſhal of Berwick is ſcarcely to be conſidered in any but a military view, yet he ſhewed that he could likewiſe have been an able politician. He was for ſeveral years miniſter to * * * *, known by the name of the Chevalier de St. George. His plan for the re-eſtabliſhment of that Prince in 1715, after the death of Queen Anne, demonſtrates that he had great penetration in thoſe matters, and was capable of diſcovering and taking advantage of circumſtances which had eſcaped the obſervation of others. He proves in his Memoirs, that the ſucceſs of the enterprize, ſituated as affairs were at that time, was infallible: there wanted but one word from the King of Sweden, which would have been as much for his

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intereſt as for that of ****†, and the revolution in England would have been effected.

THE Marſhal of Berwick was not without ambition; but that paſſion, which more or leſs miſleads almoſt every man who is poſſeſſed with it, never made him deviate from the path of virtue. He was fond of glory; but he ſought it chiefly in the line of his duty, which no one knew or performed better than himſelf. Far different from thoſe who acquit themſelves with a ſervile caution, and always ſeem to be on their guard leſt they ſhould do too much, he meaſured the extent of his duty by his talents, perſuaded that the uſe and the account of them is due to God, from whom they were received; to one's King and one's country, for the ſervice of which they were given; and to one's ſelf, for the eaſe of one's conſcience. There is no modern better calculated than the Marſhal of Berwick to renew the idea of the great men of antiquity, particularly the Greeks. Their chief ſtudy was mora-

† The Pretender.

lity;

lity; and they placed their glory in the accompliſhment of their duties. If Ariſtides, Epaminondas, Fabius, or Cato had appeared in our wretched age, and been circumſtanced as the Marſhal of Berwick was, they would have been what he was in every reſpect. The internal ſenſe of an enlightened conſcience, the integrity of which is preſerved ſolely by the practice of virtue, was the guide of this Chriſtian Hero in all his actions. The object of theſe was that truly great end which religion preſents, and which alone is capable of fixing and concentring all the deſires of man. Attached to true and great principles, with great elevation of ſoul, his conduct was ſimple; modeſty and truth ever compoſed and marked his character. He was cautious not to praiſe any but thoſe who deſerved it; attentive to ſpeak ill of none; and never made himſelf the theme of his diſcourſe. Although impenetrable where ſecreſy was neceſſary, his frankneſs and the certainty of not being deceived by him, exacted from others that confidence which

ſmooths

ſmooths the greateſt difficulties in buſineſs.

NEVER did Patriot carry the love of the public further, or manifeſt a more fixed deſire of acquitting himſelf well of the truſt repoſed in him: this was his ruling paſſion; and it was ſo ſtrong, that he would employ even the man who had endeavoured to do him miſchief, in preference to others, if he thought him more likely to promote the ſucceſs of a buſineſs; thus appearing to forget all cauſes of perſonal animoſity, which he might have, but with which his ſoul was only lightly affected. It was by this generous, truly noble, and public ſpirited proceeding that he made real friends of thoſe who were capable of gratitude; and who, aſhamed of the injuſtice of their former ſentiments reſpecting him, became the greateſt admirers of his virtues, and were from that time ſo attached to him, that they would have ſacrificed their lives for his ſervice.

THE arts of a Court were unknown to the Marſhal of Berwick; and thoſe even who practiſed them with the moſt addreſs

dreſs ſeemed to reſpect his virtue. He was univerſally known as a man who in great affairs would never be ſwayed by private conſiderations, ſtill leſs by ſelfiſh views, but always by the good of the public. So notorious was this, that actions, which the neceſſity of circumſtances would have made equivocal in any one but himſelf, were always taken on the good ſide, and favourably conſtrued by the public; ſo much was his integrity above the ſlighteſt ſuſpicion.

THE Marſhal of Berwick might have enriched himſelf in fifteen campaigns by the command of armies, but he lived in a conſtant contempt, or rather forgetfulneſs of wealth. Kind and tender as he was to his children, it will perhaps be thought that his neglect of money was too great for the father of a family; but his heart was engroſſed by true glory and virtue. In his expences, particularly thoſe which related to his perſon, he was moderate, as much by taſte as principle; yet he lived conformable to his rank, and ſometimes even magnificently when occaſion required it.

To

To the qualities of patriot, friend, and father, the Marſhal of Berwick added thoſe of a good huſband; there never was one more affectionate, more complaiſant, more patient even, but not to weakneſs. He loſt his firſt wife ſoon after his marriage. It ſeemed to be his deſtiny to have one, and to make her happy. It was not long before he entered again into the marriage ſtate, in which his ſecond wife enjoyed the greateſt felicity for thirty-four years that he lived with her in the moſt perfect harmony. She ſurvived him ſeventeen years, a continual prey to grief, and inconſolable for his loſs. She was diſtinguiſhed as well for reſolution and courage as for wit; her tenderneſs for her huſband therefore had no tincture of weakneſs in it: the uncommon impreſſion which his loſs made on this ſtrong, but ſenſible, mind, and which was ſo deep, that neither time nor the abſence of the object could ever efface or impair it, affords the moſt inconteſtable proof of the amiable and eſſential qualities of the Marſhal of Berwick.

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His noble figure, fine ſize, calm and ſerious deportment, gave him an air of ſeverity which inſpired reſpect, and even a kind of awe in thoſe who approached him, and whoſe rank or employment placed them beneath him. This commanding outſide covered much humanity and gentleneſs, and a remarkable equality of temper, whether in buſineſs, in the command of armies or provinces, or in ſociety, by which he was always perfectly maſter of himſelf. The regularity of manners which he aſſumed in early life did not interfere with that mild gaiety which was natural to him. It always recurred in his private and familiar ſcenes; though that ſort of decorum, ſo much recommended by the ancients, had brought him to a habit of grave compoſure, required in public characters and in the great employments which he bore even in his youth. Hamilton, ſo much celebrated for his elegant poetry, his tales full of wit and taſte, and ſome other works, was one of the Marſhal's companions, and ſcarcely ever left him: he found there that amuſe-

amuſement and pleaſure to which he himſelf ſo much contributed. In the abſence of the Marſhal, they had a correſpondence by letters.

THE Marſhal of Berwick ſpoke little, unleſs he was animated by ſome ſubject that pleaſed him: what he ſaid was always well expreſſed, and in few words. No man had clearer ideas, or delivered them more clearly. He had ſtrong ſenſe, ſound judgment, and great penetration; which appears in all his actions and enterprizes, and has been ſeen in his Memoirs.

THERE are few heroes who do not ſometimes forget themſelves and betray the man; but the Marſhal of Berwick, without having need of art to conceal himſelf (he knew not what it was), never ſhewed a weakneſs in any moment of his life, even to thoſe who had the neareſt acceſs to him. He had, without doubt, his faults, becauſe he was a man; but there are none imputed to him, becauſe he had none in any eminent degree. The utmoſt that could be ſaid of him was, that he was naturally inclined to be choleric;

leric; but he corrected this ſo thoroughly in his youth, that it could not perhaps be perceived afterwards but by thoſe who were moſt intimate with him.

In finiſhing our ſketch of the Marſhal of Berwick, we cannot avoid obſerving, that he united in himſelf an aſſemblage of circumſtances not only remarkable, but perhaps peculiar to his own perſon. He had commanded the armies of three of the greateſt Monarchs in Europe, thoſe of France, Spain, and England: he was poſſeſſed of the higheſt rank in each of thoſe realms, being a Peer of France as well as England, and Grandee of Spain; and each of theſe Kings had inveſted him with their reſpective Orders.

THE END.

NOTES

TO

The SECOND VOLUME of the MEMOIRS of the Marſhal Duke of BERWICK.

No. I.

Extract of ſeveral Letters written by the Duke of BURGUNDY, by the Duke de VENDOSME, and the Marſhal of BERWICK, during the Campaign of 1708.

LETTER.

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to the Duke of BURGUNDY.

Liſle, 15th *July*, 1708.

[*Duplicate of that of the* 14*th.*]

THE army of the enemy came to encamp yeſterday at Helchin, as I have had the honour to acquaint you. To-day they paſſed the Lys at Menin and near it, and are gone to encamp at Outhem; this morning they forced the lines without much trouble, and took the poſts that were at Commines and Warneton. It ſeems by this ſtep that they have deſigns upon Ypres; I do not know, however, whether they have a ſufficient quantity of artillery

in Menin for ſuch a ſiege. M. de Chevilly has informed me, that, agreeable to what I wrote to him yeſterday, he has retained all the ſoldiers of your army, which amount to about five thouſand men.

I am aſſured that Prince Eugene's army has joined Marlborough's, ſo that now the other ſide of the Scheld is free; it remains, therefore, for you to determine what you think proper to do, that I may conduct myſelf accordingly.

It appears to me, that you have but four things to do: Firſt, to remain behind the canal, in which caſe it will be neceſſary that you ſhould ſend a large body of infantry to take poſt between Nieuport and Bruges, for the ſecurity of your convoys; and then, as I believe you will think it unneceſſary to keep all your cavalry with you, you may be able to ſend me a part of it. Secondly, to march to the enemy, in which caſe you muſt abandon Bruges, leave a ſtrong garriſon in Ghent, if you mean to keep it, and advance by the other ſide of the Scheld. I will come up as far as Oudenard to meet you; after which you will determine how you are to proceed to relieve Ypres, and to attack the enemy. The third plan is, to march into Brabant, in order to take Bruſſels, Mechlin and Louvain; and at the ſame time to cauſe Huy and Liege to be beſieged in your rear. The fourth plan, if the enemy ſhould attack Ypres, is to attack Oudenard at the ſame time.

Whatever reſolution you may take, there is not a moment to loſe in making your diſpoſitions, and ordering the neceſſary preparations. In expectation of being honoured with your orders, I ſhall collect all my troops about Douay; the laſt of which cannot come up before the 19th or 20th, &c.

LETTER,

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to the Duke de VENDOSME.

Liſle, (the ſame day) 15th July.

THE enemy marched this morning from Helchin, paſſed the Lys at Menin and near it, and are at preſent encamped, with their whole army, between Ypres and Commines. You may well imagine they found no great difficulty to force the lines, and to put themſelves in poſſeſſion of the poſts of Commines and Warneton. I had, however, ſent word to the officer who commanded this laſt to retire; but it appears by the letters I have received from him, that the expreſs I ſent has been either taken, or elſe has loſt his way.

Fortunately I have kept near five thouſand men of your army in Ypres; for that fortreſs, in caſe of a ſiege, would have been in great want of troops, as it is impoſſible to throw in any at preſent.

My troops are to rendezvous at Douay, but the laſt cannot be there till the 19th or 20th. I have ſent a regiment of dragoons to Tournay, and to-morrow another will come here.

I write a long letter to the Duke of Burgundy, in which I take the liberty to acquaint him with the ſeveral plans it appears to me he may purſue. I ſend you the copy of it. I have nothing more to ſay, but, that there is not a moment to loſe in determining, &c.

LETTER

From the Duke de VENDOSME to the Marſhal of BERWICK.

Camp at Lovendeghem, 17th July, 1708.

I HAVE received the letter you have done me the honour of writing to me, with the copy of that you wrote to the Duke of Burgundy, in which you acquaint him with the ſeveral plans we may purſue.

Your ideas are wonderfully juſt; however, it is certain that yeſterday Prince Eugene's army was ſtill on the other ſide of the Dender; and there is not the leaſt probability that the enemy will be able to lay ſiege to Ypres, being obliged to fetch every thing from Bruſſels; ſo that as the ſiege of that fortreſs, and the junction of Prince Eugene, are the two principles upon which your reaſoning is founded, it appears to me that we need not yet take any reſolution.

For my part, I perſiſt in thinking, that the enemy have no other intent but to diſlodge us from here, in order to retake Ghent and Bruges, which they are very deſirous of. I will moreover tell you, that the conqueſts they might make between the Lys and the ſea, would be uſeleſs to them as long as we are in poſſeſſion of Ghent and Bruges; for it is in our power to ſhut up the paſs of Oudenard during the winter, and not only to retake Ypres, but alſo to make ourſelves maſters of Menin.

I will afterwards tell you that the ſiege of Ypres is of ſuch great conſequence, that it is impoſſible to undertake it without having all the proviſions

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and artillery at Menin. After this, if you will have any cavalry, you have only to ſay how many you will have, we will ſend you ſome, &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to the Duke of BURGUNDY.

Courtray, 17th July.

MOST of the advices we had received informed us that Prince Eugene's army had joined Marlborough's: that intelligence turns out to be falſe; for it is certain the Prince's infantry was, the 14th, at Louvain. That being the caſe, might not one prevent the junction of the enemy, and by that means render Marlborough's ſubſiſtence very difficult. For if we could find a proper ſituation in the interval between the Lys and the Scheld, Oudenard being in our rear, Marlborough would have no other place to furniſh him with bread but Menin, and you would be ſure of getting yours from Tournay, by making bridges upon the Scheld, below your left. I am not enough acquainted with the country to be able to ſay, whether, what I have the honour of propoſing to you, can be carried into execution; but you have many people in your army who know perfectly well the ground in queſtion, by which you will judge whether you can place your right to the Lys, and your left to the Scheld, with Oudenard behind you. I ſhall not ſtir from Douay till I know the reſolution you may think proper to take, more eſpecially as my laſt troops will not arrive till the 20th.

There is no time to be loſt, if you think you can execute what I propoſe; the left at the rivulet of Eſpierres, and the right at the rivulet of S. Eloi. There is a large convoy coming from Bruſſels, which is to be eſcorted by Prince Eugene's troops, &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to the Duke de VENDOSME.

Tournay, 17th July, 1708.

PRINCE Eugene's infantry has certainly not joined; it was at Louvain the 14th. Might we not, by a forced march in the night, from Ghent and Tournay, place our left to the Scheld, and our right to the Lys, with Oudenard in the rear? By that manœuvre, we ſhould keep Marlborough incloſed in our country; we ſhould prevent the junction with Prince Eugene's army; and the large convoys that are preparing for him at Bruſſels, and which are to be eſcorted by Prince Eugene's troops, will not be able to join them. It is for you, Sir, who are perfectly well acquainted with the country, to judge, if what I propoſe be practicable, and whether it be right; it is one of thoſe military plans, to which the leaſt delay may be fatal, &c.

LETTER

From the Duke de VENDOSME to the Marſhal of BERWICK.

Camp at Lovendeghem, 19th July, 1708.

I HAVE this morning received the letter you have done me the honour to write to me, in which

I am informed of the propoſal you make me. I believe you will agree with me, that the beſt thing we can do is to remain here as long as we can. Our poſt is excellent, and we are making it ſtronger every day; ſo that we can do nothing better than to remain where we are, and by that means to preſerve Ghent and Bruges. With regard to you, you have only to attend to the preſervation of the frontier towns, although I do not believe the enemy are in condition to lay ſiege to them; if, however, they ſhould determine upon any thing of this kind, we ſhall always be able to join and oppoſe their enterprizes.

LETTER

From the Duke of BURGUNDY to the Marſhal of BERWICK.

SIR, *The ſame Camp, the ſame day.*

I HAVE this morning received your letter and the duplicate; it appears to me, as well as to M. de Vendoſme, that we are not able to execute what you propoſe, and that we muſt be contented, each of us on his ſide, with defending Ghent and Artois, to make the enemy loſe the fruits of their advantage: I do not deſpair of our being able, between this and the end of the campaign, to obtain ſome advantage over them in our turn, &c.

LETTER

From the Duke de VENDOSME to the Marſhal of BERWICK.

Camp at Lovendeghem, 17th July, 1708.

SIR,

WE are in the beſt ſituation poſſible, and are abſolutely not in want of any thing. All the motions of the enemy have no other object than that of obliging us to abandon Ghent, but they will not ſucceed in this: we muſt let them fix themſelves, after which we will come to a reſolution, &c.

LETTER.

The ſame, in anſwer to the letter from Liſle of the 14th.

The ſame Camp, 18th July.

YOU are wiſe and good, and I hope you will remedy every thing; we have only a few days to wait, for I am perſuaded that the difficulty of getting proviſions, will, in a ſhort time, oblige the enemy to draw near to the Scheld and the Dender, &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to the Duke of BURGUNDY.

Camp under Douay, 18th July.

THIS day at noon I received the letter you did me the honour of writing to me, dated the day before yeſterday,

yeſterday, at eleven o'clock in the morning, by which I find that the Count de Bergueick is in hopes of ſupplying the proviſions we could not furniſh you with from hence, conſidering the ſituation of the enemy. It alſo appears to me, by what the Duke de Vendoſme writes, that you intend remaining where you are, being of opinion that the enemy will not be able to ſubſiſt a long time in our country: if that be the caſe, would not you think proper to ſend half your cavalry this way, the other half being more than ſufficient behind the canal? I ſhould then be enabled to extend myſelf all over Brabant, which would oblige the Duke of Marlborough to repaſs the Lys and the Scheld immediately; and I believe that, notwithſtanding Prince Eugene's army, which the Duke de Vendoſme ſays is encamped at Gramont, the cavalry you would have ſent me, might come by the other ſide of the Scheld. If you ſend half the cavalry you have, I might alſo advance to meet them, if I were acquainted when they would come, &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to the Duke de VENDOSME.

Camp under Douay, 18th July.

IF you have proviſions enough where you are, and that by remaining there, you think the enemy will ſoon be obliged to leave our country for want of ſubſiſtence, would you not think proper to ſend me half your cavalry, with which, and the troops I have here, I will advance into the heart of Brabant? This

This would undoubtedly oblige the Duke of Marlborough to repaſs the Lys and the Scheld. In the mean time I think of marching from here the 21ſt to the Scheld, keeping myſelf always covered by the Scarpe, and afterwards poſting myſelf on the other ſide of the Scheld, or at leaſt foraging there. I ſhall then be equally at hand to aſſiſt you, if it be neceſſary, to cover the Cambreſis, and ſhall be out of the reach of Marlborough's army; for as to that of Prince Eugene, we are not afraid of it, &c.

LETTER

From the Duke de VENDOSME to the Marſhal of BERWICK.

Camp at Lovendeghem, 21ſt July, 1708.

OUR intrenchments on the banks of the canal from Ghent to Bruges, are almoſt finiſhed. I ſhall go to-morrow night to Bruges in order to viſit them, and continue my excurſion as far as Plaſſendal. I hope the enemy will do us no eſſential hurt; they have levied ſome contributions in the country of Artois; we might very well, in a few days, do the ſame, from the greater part of Zeland, &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to the Duke of BURGUNDY.

Camp under Douay, 19th July, 1708.

THE difficulty and embarraſſment which I found in your ſituation was only for your ſubſiſtence; from the

the moment that you do me the honour to write to me that it will not fail you, I am ſatisfied; but at the ſame time it confirms my opinion, that, as you do not want all your cavalry behind the Canal, half of it might be very uſeful here, as I propoſed to you yeſterday. I have no doubt, that as ſoon as I ſhall paſs the Scheld with ſo large a corps, and ſhall advance towards Leuze or Chievre, that the Duke of Marlborough will immediately repaſs the Lys and the Scheld; at leaſt, Prince Eugene's army will not venture to remain at Gramont, for fear of finding themſelves between your army and me; if they ſhould, one might find means to give them a blow. In that caſe, I would leave M. de Montagny at Bethune; the two regiments of dragoons which are at Liſle would alſo remain there; and I ſhould place four hundred horſe here, with ſome infantry, along the Scarpe, &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to the Duke de VENDOSME.

SIR, *Camp under Douay, 19th July.*

I YESTERDAY received the letter you did me the honour of writing to me on the 17th. The principal foundation of the reaſonings I made uſe of to you, was the fear that you would not be able to get any proviſions where you are, unleſs by means of convoys which might be ſent to you; but from the moment you inform me that you are ſure of your ſubſiſtence, I am eaſy, eſpecially as you do not think the enemy have ſtores ſufficient for a ſiege either in Menin

Menin or Oudenard: that being the caſe, I believe that what I propoſed to you yeſterday concerning part of your cavalry, is the only thing to be done at preſent; for beſides that by my going to the other ſide of the Scheld with ſo large a body, the enemy will be obliged to come to the aſſiſtance of Brabant, ſuch a diminution of your cavalry will enable you to ſubſiſt longer where you are, &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to the Duke of BURGUNDY.

Camp at Douay, 22d July.

I HAVE received advice to-night that Prince Eugene's army decamped yeſterday morning from the neighbourhood of Bruſſels, purſuing its march towards Enghien; a great convoy ſet out at the ſame time, proceeding by the ſame road. This agrees with the advices which I received on all ſides, that the enemy are conveying heavy artillery from Bruſſels, to undertake ſome ſiege in theſe parts. It would be of the utmoſt importance to endeavour to beat this convoy; this would not only render the enemy incapable of undertaking any thing, but would even oblige them to quit our country, and to repaſs the Scheld.

If I knew exactly what quantity of cavalry you intend to ſend me, together with the road they are to take, and the day of their ſetting out, I would take my meaſures for attacking the convoy, though my attention to Artois keeps me rather at too great a diſtance. This convoy muſt neceſſarily paſs by Ou-

denard; I think there are no more than five leagues from Ghent to Oudenard; being well apprized of the rout of the convoy, could you not cauſe it to be attacked on the other ſide of the Scheld, before it arrives at Oudenard? If even it ſhould be eſcorted by Prince Eugene's army, you might ſend a body of twice the ſtrength, by which the affair would be concluded, and your troops would have re-entered Ghent before Marlborough could be apprized of it, and could come to the aſſiſtance of Prince Eugene. Upon this enterprize the ſucceſs of the whole campaign depends; for I own to you, that I cannot be of the opinion of thoſe who think that the preſervation of Ghent, during the ſummer, can enable us to retake, in the winter, the places that might be taken from us; for Ghent would not blockade Oudenard, Menin, and the other places we ſhould loſe; on the contrary, thoſe places would blocade Ghent; which cannot be prevented but by beating the convoy.

Since the letter I had the honour of writing to you this morning, I have received letters from Ch. de Saillan and Ch. de Varo, of which I ſend you copies: we know not whether there be any heavy artillery with the convoy; but however this may be, it would be a ſtroke of policy if one could beat it, &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to the Duke de VENDOSME.

Camp under Douay, 22d July.

I HAVE received to-night a letter from Mons, by which I am informed of the departure of a very great convoy

convoy from Bruſſels yeſterday, eſcorted by Prince Eugene's army; the whole takes its march towards Enghien, in order from thence to go to Oudenard. The ſucceſs of this campaign depends upon the ſafe arrival of the convoy; if we can defeat it, the enemy will not be able to undertake any thing of conſequence in theſe parts; if it ſhould get up ſafe to them, they will make conqueſts that will perplex us infinitely. It appears to me, that from Ghent, by the other ſide of the Scheld, it might be attacked before Marlborough could have intelligence, and come to its aſſiſtance, &c.

LETTER

From the Duke of BURGUNDY to the Marſhal of BERWICK.

Camp at Lovendeghem, 23d July.

I HAVE juſt received your letter of yeſterday morning, and have ſent immediately for Count Bergueick. He had already informed me of the departure of the convoy, but he aſſures me that there is no heavy artillery with it; and it is ſaid, that it would take the enemy a great deal of time to load carriages with all the artillery which would be neceſſary for ſuch a ſiege as that of Liſle. Our ſituation, and the rout the enemy take by Renay, will ſcarcely permit us to think of attacking them, without riſking a ſeparation of the army; ſo that the troops that would be ſent there, would afterwards be obliged to return by the road of Tournay; but the Duke de Vendoſme, with whom I have conſulted upon this matter, thinks, that in order more effectually to embarraſs the enemy, and

and render them more anxious for the convoys which are to follow, you ſhould proceed to the Scarpe, near Mortagne, giving notice of your motions to Cheyladet, who ſhould be to-day at Nieuport, and leaving upon the ſide of Artois ſuch a body of cavalry as you ſhall think proper. As for me, I ſtill believe that the enemy will find any enterprize upon our fortreſſes very difficult, and that their preſent intention is to draw us from hence, in order to fall upon Ghent, &c.

LETTER

From the Duke de VENDOSME to the Marſhal of BERWICK.

Camp at Lovendeghem, 24th July.

THE Duke of Burgundy ſent off his courier in ſuch haſte, that I had no time to anſwer your letter; I take the opportunity of anſwering it to-day by the perſon who brought me the duplicate, in order to acquaint you, agreeable to what the Duke of Burgundy wrote to you, that it appears to me, you cannot place yourſelf too ſoon in the neighbourhood of Conde, as you propoſe; I even think it is proper you ſhould do it before Cheyladet's detachment joins you; that detachment lay laſt night at Nieuport, and will join you as eaſily at Condé as where you are at preſent.

The convoy the enemy ſends from Bruſſels to their army, conſiſts only of a part of their heavy baggage, and ſome meal, but in ſmall quantity; it is not compoſed, in the whole, of more than eight hundred carriages; and there is not a ſingle piece of cannon,

nor even any ammunition: what I tell you is certain; the perſon who gave me the account has ſeen the whole. If the enemy ſhould think of conducting more convoys, or bringing up their artillery, we can, when you are at Condé, act in concert, and oppoſe them. For this reaſon, I think you cannot be too expeditious in taking that poſition. You muſt, however, leave a body of cavalry at Bethune, and another at Douay, to oppoſe the enemy's parties, &c.

LETTER

From the Duke of BURGUNDY to the Marſhal of BERWICK.

Camp at Lovendeghem, 24th July.

YESTERDAY I received the duplicate of your letter of the day before. Since I wrote to you yeſterday, we have been informed, that the convoy which comes to the enemy conſiſts of nothing but meal. We have certain intelligence that they are embarking heavy cannon at Antwerp; to ſend by water to Bruſſels; if you place yourſelf at Mortagne, you will be able not only to harraſs, but even to do them ſome miſchief, when they think of tranſporting every thing neceſſary for a ſiege by land; as for us, we are at a great diſtance; we will, however, do what we can. We cannot riſk the parting of our infantry, nor even of our cavalry, which we might want if we ſhould be obliged to leave this place, &c.

LETTER

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to the Duke of BURGUNDY.

Camp at Douay, 2d Auguſt.

I HAVE received advice, that the large convoy was preparing to ſet out from Bruſſels to-morrow, the third of this month: give me leave to communicate to you my ideas upon this head: you will make what uſe you think proper of them; for I ſhall always ſubmit my judgment to ſuperior authority and talents.

It is certain the enemy can undertake nothing without artillery, ammunition and proviſions, which they mean to bring from Bruſſels: that being the caſe, it is clear, that if you can find a ſituation which will cut off their communication with Bruſſels, you will make all Marlborough's projects miſcarry. I had taken the liberty to aſk whether there were not ſome poſts you might take between the Lys and the Scheld, putting Oudenard in your rear; but I ſuppoſe there are none. I have enquired of M. de Cheydalet, what ſort of ground there is on the other ſide the Scheld; he has aſſured me that the high grounds have a very great command upon Oudenard, and ſtand very near it; if this be ſo, could not you come in a day's march, and take poſt there, extending your left as far as the Ronne? I would at the ſame time ſend part of my infantry, and about thirty ſquadrons, to join your left, in order to prevent Marlborough's army from making bridges at Pottes and Eſcanaffe. I could even, in that caſe, ſend likewiſe the field battalions that I have put in Liſle and Tour-

nay; becauſe thoſe places would be in no danger of being attacked while we could ſtop the paſſage of the convoy.

While M. de Tilly's corps remains at Lens, I cannot avoid keeping here, or near Arras, a body of cavalry equal to his, and ſome battalions for the ſecurity of Douay and Arras; as the King has ordered me, in preference to every thing elſe, to prevent any incurſions into Picardy; but as ſoon as M. de Tilly marches to rejoin Marlborough, I will march to join you, and place myſelf at Pattes, or wherever you ſhall order me.

If you can once take your poſt with a hundred battalions and moſt of your cavalry, and can be joined by twenty battalions and thirty ſquadrons, which I will ſend to you, till ſuch time as M. de Tilly takes his reſolution, it appears to me that it will be difficult for Marlborough to force the paſſage of the Scheld, to join Prince Eugene's army, and conſequently to get up his artillery; I don't even know how he will contrive to ſubſiſt. Ghent and Bruges will run no riſks; for I ſuppoſe you will leave in thoſe places M. de la Motte's corps, and ſuch battalions of your army as you have not occaſion for, with a few cavalry; and if Marlborough's army ſhould move that way, you will always be in time to return there by your right, leaving me with an army only a little ſuperior to that of Prince Eugene.

This plan ſeems to me the more proper, as the King does not approve what you at firſt had thought of; and therefore if the enemy were once enabled to form a ſiege, we ſhould be obliged, in order to prevent their ſucceeding, to attack them, perhaps when they would be ſtrongly poſted; inſtead of which, by the method I propoſe, we may put an inſurmountable obſtacle

ſtacle in the way of their deſigns without ſtriking a ſtroke.

I beg your Royal Highneſs a thouſand pardons for the liberty I take; you have given me leave to tell you my thoughts; and you know better than any one how to diſtinguiſh the good from the bad, &c.

LETTER

From the Duke of BURGUNDY to the Marſhal of BERWICK.

Camp at Lovendeghem, Auguſt the 4th.

I HAVE received your two letters, of the firſt and ſecond of this month; in the firſt I find, that the enemy have not ſucceeded in their deſigns againſt Picardy; and in the ſecond, that M. de Tilly's corps has marched back towards their grand army. We had a conſultation laſt night upon what you propoſe to us; it is certain that it would be an excellent ſcheme, if we could place ourſelves in ſuch a manner, that, having rivers before us, we might ſeparate the enemy, and prevent the grand convoy from joining them; but the difficulty would be to arrive in time where you propoſe; you cannot go there from Douay in leſs than two day's march; we can ſcarcely get there in leſs than two ourſelves, as our troops are very much ſeparated; but the enemy can arrive on the Scheld in one day's march, and if they were to make that motion at the ſame time that we make ours, we ſhould find ourſelves very much embarraſſed; beſides, there are three leagues from the height of Oudenard to the Ronne; add to this, that if, after we have paſſed the Scheld, the enemy ſhould, by a forced march,

go to Bruges, I do not know whether Count la Motte could prevent their making themſelves maſters of it; in which caſe, Ghent would not be able to hold out: but this is not the greateſt difficulty; that of having each of us a march of ten leagues, at leaſt, to make, while the enemy have but four or five, appears to me to be of more conſequence. Our confidential advices do not yet mention when the convoy is to ſet out from Bruſſels; they ſay, on the contrary, that every thing is not yet taken out of the boats. I do not know, as I mentioned to you before, whether they have not rather a deſign upon Mons than Liſle or Tournay, on account of the convenience of the road there from Bruſſels. I will add alſo to what I have juſt told you, that it is probable the enemy's grand army will make a movement towards the Scheld as ſoon as Count de Tilly's corps has rejoined them, and therefore we ſhould not be in time to make ours. I have received, while they were cyphering this letter, your laſt of the 2d in the evening. I think, that all the precautions you take are very neceſſary. You know already, that laſt night Count Tilly rejoined the grand army, which was on the point of marching; and you will alſo be acquainted with their deſtination ſooner than we: I believe that we ſhall know their deſigns in a few days.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to the Duke of BURGUNDY.

Camp at Chateau L'Abbaye, 11th Auguſt, 1708.

AS there is no reaſon to doubt that the enemy intend laying ſiege to ſome place, it is neceſſary you ſhould

ſhould have the goodneſs to give me a general idea of the movements and marches you intend to make, that I may manœuvre accordingly, and be as near as poſſible to execute the orders you will be pleaſed to honour me with. There is no time to loſe; for I have no doubt, that in leſs than two days, Liſle, Tournay, or Ypres, will be inveſted. If their deſigns are upon Liſle, my intention was to put the detachments of Mortagny and De Champſleur in Tournay, to bar the enemy's communication from Bruſſels to the Scheld, and to draw near to Douay with all my troops, as well cavalry as infantry, to ſtreighten them on that ſide; and in caſe the Duke of Marlborough ſhould remain ſeparated from the ſiege, I will ſee if I cannot attack one of Prince Eugene's quarters; but I cannot form my ideas with propriety till I know your intentions, or till you ſend me your orders what ſituation I am to take, &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to the Duke of BURGUNDY.

Camp at Chateau L'Abbaye, 12 *Auguſt*, 1708.

IT appears the enemy are determined to lay ſiege to Liſle, as the convoy, after having paſſed the Scheld, has taken the road to Menin; that being the caſe, give me leave to propoſe my idea to you; you will make what uſe you pleaſe of it, as it only comes from the extreme deſire I have, that things ſhould turn out to the advantage of the King's ſervice, and your glory.

The enemy being once poſted before Liſle, I do not think it will be poſſible to make them raiſe the ſiege by force, for they will chuſe their ground and intrench themſelves, and our infantry is not the beſt in the world for attacking intrenchments, nor for diſputing poſts; I ſhould therefore be very much afraid, that, after having loſt a great number of men, we ſhould receive a conſiderable check, which would put it out of our power to do any thing any where elſe, and perhaps even to preſerve Ghent; I would therefore immediately think of rendering the conqueſt of Liſle of no ſervice to the enemy, and of putting it out of their power to keep it: perhaps even, if what I propoſe ſhould ſucceed, they may find it difficult to preſerve Oudenard and Menin.

It is neceſſary, before I open my plan, to ſtate the forces of the two armies. The Duke of Marlborough's is compoſed of a hundred and twelve battalions, and about one hundred and fourſcore ſquadrons; Prince Eugene's conſiſts of thirty-ſix battalions and threeſcore ſquadrons, which makes in all a hundred and forty-eight battalions, and two hundred and forty ſquadrons; from which muſt be deducted eight battalions they have detached to Hulſt, to join General Fagel; eight that are now encamped under Bruſſels, with nine ſquadrons; four battalions they have put in Antwerp, beſides a ſmall corps, the number of which I am not acquainted with, which is marching from near Ath, to go to Bruſſels: we may therefore ſafely ſtrike off four or five and twenty battalions, and about twenty ſquadrons; ſo that there will remain no more than a hundred and twenty, or a hundred and twenty-five battalions, and two hundred and twenty ſquadrons.

You

You had a hundred and thirty four battalions, ten from Count la Mothe, thirty-four which I brought from Germany; which makes a hundred and ſeventy eight battalions. You had two hundred and five ſquadrons, M. de la Mothe ſeven, and I ſixty-five; which makes in all two hundred and ſeventy-ſeven ſquadrons.

I would propoſe to leave count la Motte at Bruges and Ghent, with thirty of the battalions which have moſt ſuffered, and twenty ſquadrons that are in the worſt order. You might paſs the Scheld at Ghent with a hundred battalions, and two hundred ſquadrons, in order to poſt yourſelf with your right facing Oudenard, and your left towards the Ronne, placing near Pottes and Eſcanaſſe, a corps ſufficient to prevent the enemy from throwing bridges over at thoſe places, and to give you time to march up there. The Duke of Marlborough will not be able to go there with a ſuperior, nor even an equal force to yours, and to continue at the ſame time the ſiege of Liſle.

You will ſtill have remaining forty-eight battalions and fifty-ſeven ſquadrons, nine battalions of which I ſuppoſe muſt be left in Ypres, Bethune, Aire, Arras, and Douay; ſo that I might march ſtraight on to Bruſſels, in order to lay ſiege to it with thirty-nine battalions and fifty-ſeven ſquadrons. I would ſend to Namur for large cannon, and I don't think it is an affair of more than a week. I would afterwards make myſelf maſter of Mechlin, Lierre, and Louvain, and it will not be very difficult to take Lewe alſo, if I have time; the Count la Motte will, at the ſame time, occupy Aloſt, which muſt be fortified with all diligence, in order to put ſome battalions into it with ſafety.

What

What can the enemy do while we are executing this project? Marlborough, (as I have already mentioned) cannot come to us with ſuperior or even equal forces, and at the ſame time continue the ſiege of Liſle: if he were even to do it, would he be able to paſs the Scheld in your ſight? If he were to raiſe the ſiege and to march with all his forces, it will always be in your power either to diſpute with him the paſſage of the Scheld, or to retire towards Ghent; in which caſe you would have ſucceeded in your intention, as you would have prevented the enemy from taking Liſle; and as for my part, I ſhould always be ſure of a retreat towards Mons, Charleroi, or Namur.

If Marlborough does not trouble his head about us, but prefers the taking of Liſle to every other conſideration; I aſk, how will he be able to maintain himſelf in it during the winter, and how will he be able to move off from it? For if I ſucceed in my expedition, I ſhall be able to ſend you back twenty battalions and twenty ſquadrons, by means of which you will bar him the paſſage of the Scheld; the more ſo, as he will be obliged to leave ſome garriſon in Liſle when he has taken it. Neither will he be able to undertake the ſiege of Ypres, not having any thing neceſſary for it, and the ſeaſon being too much advanced. If he takes up his quarters at the other ſide, or along the Lys, you may do the ſame along the Dender, and in all Brabant, and it will always be in your power to aſſemble your troops if he ſhould advance towards you; but we ſhall have time enough to diſcuſs this laſt matter more fully; for I cannot reaſon very exactly upon it at preſent, not having the ſituation of the country entirely in

my head; but it appears to me, from what I have heard ſay, that in caſe Marlborough ſhould aſſemble his troops, you might always keep up a free communication from Aloſt to Ghent, and even from Bruſſels to Aloſt, by placing your left on the Dender, and ſpreading yourſelf upon the rivulet which comes from the Cocamber, and which enters the Scheld below Oudenard. Perhaps what I propoſe to you, will oblige you to a winter campaign; but it will be a point of neceſſity, and you will carry it on with a great deal more eaſe than the enemy, &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to the Duke of BURGUNDY.

Camp at Chateau L'Abbaye, 13th Auguſt.

THOUGH the Duke of Marlborough is gone to Helchin, I don't think that it prevents the execution of the project I have taken the liberty of ſending to you yeſterday; the only difference will be, that, before I march to Bruſſels, I ſhall be obliged to advance towards Pottes and Eſcanaffe, as if I intended to join you, to facilitate your placing yourſelf; after which I ſhall be able to re-march ſpeedily behind you, to execute the project, a duplicate of which I have the honour of ſending you, for fear the one I ſent you yeſterday ſhould be taken.

I ſhall remain here with my cavalry and ſome infantry till I receive your orders, &c.

LETTER

LETTER

From the Duke of BURGUNDY to the Marſhal of BERWICK.

Camp at Lovendeghem, 14th Auguſt.

I HAVE read with a great deal of pleaſure the project you have ſent me for making yourſelf maſter of Bruſſels, and of the reſt of Brabant, while the enemy are employed about their ſiege. This plan would perhaps be as advantageous to us as that of trying to relieve the places, if we had every thing ready. But before we could get together all the things requiſite for this enterprize, that of the enemy would be in great forwardneſs; and if, by the poſts which we might take, we ſhould prevent their croſſing the Scheld, they might ſend a body of troops towards France, which, entering Picardy, would raiſe contributions, and be the occaſion of your being ſoon recalled to defend the frontiers. But if they were not to do this, for fear of ſeparating themſelves, and leſt we ſhould be aſſembled ſooner than they, you know that the King's orders are poſitive with regard to the ſuccour of the place, and I believe we muſt conform to them; and think as ſoon as poſſible of aſſembling all our forces, which are very much diſperſed, &c.

LETTER

LETTER

From the Duke of BURGUNDY to the Marſhal of BERWICK.

From the ſame Camp, 17th Auguſt.

I HAVE juſt received the letter you wrote to me yeſterday, in which I ſee the meaſures you have taken, according to what I wrote to you about joining as ſoon as it is proper. However, the enemy not being abſolutely ſet down before Liſle, I am afraid it will be dangerous to take the troops out of Ypres ſo ſoon. You will ſee by a letter the Duke de Vendoſme wrote yeſterday to M. de Bernieres, that I have made ſome alterations in what I ſent you word of; but they are of no great conſequence, for the eſſential part of the affair is ſtill the ſame. With regard to the plan I propoſed to you, the King does not approve of it, as you will ſee by a letter which he writes to me, of which he has ſent you a copy. The circumvallation of the enemy round Liſle is as Marſhal Boufflers has deſcribed it. They cannot defend La Marque. I believe they will be greatly embarraſſed in their intrenchments.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to the Duke of BURGUNDY.

Camp at Chateau L'Abbaye, 21 Aug. 1708.

I RECEIVED laſt night the letter you did me the honour to write to me, dated yeſterday. I will put myſelf in readineſs to obey your orders, either

to

to aſſiſt you, or make ſome attempt on Prince Eugene's quarters, in caſe he ſhould weaken his own army to put Marlborough in a condition of marching up to you. Your firſt march will determine the movements of the enemy; according to which you will regulate your own.

I received the copy of the letter written to you by the King, dated the 19th inſtant; and as I have received orders at the ſame time not to withdraw any companies from the garriſons, I have countermanded them. There is nothing new from Liſle ſince the letter I had the honour to write to you yeſterday morning: there is yet no advice received of the opening of the trenches, &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to the Duke of BURGUNDY.

Camp at Chateau L'Abbaye, 23d Aug. 1708.

I HAVE put off till now doing myſelf the honour of acquainting you with Marlborough's march towards Forets, in hopes that I might be able, at the ſame time, to ſend you word exactly where he was encamped; but as I have no poſitive news about it, neither from Tournay nor from any of my parties, I thought it was neceſſary to acquaint you as ſoon as poſſible, (as M. Dolet ſends me word) that Marlborough's army has certainly paſſed the Scheld. I ſhould be glad to know what you chuſe I ſhould do, and whether you do not think proper to advance towards Gramont, before I paſs the Scheld or the Hayne, that I may join you more ſecurely.

Give

Give me leave to make a few reflections, which certainly have no other motive but the good of the ſervice.

As Liſle is beſieged, we muſt fight the enemy, in order to ſuccour it: that being the caſe, it will be more advantageous for us to fight them at a diſtance from the place they beſiege, becauſe they will not be ſo ſtrong. Marlborough has at preſent about ſeventy battalions and a hundred and ſixty ſquadrons. He will certainly wait for you if you march up to him: as you are obliged to fight, will you not do it with more advantage this way than you would even if I were to join you, by attacking him in the lines of circumvallation, where he will be joined by Prince Eugene? It is certain, that if you wait to march towards him till I have joined you, (a thing which will not perhaps be very eaſy, at leaſt, in order to put it in execution, I ſhould be obliged to make a great circuit), Marlborough will then repaſs the Scheld, in order to endeavour to diſpute or retard our paſſage; and even when you have paſſed it, he will retire within his lines, where you will be obliged to attack all his united forces to a diſadvantage, and with great uncertainty of ſucceſs. This is what makes me imagine, that it would perhaps be better for you to march up to him, and place yourſelf ſo near, that he will not be able to retire before you, nor to paſs the Scheld, and then I would join you directly, and you would attack him with all your forces. If he ſhould himſelf attack you before my arrival, it would be with a body of infantry much inferior to yours. If he ſhould wait till Prince Eugene ſends him ſome reinforcement, this would alſo give me time to come up, and in the mean while the ſiege would go on but ſlowly: there would

be

be ſtill another alternative remaining in caſe Prince Eugene ſhould ſend a large reinforcement to Marlborough's army; this would be, for me to fall upon the troops left to carry on the ſiege.

Theſe are thoughts your Royal Highneſs will make the uſe you think proper of. I ſhall ſtill ſend my infantry the day after to-morrow to the neighbourhood of Mons, in order to be able to execute whatever you pleaſe to command me, &c.

Extracts of ſeveral Letters from the KING, M. de CHAMILLART, and the Marſhal of BERWICK.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

SIR, *Camp at Douay, 18th July, 1708.*

I HAVE received, by a courier of the Duke de Vendoſme, the letter you have done me the honour of writing to me the 16th. By the copy of that which I wrote to the Duke of Burgundy, dated the 16th, you have ſeen the ſeveral plans I have propoſed to him: I add to this a copy of a letter I wrote to him yeſterday. I have not been able ſince I am come here to learn the plan that is propoſed in the preſent ſituation of affairs; I ought, however, to be

informed of it, that I might act accordingly; I therefore wait for the Duke of Burgundy's anſwer and orders; but if I don't hear any thing poſitive in three days time, I ſhall move behind the Scarpe, near Mortagne; and ſhall leave here about a thouſand horſe, to prevent the enemy's ſmall parties (which are already making incurſions into Artois) from penetrating further.

From Mortagne I might paſs the Scheld, and approach Tournay, in order to have a nearer view of what may come from Bruſſels to Ath, and from Ath to Oudenard.

The advices I had received of the junction of Prince Eugene's army with Marlborough's are not true; for the Prince's infantry was at Louvain the 14th; ſo that in paſſing the Scheld, I ſhall be able to obſerve this army. I have never ſeen a frontier, upon which Governors and Commanders were ſo ill informed. I have written to them letter after letter; but it ſeems as if they were all aſleep, for they never ſend me any thing but old, and very bad news.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to the KING.

Douay, 18th July, 1708.

I HAVE received the two letters your Majeſty has done me the honour to write to me of the 14th and 16th, and I wait for an anſwer to ſeveral I have written to his Royal Highneſs the Duke of Burgundy, that I may be able to determine the movements I am to make in the preſent ſituation; for it is impoſſible I ſhould manœuvre properly till I am acquainted with

the ſyſtem and plan of operations propoſed. As yet there is no time loſt, more eſpecially as my laſt troops cannot arrive till the day after to-morrow.

Your Majeſty has ſeen, by the copy of the letter I have written to his Royal Highneſs the Duke of Burgundy on the 16th, the ſeveral plans I propoſe to him; you will likewiſe ſee that which I wrote to him yeſterday, by the copy I ſend of it to M. de Chamillart: if I have no anſwer between this and the complete arrival of my troops, I ſhall extend my right to near the Scheld, that I may be able to interrupt the convoys which are to come from the other ſide of Bruſſels to Oudenard; but as long as the enemy ſhall remain on the other ſide of the Lys, at Commines, I muſt keep ſome cavalry here to prevent their incurſions, &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

Camp under Douay, 22d July, 1708.

TO-NIGHT I have received advice, that Prince Eugene's army decamped yeſterday from Bruſſels, eſcorting a very large convoy, and directing its march towards Halle and Enghien; upon which I immediately diſpatched a courier to the Dukes of Burgundy and Vendoſme. You will find incloſed the copy of the letters I wrote to them: I likewiſe ſend you a paſſage of a letter from the Duke de Vendoſme of the 17th, that you may underſtand what I ſay in that which I write to the Duke of Burgundy, with regard to the conqueſts the enemy might make. I expect

their

their anſwer, that I may come to a reſolution; for if they will not try to intercept the communication between Marlborough's army and Bruſſels, I might encamp myſelf near Lens, or even at Bethune, the better to cover Artois, and be attentive to what paſſes towards the ſea.

LETTER

From M. DE CHAMILLART to the Marſhal of BERWICK.

Fontainbleau, 25 *July*, 1708.

I HAVE received your letter of the 22d inſtant, by which I ſee, with as much concern as you, that the convoy of large artillery which was aſſembled at Bruſſels, is gone from thence by Enghien, eſcorted by all Prince Eugene's army. I have even ſome reaſon to believe that the Duke of Marlborough has ſent a detachment from his army of at leaſt twelve thouſand men to meet them. There is no doubt that this convoy, unleſs it be ſtopped, will arrive in four days at Courtray; and that, when it is there, it will eaſily paſs on to Menin, or to any other place where the enemy may have moſt occaſion for it. I cannot believe that the Duke of Burgundy can be informed of this time enough, nor that he can act in ſuch a manner as to enable you to attack it with the aſſiſtance of what troops he would ſend to you from his army. When we cannot defeat the enemy's deſigns by force, we muſt have recourſe to artifice. If ſome very enterprizing people could be found that would run the riſque of the danger there would be in hazarding the ſetting fire to the carriages of gunpowder, bombs,

grenades, and artillery; the King would, with pleaſure, reward them very liberally, if they ſhould be lucky enough to ſucceed. One muſt attempt all kinds of means, &c.

LETTER

From M. DE CHAMILLART to the Marſhal of BERWICK.

Fontainbleau, 30th July, 1708.

THOUGH the convoy deſerves a very ſerious attention, his Majeſty deſires, nevertheleſs, you would give all your attention to the preſervation of Artois and Picardy, preferably to every thing elſe, &c.

LETTER

From M. DE CHAMILLART to the Marſhal of BERWICK.

Fontainbleau, (the ſame day) 30th July, 1708.

SIR,

I HAVE received the letters you have done me the honour of writing to me the 24th and 26th inſt. I ſend you a copy of that which I write to M. de Bernage, in which you will ſee the reſolution the King has taken of permitting the States of Artois to treat with the enemy about contributions upon any tolerable terms. If they agree between them, and you take the reſolution of going from thence, as it is very probable you will, in order to go to Mortagne, I can ſcarcely believe they will not advance a body of troops towards Picardy. This ſtep would greatly alarm

alarm the country as far as Paris. It will, however, be very difficult to prevent their making this movement, as long as the Duke of Burgundy's army remains behind the canal at Brûges, without making any. The King's intentions are, preferably to any thing, that you ſhould take ſuch care of the frontier towns which might be expoſed to a ſurprize, particularly of thoſe of Arras, St. Omer, Bethune, and Aire, that no inconvenience may happen from your abſence.

LETTER

From the KING to the Marſhal of BERWICK.

Fontainbleau, 1ſt Auguſt, 1708.

COUSIN,

I HAVE ſeen, by the letter you have written to me the 29th of laſt month, how far the enemy carry their demands of contributions. I ſee plainly, that in the ſtate you are in, with the body of troops that are left you, you cannot cover all my frontiers in ſuch a manner as to defend them from the enemy's incurſions, and at the ſame time prevent the paſſage of their convoys from Bruſſels. I think I have already ſent you word, that I would have you, before any thing elſe, take all the meaſures you can to cover Artois and Picardy as far as you are able; leaving it to you beſides to act in concert with the Dukes of Burgundy and Vendoſme, to whom I have written fully concerning the great convoy the enemy are to ſend from Bruſſels, that they may try to fall upon, and beat the eſcort, &c.

LETTER

From M. de CHAMILLART to the Marſhal of BERWICK.

SIR, *Fontainbleau, 1ſt Aug.* 1708.

I HAVE received the letter you have done me the honour of writing to me the 29th of laſt month, with the one that was for the King; I have delivered it to his Majeſty, who has given me orders to addreſs the anſwer to you. It is evident that, the Duke of Burgundy's army being poſted at the Canal, it is impoſſible for you to cover Artois and Picardy, to undertake any thing againſt the enemy, and to prevent their convoys from paſſing; though this laſt article is of the utmoſt importance, it is nevertheleſs certain, that, preferably to any thing, you muſt be very attentive to the motions the enemy may make with a conſiderable corps towards the Somme or Lauthis. If they ſhould do this, it would be a ſure way of ruining Picardy intirely, and of ſpreading terror throughout Normandy, and to the very gates of Paris. But without intirely changing your ſituation, the zeal and capacity of M. Dolet may ſupply the want of forces; and if he had a ſmall quantity of infantry and cavalry, the country he is in being ſo full of defiles, he might do a deal of miſchief, without expoſing the troops he would employ for this expedition. If you are able to aſſiſt him, there is not a moment to loſe, &c.

LETTER

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

Camp at Chateau L'Abbaye, 21ſt Aug. 1708.

IT appears to me that nothing can be more juſt than the reaſoning contained in the laſt letter (of the 19th Auguſt) and that it is much better the Duke of Burgundy ſhould take a great ſweep on the other ſide of the Dender, to draw nearer to me, than to make me go to Gramont, to return afterwards by Leuſe to Tournay. The Duke of Marlborough will ſcarcely advance upon the Dender, as long as he ſees me with an army here; for in that caſe, one might perhaps make ſome manœuvres that would embarraſs him, if I were to approach Tournay on this ſide of the Scheld, and place myſelf behind the river of Ere, from whence I might march in order of battle to La Marque. Moreover, the Duke of Marlborough's army not conſiſting of more than about ſeventy battalions, is not ſtrong enough to think of attacking, nor even of ſtopping, that of the Duke of Burgundy, which will conſiſt of one hundred and two battalions when it quits Ghent. If Marlborough ſends for troops from Prince Eugene's army, to be nearly equal to the Duke of Burgundy, I might then (if the King approves of it) aſſemble my forces, and attempt to ſuccour Liſle; more eſpecially as I have ninety-eight ſquadrons, and could, if it were neceſſary, collect thirty-five battalions. Prince Eugene has, at preſent, ſixty-four battalions, and as many ſquadrons, in his camp: if he ſhould ſend fifteen or twenty battalions

to Marlborough, I ſhould then become as ſtrong as he, becauſe he will be obliged to leave ſome troops for the guard of the batteries. The worſt that can happen is, my not being able to force the lines; for, being ſuperior in cavalry, I can never be beaten, &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

Valenciennes, 25th Aug. 1708.

I HAVE received your letter of the 23d inſt. laſt night. I will freely own to you, that I am not without uneaſineſs about Marlborough's motion, for his intention is certainly to fight, and that, if it be poſſible, before my junction can be effected. I cannot paſs the Haine before the Duke of Burgundy is poſted on the Dender; and it is preciſely while he is on his march there that Marlborough will attack his army, unleſs they march with great precaution, and in great order. If once the Duke of Burgundy ſhall have taken his poſt, I don't ſee how Marlborough will be able to prevent me from either joining the army, or relieving Liſle: for having the Duke of Burgundy in his front, he will no longer be able to aſſiſt the beſiegers; and if Prince Eugene ſhould ſend any conſiderable detachment to Marlborough, I ſhall be ſtrong enough to attempt the relief; for in caſe of neceſſity, I can aſſemble forty battalions, including the ſcattered parts of the army, and three or four of the beſt battalions from the fortreſſes. I am of your opinion, a battle between the Dender and the Scheld is not a deſirable thing; it is a very cloſe coun-

country, where it will be very difficult for our cavalry to act, and to produce a decisive action; so that we should be obliged to begin again, in order to relieve Lisle.

LETTER

From the KING to the Duke of BURGUNDY.

Fontainbleau, 26th August, 1708.

I SEE, by your letter of the 23d, that, upon the advices you have received that the Duke of Marlborough had passed the Scheld (not having yet any news of the opening of the trenches before Lisle) you had sent word to the Marshal of Berwick to suspend his march till he was certain of it, and till the enemy, being entirely attached to the siege, should not have forces enough in Marlborough's army to oppose your passage: you will have been informed since that time, by Marshal Boufflers' letter of the 23d, that the trenches had been opened the 22d, at ten o'clock at night, and that they attacked the place by the tenailles. They have since that continued; and we find by the signals which have been made, that the siege goes on as usual. The batteries had not yet begun to play yesterday, the 25th, in the morning. It is difficult to comprehend how they can pursue so many different objects at once; and more so, that they can succeed in them. It is highly probable, however, that the Duke of Marlborough has not passed the Scheld without having determined to attack the army you command, or that of the Marshal of Berwick, while they are on their march to join; and this junction has appeared to me so dange-

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rous to attempt, that, after having conſidered of it, I believe it to be of no ſervice, as the preſervation, or taking of Liſle, is the only object of all the motions that are made on both ſides. One may ſuccour this place without running the chance of a battle, which would be fought at too great a diſtance to oblige the enemy to forſake the enterprize; or at leaſt, if any unforeſeen event ſhould happen, to prevent your junction or retard your march, the enemy during that time might make themſelves maſters of the town, the loſs of which would be irreparable. To avoid this, I ſee but one ſtep to be taken, which (though it hath its difficulties) appears to me the beſt of all, and that which I deſire you would prepare yourſelves to carry into execution, with all the precaution, ſecrecy, and good conduct, that an affair of ſuch importance requires. For this purpoſe, all your motions muſt be well concerted with the Marſhal of Berwick; and, inſtead of his advancing to join you, he muſt ſtrengthen himſelf with as many troops as he can collect; and immediately after theſe troops have joined him where he is at preſent, or near Valenciennes, he muſt advance upon the enemy's lines by two forced marches. He muſt inform you, two or three days beforehand, of the motion he intends making. You muſt meet him, with the whole army under your command, on the ſide of Aloſt; and you muſt take care to have bread for at leaſt ſix days. If the Duke of Marlborough is joined by part of the troops that form the ſiege, in order to march towards you with an intention of giving you battle, your army being compoſed of a hundred and one battalions, and a hundred and forty ſquadrons, and the Dender being between you and him, he would find it very difficult

ficult to paſs that river in your ſight; and nothing would prevent you from finding ſome poſts ſufficiently advantageous to avoid coming to an action; but in that caſe he would leave ſo few troops for the ſiege, and for the defence of the lines, that it would not be difficult for the Marſhal of Berwick, by concerting his meaſures with the Marſhal de Boufflers, to enter the lines, and to cauſe ſo much confuſion in the enemy's camp, as to diſable them from continuing the ſiege: you might then retire to Ghent, without venturing an action. If Prince Eugene, on the contrary, ſhould fortify his army, and there ſhould be, at leaſt, ſixty battalions, and as many ſquadrons, within the lines; though this would be but a ſmall force in proportion to what the Marſhal of Berwick would be able to carry with him, which might, at leaſt, compoſe an army of thirty-ſix battalions and a hundred ſquadrons, excluſive of the garriſon, which would be able to act at the ſame time; it ſeems, that the army the Duke of Marlborough would then have with him would not be ſufficient to prevent your continuing your march, and arriving at Mons. I don't even believe he would expoſe himſelf to it, and ſeparate himſelf intirely from the army of Prince Eugene, by paſſing the Dender and the Scheld. You know that the enemy's two armies cannot, at moſt, conſiſt but of a hundred and thirty-ſix battalions, and of two hundred and thirty ſquadrons; yours and the Marſhal of Berwick's are, at leaſt, as ſtrong; for part of their troops they are obliged to employ in guarding the lines, the camp, and in the trench duty. This gives me reaſon to believe, that, by conducting yourſelves on both ſides with precaution, both Liſle and Ghent may be preſerved at the ſame time. If, in the event,

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the enemy making the capture of Liſle their principal buſineſs, you ſhould find it more eaſy to go to Mons than you had reaſon to expect, &c. &c. &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

Camp at Herrines, 28th Auguſt.

WHILE I was on my march hither, I received your letters of the 25th and 26th; ſo I have continued my march for fear of cauſing ſome embarraſſment in that of the Duke of Burgundy. I arrived here with the van of my cavalry at ſix o'clock at night; the rear and the infantry will not arrive till late. The enemy have not made any movement, ſo that as I am but two leagues from Ninove, you may take it for granted our junction is effected.

I have received an anſwer from the Duke of Burgundy, ſince he has received the King's packet; he ſends me word to continue my march, which I will do at day-break. I will inform you of the reſolutions he will take for ſuccouring Liſle.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to the Duke of BURGUNDY.

Bruges, 25th Sept. 1708.

ON my arrival here, Count la Mothe informed me, that the enemy had entered by the bridge of Leſſinghe, into Camerlinback, in order to load their carriages

carriages at Oſtend, by which we ſee that the inundation ordered at Nieuport, has not had the deſired effect. Our object now is to prevent the return of the convoy. For this purpoſe Count la Mothe intends to go to-morrow and take poſt at Oudenburgh, that he may take poſſeſſion of the only cauſeway that leads from Leſſinghe, by which means they will be able to find no other way but by the north of the diſtrict of Bruges, which will be impoſſible for them to do, as they muſt afterwards paſs the canal of Oſtend in the face of M. la Mothe.

The only thing that is to be feared, is, that the Duke of Marlborough may ſend ſpeedily a body of troops, conſiderable enough to attack Count la Mothe. That might eaſily be remedied by ſending immediately to him a reinforcement of fifteen or twenty battalions, which would render him ſuperior to any number of men the Duke of Marlborough could detach againſt him, and you would ſtill have troops ſufficient left with you to cover Oudenard and guard the Scheld. This would even be beginning to carry into execution the plan you conceived for the preſervation of this country. You might alſo ſend to Count la Mothe a reinforcement of twenty ſquadrons. As the enemy have much leſs way to go to Oudenburgh, from their great army, than the detachments you could make would have, and as the ſucceſs of this campaign depends upon the difficulties you can throw in the way of the paſſage of the convoy, I think you ſhould not loſe a moment in ſending Count la Mothe ſuch a number of troops as you think proper. The moſt expeditious method would be, to ſend the troops that are near Oudenard,

nard, which would be immediately replaced by thoſe you have ſpread along the Scheld.

If I can, I will go as far as Plaſſendal to-day; but I am not ſure of being able to return to-morrow, as I intend to make myſelf thoroughly acquainted with the country, that I may have the honour to ſend you a more exact account of it, but I ſhall certainly return on Friday, &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to the Duke of BURGUNDY.

Bruges, 26th, Sept. 1708.

I WENT yeſterday to reconnoitre the canal of Oſtend as far as Plaſſendal, and at the ſame time formed a tolerable idea of the reſt of the country. I don't think Count la Mothe can take a better ſituation than Oudenburgh, placing his right, and intrenching himſelf, upon the Dyke that comes from Leffinghe along the canal of Nieuport: he will even be able, by means of the ditches and watergangs, to ſecure his front againſt any forces that might come from Marlborough's army, provided their numbers were not greatly ſuperior. By his left, he muſt neceſſarily occupy the canal that goes from Bruges to Oſtend, and have even bridges thrown over near Plaſſendal, that he may draw his ſubſiſtence from Bruges the more eaſily, and that he may go into the north of the diſtrict of Bruges, if it be neceſſary. The troops that are headed by M. de Puyguion will arrive here before noon: ſo that Count la Mothe may begin his march towards evening.

evening. If it had been poſſible to conceal the arrival of all theſe troops, it would have been better to ſuffer the convoy to get on this ſide of Leſſinghe before we ſtirred from hence, that we might make ourſelves maſters of the whole; but as the march of an army cannot poſſibly be concealed for four-and-twenty hours, we muſt be contented with preventing the paſſage of the convoy, and for that reaſon go to Oudenburgh and intrench ourſelves on all ſides.

The news that came yeſterday from Oſtend, was, that they were loading in a great hurry ſeven hundred carriages come from Marlborough's army; that the troops were encamped at Mariquerque, and that there was a conſiderable poſt for the defence of the bridge of Leſſinghe: they have alſo ſent a detachment to the north of the diſtrict of Bruges, that they may have all the carriages from thence. There have been ſtrict orders given here to prevent it, and the peaſants make their eſcape with their horſes, &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to the Duke of BURGUNDY.

Bruges, 27th Sept. 1708.

UPON hearing yeſterday of the Earl of Albemarle's arrival at Rouſſelaere, with a pretty large body of troops, Count la Mothe was this morning to have gone towards Dixmuyde, in order to meet and engage him on his march from Rouſſelaere to Leſſinghe, as Count la Mothe has forty-four ſquadrons

drons and, thirty-four battalions; and according to the report of all the country people, the Earl of Albemarle has not at moſt more than four thouſand horſe, and eight or ten thouſand foot with him. Since this reſolution has been taken, I have been informed by a man who ſet out from Menin yeſterday in the afternoon, that the Duke of Marlborough had paſſed through there, as well as M. d'Auverquerque and all the enemy's army; that Marlborough's quarters were fixed at Rombecq, and Auverquerque's at Iſeguem, near Rouſſelaere. Though we cannot depend entirely upon this report, nevertheleſs as the man is looked upon to be a perſon of veracity, and mentions a great many circumſtances, I have thought it adviſeable to ſend Count la Mothe word not to advance too far, till we were ſure of the truth of the report, leſt he ſhould fall in with a party much too ſtrong for him; he therefore marched towards St. André to Vaſnart, where he will halt with the main body of his troops, until he is informed of the enemy's motions by the parties he has diſpatched to Thorout, to Rouſſelaere, and upon the road to Courtray. He has, at the ſame time, detached the greateſt part of his grenadiers to occupy Oudenburgh, that they may be at hand to obſerve the arrival of the convoy from Leffinghe, and to attack it, or to march againſt the Earl of Albemarle's army if Marlborough does not follow him. We are aſſured that from Leffinghe the convoy muſt neceſſarily keep along the dyke that comes from Oudenburgh, on account of the overflowing of the waters in all the roads from fort Nieuvendan, as far as to this ſide of Inaſquerque.

I ſhall remain here till I know for certain the truth

truth of Marlborough's march, after which I will ſet out to join you.

The convoy is loading at Oſtend, but we have as yet no intelligence of its being ſet off, &c.

LETTER.

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

Camp at Saulchoi, 29th Sept. 1708.

IT is time to think of the ſteps neceſſary to be taken to ſupport Ghent and Bruges; for there is no doubt that as ſoon as the expedition againſt Liſle ſhall be finiſhed, the enemy will do every thing in their power to deprive us of thoſe two places, or at leaſt of the laſt, in order to open to themſelves a nearer communication with Menin and Liſle. I hope, that with the aſſiſtance of the corn that we have at preſent in Ghent and Bruges, and what is carrying there, the troops that will be put in thoſe places, will have enough to ſubſiſt them till the next campaign, &c.

MEMORIAL of the 30th Sept. 1708.

ACCORDING to all appearances we are to expect that Liſle will be taken; but it is certain that nothing is more important for us than to prevent the enemy from having a ſhort and eaſy communication with Courtray and Menin. For this purpoſe we muſt immediately begin to make our diſpoſitions for the preſervation of Ghent and Bruges, hoſe being the

only places by which the enemy can eſtabliſh the above-mentioned communication; we muſt alſo, at the ſame time, make ſuch an arrangement of the troops, that we may be able to cover France from any enterprizes or inſults.

It is therefore propoſed to make an immediate diviſion of the forces of this army, to ſend fifty battalions and ſixty ſquadrons behind the canal; which, with the addition of the troops that will be left in Ghent and Bruges, will be ſufficient for the preſervation of thoſe two places. The perſon who may be charged with this buſineſs, will examine upon the ſpot the ſituation he is to take, whether to leave twenty battalions with twelve or fifteen ſquadrons in Ghent, and intrench himſelf under Bruges with the reſt, or to fix himſelf behind the canal, in order to have a communication by the right and left with both theſe towns. The remainder of the army, compoſed of ſeventy-five battalions and a hundred and fifty ſquadrons, will remain behind the Scheld, and cover Oudenard until Liſle be either taken or the ſiege raiſed; after which it is imagined we muſt draw near to Mortagne, in order, by putting ourſelves behind the Scarpe, to be in readineſs to cover Douay, and prevent the enemy from making any incurſions into France.

After this we ſhall ſee what reſolution the enemy will take. If they ſhould paſs by Oudenard, to return into Brabant, it is what would be moſt deſirable, as the campaign would then end as uſual. If they ſhould march towards Bruges or Ghent, the army which remains behind the Scarpe, will paſs the Lys, to follow the enemy, and prevent their cutting off all communication between Bruges and France; for it

it is certain that if one of our two armies is near Bruges, and the other near Ypres, the enemy will not be able to ſtop up the paſſage from Bruges to Ghent; and that from Bruges to Ypres; the one or the other muſt remain open. If the enemy ſhould march towards the Scarpe, it is thought the ſeventy-five battalions and a hundred and fifty ſquadrons will be ſufficient to ſtop them, eſpecially if we ſet about it immediately. Moreover, in that caſe the army upon the canal of Bruges, would immediately come nearer the Lys, in order to harraſs the enemy's rear, and will always have it in its power to retreat behind the canal again, if the enemy ſhould march that way.

The plan that is propoſed is not only neceſſary for the ſupport of Ghent and Bruges, but alſo to endeavour to prevent the paſſage of the other convoys the enemy certainly intend to bring from Oſtend; but above all things there is not a moment to be loſt in taking our reſolution, for Liſle will ſoon be taken, and we ſhall have a great many manœuvres to make, and ſhall have miſſed the opportunity of ſettling them.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

Camp at Saulchoi, 1ſt October, 1708.

THE Duke of Burgundy, writes to the King concerning the diſpoſitions and meaſures to be purſued for the reſt of this campaign. It appears to me, that nothing elſe can be done than what is mentioned

in his letter, and there is not an inſtant to be loſt in preparing ourſelves to prevent being ſurprized or embarraſſed in our movements.

I have forgotten to add, that if Liſle be taken, notwithſtanding all we can do to prevent it, I do not think it at all an impracticable ſcheme to endeavour to retake it in the winter; I ſay further, that it is abſolutely neceſſary to exert ourſelves for that purpoſe; indeed, if the enemy ſhould winter in the neighbourhood of Liſle, this enterprize would not be eaſy; but if the greateſt part of the army ſhould return into Brabant, it is poſſible to be done, by taking early arrangements for it, &c.

LETTER

From M. de CHAMILLART to the Marſhal of BERWICK.

Verſailles, 2d October, 1708.

NOTHING is more diſtreſſing than to ſee Liſle taken from us, after all the hopes we had reaſon to have of its preſervation. The King had ſcarcely heard of the Chevalier de Luxembourg's entrance into the place, than he was informed, by a letter from M. la Mothe to the Duke of Vendoſme, that the convoy of ſeven hundred carriages from Oſtend was paſſed by him to join the army, without his being able to prevent it, although he attacked them, becauſe his infantry was not able to make an impreſſion upon them.

You will ſee, by a copy of a letter from his Majeſty to the Duke of Burgundy, that he will not wait to the laſt extremity to take the meaſures neceſſary for the remainder

remainder of the campaign, either to prevent the enemy's receiving any more convoys, or to embarraſs their retreat, in caſe they ſhould determine to ſend back part of their troops into Germany, or into Flanders and Holland. You will attend ſeriouſly to the plan his Majeſty requires; he depends upon your zeal and attachment to his ſervice: of my own accord I will add, for yourſelf merely, a thing that you will make no public uſe of. Nothing would be more dangerous than to give the enemy the idea I communicate to you in the utmoſt ſecrecy; I ſhould be unwilling to truſt it to any but yourſelf, though I am perſuaded it can be of no uſe, yet I will explain it to you. I have taken it into my head, that in order to preſerve Liſle, the enemy will make eſtabliſhments at Armentieres, Warneton, Comines, Werwicke, Menin, Courtray, Oudenard, Rouſſelaere, Tourout, Oudenburg and Plaſſendal, in order to keep up the communication by Oſtend. The fruitfulneſs of this country, (though greatly deſtroyed) will ſtill ſubſiſt them, and they may leave a ſufficient number of troops there to prevent us from diſlodging them. God ſend I may be miſtaken, and that you may be able to take Courtray and Menin in the winter. Liſle would of itſelf return to the allegiance of its legitimate ſovereign, &c.

LETTER

From M. de CHAMILLART to the Marſhal of BERWICK.

Verſailles, the 3d of October, 1708.

I CANNOT be of your opinion with reſpect to the retaking of Liſle, ſuppoſing it ſhould be al-

ready loſt. I aſſure you that it is much more eaſy to prevent its being taken, in the ſtate it is in, than it would be to lay ſiege to it if it were once in the enemy's hands. Give me leave to tell you, that if the Duke of Burgundy will employ his army, he will ſtill have a great many things to do before the enemy ſeparates. Could you not contrive to have a correſpondence at Oudenard? There is but a ſmall garriſon there, and ſtill leſs ammunition. The army would be better employed in ſeconding the good will of the inhabitants than in remaining inactive behind the Scheld. It is a ſtrange thing, that being maſters of the places and the country, and having an army at leaſt equal to the enemy's, you ſuffer all their convoys to paſs, and let them take Liſle without the Duke of Burgundy's forming any obſtacles againſt it. The uncharitable public attribute this to the little union there ſubſiſts between the Duke of Vendoſme and yourſelf. I wiſh you had already found an opportunity to ſhew them they are miſtaken,

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

Camp at Saulchoi, 5th October, 1708.

I CANNOT anſwer your two letters of the 2d and 3d inſt. better than by acquainting you with my thoughts about the views and diſpoſitions for the remainder of the campaign. By your firſt, it appears to me that the King expected a plan from the Duke of Burgundy. He has anticipated his Majeſty's expectations upon this point, by the letter he ſent him.

ſent him the 2d inſtant, and he writes to him by this opportunity more fully. If the bad weather or the want of ammunition ſhould oblige the enemy to raiſe the ſiege of Liſle, I do not think we can do better than to place a ſufficient body of troops behind the canal that goes from Ghent to Bruges, to be able to aſſiſt theſe two towns, and to prevent the Duke of Marlborough from undertaking any thing againſt them; then, leaving the paſſage of Oudenard open to him, we muſt, as ſoon as the enemy ſhall have retired into quarters, think of occupying Deynſe and Dixmuyde, in order, during the winter, to block up Menin, and to be able to lay ſiege to it at the opening of the campaign, in covering with the main body of the army the paſſage into Oudenard on the other ſide of the Scheld. But if the enemy ſhould take Liſle, it appears to me that our principal object ought to be to preſerve Bruges and Ghent, and prevent them from taking quarters on the frontiers of France, as you yourſelf ſeem to be afraid they will do.

The keeping of Bruges and Ghent is neceſſary for us, as well for the advantage we may draw from two of the moſt conſiderable towns in the Low Countries, as to impede that communication of the enemy with Oudenard, Menin and Liſle. As long as the campaign laſts, theſe two places cannot be preſerved but by a very conſiderable body of troops: when the enemy is retired, and the campaign is ended, we ſhall always be in time to ſend back into France what number of them we think proper, taking care however to occupy the poſts of Dixmuyde, Deynſe, and even Courtray, if we can find an opportunity to take it.

There are two things requiſite to prevent the enemy from eſtabliſhing themſelves, in the winter, upon the frontiers of France; the one is, to take from them the free communication with their own country, by preſerving Bruges and Ghent; by which means they will not be able, without the aſſiſtance of an army, to have any thing carried to Menin, or to Liſle; the other, to leave them an opening to return into their own country, for if all the paſſages are ſtopped up they will neceſſarily be obliged to ſtay here; and the ſtep they will have been compelled to take, will perhaps make it eaſy for them to find ſubſiſtence there; and in that caſe, if even the road were left open to them, they would not think of quitting the place where they are; ſo that, conſidering Liſle as taken, it will be better not to ſtop the paſſage of the Scheld.

But beſides that it would not be poſſible to remain all the winter behind the Scheld; as ſoon as any of the enemy's corps ſhould be ſeen in Artois and Picardy, we ſhould be obliged to return immediately, in order to ſave the neighbourhood of Paris from being put under contribution, and to prevent the enemy from living in plenty at our expence.

I think therefore, that, whether Liſle be taken or not, it would be proper to draw nearer to Mortagne, to be at hand to watch over France, and to ſubſiſt in the Caſtellany of Ath during the remainder of the campaign, in caſe the enemy ſhould paſs the Scheld.

But if, notwithſtanding all that has been hitherto ſaid, the enemy, after having taken the city of Liſle, with or without the citadel, ſhould take the reſolution of eſtabliſhing themſelves along the Lys, and in the environs of Liſle, we ſhall be obliged to put ourſelves alſo into quarters, making a ſemicircle from Tournay

to

to Ypres, in expectation of a proper opportunity of falling upon them.

Theſe are almoſt all the caſes that can happen: it is neceſſary to foreſee them all, and to take meaſures from the preſent moment. The projects for ſurpriſing fortreſſes are not to be neglected; but we are not to depend upon them.

With regard to what you tell me of the uncharitable public attributing the occurrences here to the little union there is between the Duke de Vendoſme and me, I cannot anſwer you any thing more than what you are already acquainted with as well as myſelf. I have nothing to reproach myſelf with, with regard to the ſteps I have taken to be upon good terms with the Duke de Vendoſme; and there has been no altercation or diſpute between us ſince your departure. If I don't agree with him in every particular, I muſt, before I alter my opinion, have good reaſons given me, to which I will acquieſce; but I repeat it again, ſince you left us, there has been no difference of opinion, &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to the Count de BERGUEICK.

Camp at Saulchoi, 5th October, 1708.

I RECEIVED your two letters of the 3d and 4th at the ſame time. I am perſuaded as well as you that it is the enemy's intention (after they have taken Liſle) to intrench themſelves againſt the citadel, and to endeavour to make themſelves maſters of Bruges and Ghent, that they may the more eaſily have whatever they

they want, and put their army into winter quarters along the Lys and in the environs of Liſle, purſuing always the idea of penetrating into France, and obliging the King, by that means, to make peace upon their own terms. This reaſon ſhould alſo induce us to endeavour, by all means, to counteract their deſigns, and to make the preſerving of Bruges and Ghent our grand object. The memorial I ſent you turned chiefly upon this; and it appears to me, that we only differ in opinion with regard to the number of troops that ſhould be left there. If, however, the diſpute were only for ten battalions, I ſhould be willing to give them up; there would ſtill remain, in that caſe, ſixty battalions, beſides the garriſons; and I believe that might be ſufficient; eſpecially if we conſider that Marlborough would not be able to march with all his forces, as he cannot avoid leaving a very large garriſon in Liſle; beſides that his army is greatly diminiſhed, and will be ſtill more ſo before the end of the campaign.

I cannot be of opinion that it will be right to continue ſtopping up the paſſage of the Scheld, becauſe our army could not ſubſiſt there, and we ſhould expoſe France to terrible incurſions, which would throw the whole country into confuſion as far as the gates of Paris.

Liſle, then, being taken (if Liſle is to be taken), I would leave the army intended for the ſecurity of Bruges and Ghent, behind the Canal, and with the reſt I would place myſelf near Mortagne, to be in readineſs to defend France. You can make but one objection to this ſcheme; to wit, that by uncovering Oudenard, we leave a free paſſage to Bruſſels. But I anſwer to this, that beſides the difficulties that will

will be found in traverſing a deep country at a late ſeaſon of the year, the enemy would not be able to bring any convoys from Bruſſels, without marching their whole army on this ſide of the Scheld to eſcort them; and in that caſe perhaps we might be able to place ourſelves on the other ſide of Oudenard, to prevent their returning; but if that could not be done, we ſhould ſtill preſerve Bruges and Ghent, and cover our own country, till ſuch time as we might find an opportunity of attempting ſome enterprizes not yet ripe for execution.

The orders you have ſent to have magazines of forage at Ghent and Bruges, will be of great ſervice to us, as well as the arms you intend ſending there, &c.

LETTER

From M. de CHAMILLART to the Marſhal of BERWICK.

Marli, 8th October, 1708.

IN the letter you have done me the honour of writing to me the 5th inſtant, relative to the cloſe of the campaign, and the diſpoſitions you think ſhould be made, whether Liſle be taken or not, it appears to me that there is a preliminary article which you do not take ſufficient notice of; this is, the preſent ſtate and ſituation of the armies, and what ought to be done to deprive the enemy of all opportunity of receiving convoys from Bruſſels or Oſtend. If, as we are aſſured, it be true, that they have not ammunition enough to take Liſle, how could they manage to keep that, and to take the citadel, while you remain as you are, and do all you can, both you and M. de Vendoſme,

doſme, to cut off their communication with Oſtend and Bruſſels. If thoſe who write with a perfect knowledge of things, and who have very good intentions, are to be believed, the poſt of Leffinghe alone would remove all our apprehenſions on the ſide of Oſtend. The enemy are intrenching and fortifying themſelves there; they will then go on to Slype, as they have been to Guiſtele; and when their convoys are ready, they will ſend ſuch a conſiderable number of troops, that the Duke of Vendoſme's army will be ſo much expoſed, that, inſtead of attacking the enemy, they will be obliged to act with ſuch caution, as will give them an opportunity of paſſing. If the forty-three battalions and ſixty-four ſquadrons, which are under the Duke de Vendoſme, were reſpecting their infantry, like the regiment of Piedmont, and the cavalry like the Gendarmerie, I ſhould think the enemy more embarraſſed than he, for with ſo numerous a body, they would want half their army to be ſuperior to him; and from the ſtate Prince Eugene's army is in, they would endanger him if they were to advance too far towards Oſtend, while the Duke of Burgundy is near them with forces ſufficient to march directly to Liſle, if he could reach the place while the Duke of Marlborough was employed in facilitating the paſſage of the convoy.

The ſureſt means to put a ſtop to theſe movements would be, to throw bridges over the Scheld, to make the enemy afraid of the Duke of Burgundy's army falling upon them, and of his paſſing that river every moment with all his army, to advance wherever he thought he could make the beſt uſe of it; or, at leaſt, to ſuſpend the enemy's motions, by obliging them to keep together near Liſle, which would preſerve the

Duke

Duke de Vendoſme from any apprehenſions, and take from the enemy all means of bringing their convoys. I do not mention the precautions you would be obliged to take for ſecuring the bridges of communication, in caſe the Duke of Burgundy ſhould reſolve to have ſome thrown over the Scheld; for I make no doubt that he would cauſe ſome redoubts and intrenchments to be made to cover them, and that care would be taken to draw them up every night on the ſide of Brabant. There is even a great deal of probability that he would have them made at Pottes and Eſcamaffe, and at a ſufficient diſtance from Tournay, to give the enemy equal anxiety on the ſide of Rouſſelaere, or of Liſle, according to the motions they ſhould make. In a word, without intending to ſuggeſt a plan, I muſt ſay, that, abſorbed as I am, and as I ought to be, with grief, at ſeeing Liſle fall into the hands of the enemy, who do juſt what they pleaſe in the face of an army of a hundred thouſand men, I think the Duke of Burgundy might make a better uſe of his army than in guarding the Scheld; that it would be much preferable to think of ſaving Liſle, before it falls into the enemy's hands, than to retake it afterwards, when it will perhaps have furniſhed them with the means of wintering in the extent of country occupied by the armies of the two crowns, the greater part of which is in his Majeſty's dominions. It will be time enough to talk of the Duke of Burgundy's project, when the fate of Liſle is more clearly aſcertained. The enemy could make no uſe of it if they had taken it, unleſs they had proviſions and ammunition ſufficient to ſupport and preſerve it. Reflect upon this ſeriouſly; eſpecially as, at the diſtance that the Duke of Vendoſme is from you, part

of

of the good or bad that may happen to the the Duke of Burgundy will be laid to your charge. I give you my opinion freely and naturally; you know what is to be done better than I; but my zeal obliges me to write this letter, of which you will make the uſe you think moſt proper for the good of his Majeſty's ſervice, and for the Duke of Burgundy's glory and your own, &c.

LETTER

From M. de CHAMILLART to the Marſhal of BERWICK.

Marli, 9th Oct. 1708.

COULD you remain behind the Scheld with fourſcore battalions and a hundred and fifty ſquadrons, while the enemy were bringing another convoy from Sluys and Sas van Ghent, by the canal of Bruges to Ghent? The glory of the Duke of Burgundy is at ſtake, and your honour is, in ſome degree, concerned to aſſiſt in preventing its arrival, or, at leaſt, to make a movement which may extricate you from the deſperate ſituation you are in. Do not forſake Liſle, nor Marſhal Boufflers. He has acquitted himſelf too well of what might be expected from his zeal and courage, to be obliged at laſt to ſurrender the moſt important fortreſs belonging to his Majeſty by a capitulation. Do not think you will be able to retake Liſle if it were once in the enemy's power. I foreſee ſuch fatal conſequences if we be reduced to this laſt reſource, that I ſhall have no comfort left but that of having nothing to reproach myſelf with. Act like a virtuous man, as you are. Ath is an ob-

ject

ject of no conſequence at ſuch a conjuncture: as you have the means of ſaving Liſle, or rendering the conqueſt of it uſeleſs to the enemy, employ them ſpeedily and ſucceſsfully, &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

Camp at Saulchoi, 10th Oct. 1708.

IN the preceding letters I have written to you, when I propoſed to you what was to be done, whether Liſle was taken or not, I did not mean that any thing was to be neglected from the preſent time which might embarraſs the enemy in the execution of their enterprizes. I go further; for though Count la Mothe's affair does not give us any great confidence in part of the infantry, I am ſtill of opinion that we ought not to loſe any favourable opportunity of falling upon the enemy. But while we are doing every thing in our power to prevent the paſſage of the convoys, and to be in readineſs to make uſe of any favourable opening that may preſent itſelf, prudence requires alſo that we ſhould, without delay, form a plan for our future conduct, according to the different circumſtances and ſituation of affairs; for if we are not prepared beforehand, we may find ourſelves very much embarraſſed in the execution of whatever may be thought proper to be done. You ſay that the enemy cannot make any uſe of Liſle, nor even keep poſſeſſion of it, if they have neither proviſions nor ammunition to put into it: I have always been of that opinion, and every thing that I have had the honour

honour of propoſing to you had only that in view, to preſerve Ghent and Bruges, which will either entirely cut off, or render the communication with Liſle and Menin very difficult, and will prevent them from drawing any ſubſiſtence from the provinces of France. The execution of theſe two projects will be eaſy, provided meaſures are taken immediately; if they be any longer delayed, I cannot anſwer for the event. The Duke of Burgundy, directly on his arrival here, cauſed bridges to be thrown over the Scheld, facing the left, at Herrines, Pottes, and Eſcanaffe, and our parties go out ſkirmiſhing by them every day. We have poſts alſo at the caſtles of Helchin and Warcoin, by means of the ſame bridges. With regard to the apparent inactivity of the Duke of Burgundy's army, permit me to ſay, that if they did not remain fixed in the poſts which they occupy, I do not know how they could intercept the paſſage of the convoys, as they have done, on the Scheld: if that has not been the caſe towards Oſtend, it is neither the Duke of Burgundy's nor the Duke de Vendoſme's fault; for as ſoon as we arrived in this camp, H. R. H. gave poſitive orders for laying the country under water; if theſe orders had been executed, no convoys could have paſſed, and Liſle would have been ſaved; beſides, he ſent twice the number of troops the enemy had, to ſtop and beat the convoy: this is all he could do; if they have not been employed with ſucceſs, and no uſe has been made of them, it is a misfortune that ought certainly not to be laid to his charge.

You will have been informed that the Duke of Marlborough marched three days ago to Rouſſelaere, with great part of his army; upon which the Duke of Burgundy has reſolved (in caſe he ſhould proceed

to a greater diſtance from the ſiege) to march and attack Prince Eugene in his lines; but having learned yeſterday morning that Marlborough had ſent back a body of fourteen thouſand men, and that he remained ſtill encamped with the reſt at Rouſſelaere, having bridges over the Lys near Menin, H. R. H. thought proper to ſend M. de Vendoſme a further reinforcement of fifteen battalions and ten ſquadrons, the more effectually to prevent the enemy from forcing the canal that runs from Bruges to Ghent, and bringing up the convoys, which are ready, by that way, from Sas van Ghent and Sluys; the more eſpecially as, in the ſituation in which Marlborough is, he would be able to get back to Liſle as ſoon as we could arrive there, becauſe part of our troops are employed in covering Oudenard.

You will ſee by the Duke of Vendoſme's letter to the Duke of Burgundy, that he aſſures him no more convoys will be able to paſs; and the advices we have received ſay, that Marlborough intends returning to Ronques.

I hope you know me well enough to be perſuaded, that, without paying any attention to the public, or to common report, I ſhall always give the Duke of Burgundy the beſt advice I am capable of, as I act from principles of zeal and attachment to the King, the ſtate, and the perſonal glory of H. R. H. I do not pretend to infallibility, but to integrity and truth.



LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

Camp at Saulchoi, 11th Oct. 1708.

BESIDES, I do not think that any body here ſtands in need of being ſpurred up and awakened to a ſenſe of his duty, and of the good of the ſtate. We take what ſteps we think beſt; and we ſhould be much obliged to thoſe who would propoſe effectual means to do more.

I am of your opinion that Ath is not a very conſiderable object, nor an equivalent to Liſle; but I ſee no inconvenience in forming this enterprize, as it does not take us off from any thing elſe; and with regard to what you do me the honour of telling me, that we have the means of ſaving Liſle in our hands, be ſo good as to explain yourſelf; and I can take upon me to aſſure you beforehand, that the Dukes of Burgundy and Vendoſme deſire no better: on my part, I will contribute towards it as much as ſhall be in my power, without deſiring either honour or fame for it, as I ſhall be ſufficiently rewarded by the ſatisfaction I ſhall feel in ſeeing affairs take a favourable turn, &c.

LETTER

From M. de CHAMILLART to the Marſhal of BERWICK.

Verſailles, 14th Oct. 1708.

MY anſwer to your two letters of the 11th will be very ſhort. I am very far from laying any thing to your charge; but I could wiſh, as it hath been too late found by experience, that the firſt convoy ought not to have been ſuffered to paſs: thoſe who have ſo ill executed the orders they received, ſhould be brought to puniſhment: this is the way to ſucceed. As for Liſle, I find it is reduced to great extremities; and I pity Marſhal Boufflers, that he cannot fully enjoy the fruits of the fineſt defence that has ever been made.

I did not think that what I mentioned to you in my letter of the 9th, wanted any explanation. I do ſtill believe that you have in your hands the means of ſaving Liſle, or of rendering the conqueſt of it uſeleſs; and to make myſelf underſtood, it appears to me, that ſuppoſing the enemy has ammunition ſufficient to take the town, they will not have enough to keep it, if no more convoys get up to them: this is what I thought, and I hope your conduct will confirm me in my opinion.

I greatly fear Prince Eugene's obſtinacy; a few days will clear up our doubts, but they will appear very long, &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

Camp at Saulchoi, 17th Oct. 1708.

THE enemy have found means, notwithſtanding the inundation, to bring up ſome powder, part of which arrived yeſterday at their camp before Liſle; ſo that in a day or two we ſhall have the misfortune to hear of the loſs of that important place; but however ſenſibly we may feel this, we muſt not ſuffer our grief to delay our determinations an inſtant. There is no doubt that Bruges and Ghent muſt be preſerved, which cannot be done but by putting in them a body of troops ſufficient to defend the paſſage of the canal. The Duke de Vendoſme has already a conſiderable number, and with a very trifling reinforcement, all will be ſafe on that ſide. It remains to be known, whether, in order to prevent the enemy from receiving any convoys from Bruſſels, the army is to remain all the winter behind the Scheld, occupying the ſame poſts, and covering Oudenard. If this be the plan, independent of the liberty you will leave the enemy of paſſing into Picardy, (for we cannot preſerve Bruges and Ghent, cover the Scheld, and remain ſtrong enough to prevent Prince Eugene's ſending a hundred ſquadrons into France whenever he pleaſes); how will our cavalry ſubſiſt? It already ſuffers a great deal from the diſtance of the forage; which muſt be fetched every day from a greater diſtance: beſides that, the roads will ſoon be very bad: moreover, when the enemy have joined, after the taking of Liſle, they will certainly penetrate ſomewhere, the extent

extent of the country being too great to be well guarded; but ſuppoſing they ſhould not, what are they in want of? They will find corn more than ſufficient in Liſle; ammunition, if they want it, they will get from Oſtend; or ſhould they not, we ſhould be obliged to lay ſiege to Liſle, in order to prevent their keeping it; for as you ſtop up the enemy's return, you oblige them to remain; and you will not drive them away but by force.

The queſtion therefore is, whether the King chuſes (ſuppoſing Liſle to be taken) that we ſhould continue all the winter to guard the Scheld, or by drawing near the Scarpe, ſhould enable ourſelves to ſhut up, and cover, both Artois and Picardy: here is the alternative, for both cannot be done. I can tell you further, that many people affirm, it is Prince Eugene's intention to make his infantry winter round Liſle, and along the Lys, in Courtray, Menin, Werwicke, Comines, Warneton, Armentieres, Rontain, Lannoy, Turcoin, and perhaps in la Baſſée. This would be another reaſon for taking our ſtation on the ſide of Artois, (after the ſurrender of Liſle) for fear he ſhould extend his quarters further.

LETTER

From M. de CHAMILLART to the Marſhal of BERWICK.

Verſailles, 17th Oct. 1708.

AT any rate it does not appear to his Majeſty, that it would be proper for the Duke of Burgundy to join the Duke de Vendoſme, in order to fight the Duke of Marlborough's army while at a diſtance from

the ſiege of Liſle; it would even be very difficult, not to ſay impoſſible, for the Duke of Burgundy's army to paſs the Lys at Deynſe, as he had propoſed, without any oppoſition from the Duke of Marlborough, &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

Camp at Saulchoi, 19th Oct. 1078.

I HAVE received your letter of the 17th, by which I find, that you think the Duke of Burgundy ought to paſs the Scheld, to draw nearer to Liſle, without the Duke de Vendoſme's joining him. I muſt tell you upon that, that the Duke of Marlborough, being at Rouſſelaere, is not more than five leagues diſtant from Prince Eugene's camp; that he has even already twenty battalions forming a chain towards Menin, and that he has bridges near the ſame place over the Lys; ſo that it would not be poſſible for us (having our troops to aſſemble, which are ſpread as far as to Oudenard), to ſteal a march, and get up to Prince Eugene before Marlborough; but if even that could be done, we cannot attack intrenchments without ſome preparation; and certainly the Duke of Marlborough will arrive while we are employed in them; who finding us quite expoſed, and very inferior in number, will not fail to attack us; for though the Duke de Vendoſme ſhould march at the ſame time for Rouſſelaere, he could not aſſiſt us, nor conſequently prevent our being beaten; ſo that, for the preſent, I ſee no other ſtep to be taken, than to try to

prevent

prevent (if poſſible) any convoy paſſing from Ghent, unleſs Marlborough ſhould retire from the ſiege; for as to the propoſal which M. de Vendoſme now makes, (after having demonſtrated the impropriety of it himſelf) it does not appear to me that it is practicable, nor even that it would anſwer any end; for this reaſon, that it is not poſſible for us to paſs the Scheld and the Lys, to arrive at Rouſſelaere, without Marlborough being apprized of it; and he will, in that caſe, place himſelf behind the Lys, which he will prevent us from paſſing, and will oblige us to go round by Ghent, in order to return to Oudenard; and if, in the mean time, Liſle ſhould be taken, our communication with France would become very difficult by any other way than Ypres, &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

Camp at Saulchoi, 22d Oct. 1708.

I SHALL have the honour to acquaint you, that I have not altered my opinion about M. de Vendoſme's laſt propoſal. When his Royal Highneſs was adviſed to march, I did not approve of the propoſal; yet, as ſome perſons inſiſted, I was of opinion that it ſhould be mentioned to the Duke de Vendoſme, in order to know his ſentiments. He rejected it, aſſigning reaſons, which appeared ſatisfactory to you as well as to me. He has ſince made the ſame propoſal himſelf, without ſaying any thing further, than, that he does not know what ſteps to take to preſerve Liſle; but as he has not removed, nor even alledged any thing in

oppoſition to the good reaſons he had aſſigned before, I have not changed my opinion. This is the ſtate of the caſe; and after this, I did not ſuppoſe that I had given any room for being thought capable of altering my ſentiments merely from caprice; or, to ſpeak more properly, to keep up an oppoſition to M. de Vendoſme. I have already aſſured you, and I repeat it, that I have not the leaſt rancour againſt him. The advances I have made to him are ſufficient to obtain credit to this aſſertion. As to the reſt, my inclination to live in peace and harmony may induce me to be ſilent, but will never make me give my approbation to what I think contrary to the good of the ſervice, &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

Camp at Saulchoi, 23d Oct. 1708.

WE have juſt received the news that Liſle is capitulating. The King's orders as to what H. R. H. is to do, ſhould be diſpatched without delay. You have my opinion in the ſeveral letters and memorials I have had the honour of ſending to you. I think that our principal attention ſhould be given to the preſervation of Bruges and Ghent, till the enemy ſeparates. For this purpoſe, I ſhould think it would be right to reinforce M. de Vendoſme, and place ourſelves behind the Scarpe with the remainder of the army: but I refer you, upon all theſe things, to the letters I have had the honour of writing, wherein I have

have fully explained myſelf; I ſhould only repeat to you the ſame things, for I have not altered my ſentiments, &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

Camp at Saulchoi, 23d Oct. 1708.

WE have again this afternoon received the confirmation that Liſle capitulated yeſterday: the Duke of Burgundy ſends an account of it to the King, and aſks his orders at the ſame time. I believe that every body agrees to the importance of preſerving Ghent and Bruges. For this purpoſe, a reinforcement of ſome battalions muſt neceſſarily be ſent to the Duke de Vendoſme: it remains to conſider what is to be done with the reſt of the army. If we cover Oudenard, and guard the Scheld, it is certain that we take from the enemy the means of drawing any ammunition from their own country; but at the ſame time, we leave them at liberty to live at the expence of ours, and even to canton themſelves in it. If we march up to them to prevent this, we ſhall uncover Oudenard, and they will encamp there, and will get every thing they want from Brabant. Moreover, if we perſiſt in remaining upon the Scheld, our army will periſh, eſpecially our cavalry; while the enemy will live in plenty at our expence; beſides, I do not doubt, that if the enemy ſhould attempt to force a paſſage, they will ſucceed, as there is a great extent of ground from Condé to Gavre. My advice therefore would be, as I wrote you word a long time ſince, that

that we ſhould place ourſelves behind the Scarpe, as ſoon as the breaches of Liſle ſhall be a little repaired.

With regard to winter quarters, there is no thinking of them at preſent, nor of taking them till the enemy ſets us the example, &c.

LETTER

From M. DE CHAMILLART to the Marſhal of BERWICK.

Verſailles, 23d Oct. 1708.

IF I can depend upon the advices I receive on all ſides, there is no reaſon to doubt of the enemy's intentions to fix themſelves near Liſle, to maintain themſelves there during the winter, and to open a communication by ſea and land with their own country. Nothing will be more eaſy for them, if the Duke of Burgundy arranges himſelf as he propoſes. If he ſeparates his army now, and is not able to make a good part of his troops winter in the places which may be near the enemy when their army ſhall be ſeparated, and keep his own together till that time, there is no doubt, that which ever of the two armies obliges his enemy to ſeparate firſt, will have a great advantage. You would render an important ſervice to the King, and to France, if, by your application and care, you could contribute to preſerve the horſes of the cavalry, and enable them to find means to ſhelter themſelves from the weather, at the ſame time concerting meaſures with M. de Bernieres for their ſubſiſtence; and you ſhould immediately propoſe to the Duke of Burgundy to ſend back to France all the uſeleſs mouths, and even all the officers that are tired of ſo long a campaign: this will tend to quiet them, and

put a ſtop to the diſcourſes which ſome of them hold, and which greatly prejudice the affairs and ſervice of his Majeſty. They will undoubtedly find, that it is better for them to ſpend ſome days at Tournay, than to remain in certain villages, where there are neither doors nor windows, and very often ſcarcely any wood for firing; but ſuch is the ſtate of affairs, that the reſolution muſt be taken to force impoſibilities; and if the Duke of Burgundy does not determine to do this, he will ſee the enemy eſtabliſh themſelves in the ſtrongeſt part of the kingdom, and be ready to open the next campaign on the frontiers of Picardy. If you add to this, the terror that ſuch an eſtabliſhment will ſpread in the minds of the people, the inquietude of the financiers, who will loſe the ſmall degree of confidence they have remaining, and will take great care to ſecure their money, you will recover that courage and ſtrength of mind which I have known in you, and which is become ſo neceſſary, that I am obliged to tell you, it is flattering one's ſelf to have an idea of retaking Liſle this winter, after having given the enemy time to collect proviſions of all ſorts, to put the place in order, and to fortify all the poſts that ſurround it, which muſt be attacked and taken before the place itſelf can be inveſted. You may judge whether a ſpeedy and ſucceſsful event can be expected under ſuch an idea, ſince you ſee, that the poſt of Leſſinghe, which is of no conſequence in itſelf, cannot be penetrated by his Majeſty's troops. Thoſe people who are for putting off things, are only occupied about the preſent, and not at all about the future. I repeat to you again, that if the Duke of Burgundy does not immediately put as many obſtables as he can in the enemy's way, inconveniencies will happen

which

which it will be too late to remedy. I write to M. de Bernieres to have a ſerious conference with you upon the ſubject of this letter; he will be able, by his capacity as well as by his good diſpoſitions, and the aſſiſtance he will get from M. le Blanc, to be uſeful to you in forming an arrangement capable of relieving the Duke of Burgundy, and of furniſhing means to oblige the enemy to ſeek that of ſending part of their troops into their own country at the riſk of whatever may happen to them, by rendering impracticable all communication for the purpoſe of ſubſiſting their cavalry during the winter.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

Camp at Saulchoi, 25th Oct. 1708.

I CANNOT anſwer exactly your letter of the 23d inſtant, becauſe it contains many things that I have not well underſtood; I ſhall therefore only repeat to you my thoughts about the ſteps the Duke of Burgundy ſhould take in the preſent ſituation of affairs, and I will afterwards aſk you a clear and poſitive explanation of the King's intentions, that we may conform ourſelves exactly to them, at leaſt as far as may lie in our power.

If I am not miſtaken, the principal object of your letter relates to the means of preventing the enemy from fixing themſelves near Liſle. I will freely tell you, that if Prince Eugene wiſhes it, and the Allies conſent, I don't know any means to prevent him; eſpecially as, beſide the quantity of grain they have got

got from Artois and elſewhere, they will find in Liſle more than enough to ſupply all their army: there are then proviſions for the men. The cattle muſt alſo be provided for. According to all appearance, the environs of Liſle are very much eaten up; ſo that it would be difficult for all their cavalry to ſubſiſt if the paſſage into Artois were ſhut up; for they cannot bring forage from their country by land, (the diſtance being too great) nor by ſea, while we keep Ghent. In order, then, to prevent their getting forage from Artois, we ſhould place ourſelves near it with a ſufficient body of troops, or, more properly ſpeaking, with an army, for ſmall bodies may eaſily incommode an enemy's army, but cannot prevent them from executing their deſigns.

I conclude then, that the only means of attempting to hinder the enemy's wintering in the neighbourhood of Liſle, will be, to deprive them entirely of the conveniencies they might get from Artois, by placing there part of the army, and to leave a paſſage open for them to return into their own country; for if we perſiſt in ſtopping up all the paſſages, we reduce them to the neceſſity of ſtaying in our country, and of ſeeking ſome means to live there, I mean their cavalry, for their infantry will have proviſions in abundance.

Moreover, I beg of you to conſider, that in order entirely to bar the enemy's return into, or communication with, their own country, we muſt make a chain from Bruges to Condé, behind the Canal and the Scheld; and we ſhall want our whole army to guard ſuch an extent of country: thus there will remain nothing on the ſide of France. I know very well that the enemy have not wherewithal to form any

ſiege there, that the ſeaſon itſelf does not permit it; and that conſequently we have nothing to fear for our towns but a ſurprize. I alſo know that the enemy will not venture their army, and penetrate into France, without magazines and places; but ours extending from Bruges to Conde, could not prevent their cavalry from taking up their quarters in the very heart of Artois; their infantry will remain upon the Lys, a country ſo broken that cavalry could not act there. You will tell me, that as ſoon as the enemy ſhall take that ſtep, we may march to diſturb them. My anſwer is, that if we unite all our forces, we leave an opening for the enemy to return home, either by the other ſide of the Lys, or on this ſide of the Scheld, our army not being able to guard both. I ſay further, that if we march ſtraight on to the enemy, encamped with their right near Liſle, and their left at the Lys, with the Lower Deule before them, they will wait for us with only their infantry, and their cavalry will not ſtir from their cantonments in Artois. If we march into Artois and drive them away, it is doing exactly what I have propoſed before, and the enemy will then be at liberty to return, and communicate with their own country by any way they pleaſe.

But if, notwithſtanding all theſe reaſons, the King ſhould determine that his army ſhall remain behind the Canal and the Scheld, to bar the enemy's return; you will have the goodneſs to acquaint us how we are to ſubſiſt our cavalry; for you may depend upon it, that all is deſtroyed to the diſtance of ſix leagues from the Scheld: and yet, we muſt be encamped upon it, in order to defend the paſſage. Meſſieurs de Bernieres and le Blanc are very able men, zealous, and full of expe-

expedients; but they cannot perform impoſſibilities. Our army would therefore entirely periſh, while the enemy would be much more at their eaſe. I muſt alſo tell you, that notwithſtanding all our precautions, the enemy will be able to ſend home what cavalry they will think proper by Cambray; keeping with them only ſo much as they can provide ſubſiſtence for.

Here is a great deal of reaſoning: to put an end to it, I ſhall have the honour of repeating to you, that the only means of preventing the enemy from making a firm eſtabliſhment on the frontiers of France, is, to leave them a free paſſage home; and as for the means of preventing their carrying the war next year upon the borders of Picardy, it appears to me that it can be done very eaſily, in taking early the neceſſary meaſures to recruit the army, and to fill the magazines; for we ſhall then be in readineſs to aſſemble, and to check or fight the enemy. You muſt prepare for this without delay, eſpecially for getting recruits, remounting the cavalry, filling the arſenals in which you have not powder enough, repairing your fortreſſes which are in bad condition, making depôts of flower for the ſubſiſtence of your army; and the whole muſt be ready time enough to be beforehand with the enemy, and take the field firſt. There is, beſides, an eſſential thing to be done, which is, to fortify Ghent and Bruges in ſuch a manner, as not to be obliged to leave an army to guard them, &c.

LETTER

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

Camp at Saulchoi, 26th Oct. 1708.

THE Duke de Vendoſme has juſt acquainted the Duke of Burgundy with the taking of Leſſinghe. That poſt was abſolutely neceſſary for us, to preſerve a free communication between Bruges and France. We muſt therefore immediately erect works there, beſides making redoubts along the canal of Nieuport, to ſecure the navigation of it; but at the ſame time we muſt keep a ſufficient force behind the canal that leads from Bruges to Ghent, for fear Marlborough ſhould attempt to force it; and as for us, we have nothing elſe to do than to be attentive to cover Artois and Picardy. The reaſons for this I have given you more at length in the letter I had the honour of writing to you yeſterday, and which is incloſed.

I ſuppoſe you know that the Prince of Heſſe is at la Baſſée, and that he is fortifying it: this deſerves attention, and ſhews you, that when I ſent you word that as ſoon as Liſle ſhould be taken, we muſt think of covering France, I did not obtrude my opinion upon you unſeaſonably, nor with any view of putting ourſelves into winter quarters; for I repeat to you, that we muſt remain encamped till the enemy think proper to cloſe the campaign, and even after that; but we muſt take proper ſituations, and not deſtroy ourſelves and country, while we fancy we are embarraſſing our enemy.

Since

Since I began this letter, the Duke of Burgundy has ſhewn me that which you wrote to him yeſterday. You will ſee by the anſwer, that if the enemy ſhould increaſe in numbers at la Baſſée, he will be obliged to take a reſolution before your arrival, and march towards Douay with the troops which at preſent guard the Scheld, &c.

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to M. de CHAMILLART.

Camp at Saulchoi, 28th Oct. 1708.

YOU are, no doubt, informed that the Prince of Heſſe is at la Baſſée with thirteen battalions and thirty ſquadrons, Marlborough has ſent to carry off all the grain that is to be found along, and on the other ſide of, the Lys; and it is ſaid that the enemy intend to aſſemble in a few days, in order to force the paſſage of the Scheld, or of the canal that goes from Bruges to Ghent. I am ſtill of the ſame opinion, that we have no other ſtep to take than to leave what troops will be neceſſary for the defence of the canal from Bruges to Ghent, and to fall back towards Artois with the remainder of the army, to prevent the enemy drawing from our country their winter ſubſiſtence. As long as we ſtay behind the Scheld, we leave them to do what they pleaſe, while we are periſhing: let us leave the paſſage of Oudenard open; they will not be able to receive from Bruſſels what they will be in want of but with a great deal of trouble and time, and large eſcorts. Moreover, I do not think it an eaſy matter to prevent their making an

opening ſomewhere. M. de Vendoſme is of opinion, that it will be very difficult to hinder the enemy from forcing a paſſage on the canal between Bruges and Ghent; much leſs then can we hinder them on the Scheld, which is of much greater extent. With regard to what M. de Vendoſme propoſes, for us all to join on the other ſide of the Lys, I do not ſee what end it will anſwer. Marlborough will place himſelf on this ſide, and will not only ſubſiſt from Artois and France, but will alſo eſtabliſh a communication with Bruſſels. Beſides, we ſhall eat up Ghent and Bruges, when we ought rather to think of ſupplying them with proviſions, as even the inhabitants begin to be in want: but if you come here, we will diſcourſe more fully about all theſe things, ſuppoſing that the enemy will give us time to do it, for I will not anſwer that they do not make ſome movement in leſs than two days. I do not ſay more at preſent, as I can but repeat to you what I have had the honour of acquainting you with in ſeveral of my preceding letters.

I forgot to tell you, that the Duke of Burgundy ſends to the Duke de Vendoſme the ſix additional battalions he has aſked for; and that, as we ſhall have no more remaining for the guard of the Scheld than ſixty-nine battalions, he has given orders to M. de Hatifort to retire towards Eſcanaffe, in caſe the enemy ſhould advance with all their army to force a paſſage at Oudenard; it being impoſſible, if we mean to keep every thing, not to be penetrated in ſome part or other, and not to have ſome diſaſter happen to us. H. R. H. has likewiſe ſent word to M. de Vendoſme to ſend ten ſquadrons to Ypres, to harraſs and incommode the enemy on that ſide.

LETTER

LETTER

From the Marſhal of BERWICK to the Count de BERGUEICK.

Camp at Saulchoi, 29th Oct. 1708.

IT is certain, that as we cannot ſhut up Artois and Picardy, cover Oudenard and the Scheld, and have, at the ſame time, a body of troops ſufficient to preſerve Bruges and Ghent, we muſt give up, of our three objects, that which will be of the leaſt uſe to the enemy. I agree with you, that the principal point is the keeping of Bruges and Ghent; therefore I would place there ſeventy battalions and about as many ſquadrons, and with the remainder of the army would fall back on Artois, ſtraightening the enemy in their quarters. I own, that if we do this, our forces will be ſeparated; but of what uſe will that be to the enemy? It will be in vain for them to aſſemble theirs. They cannot penetrate into France, nor attempt taking any of our places, ſince you yourſelf ſay that they have no ammunition. They cannot take from us either Bruges or Ghent, ſince we have a ſufficient army behind the canal to prevent their paſſage; which they cannot attempt but with all their forces; for, in ſhort, while we are in Artois they cannot avoid leaving a large body of troops in Liſle; and even if they are determined that we ſhall not ſuccour the citadel, they muſt have an army to bar our approach to it, without which, we ſhould find means, in ſpite of the inundation, not only to throw in every thing we ſhould chuſe, but alſo ſo large a body of troops, that we ſhould be able to retake the

town by the Eſplanade: if even this ſhould not be practicable, we ſhould be able to poſt ourſelves ſo near the citadel, that the enemy could not drive us away; and, in this caſe, I would willingly remain encamped all the winter: but this is no more than an idea, let us return to matter of fact. Ghent and Bruges are ſecure by means of the corps I mentioned before; and as, when we are in Artois, the enemy can no longer get proviſions except from Bruſſels, I leave you to judge whether it will be poſſible for them to think of paſſing the winter in our country with all their army. If they are obliged to repaſs the Scheld with part of their army, to quarter themſelves elſewhere, I ſhould then give my conſent for our aſſembling upon the Scheld, and laying ſiege to Liſle, (which is an object we ought not to loſe ſight of, and for which we ought to have been prepared a month ago).

I have but one thing to add, to make an end of my reaſoning; which is, that I cannot believe that we ſhould be able to guard the canal and the Scheld againſt the united forces of the enemy; we ſhould be too weak in one or other of theſe places: that being the caſe, I can never be of opinion that we ſhould all fall back towards Ghent, for then the enemy will not only receive convoys from Bruſſels, and collect as much grain as they think proper in Artois, but their parties will alſo make incurſions into Picardy, and, if they chuſe it, even to the gates of Paris.

No. II.

No. II.

THIS is certainly a very ſingular anecdote; one cannot avoid being very much amazed that the King and his Council did ſuffer themſelves to be ſo much guided in the anſwer M. de Chamillart was ordered to dictate to the Marſhal of Berwick, by the idea that Marlborough had taken this ſtep out of fear. If one could have imagined that the enemy's ſituation round Liſle embarraſſed them, and might give them ſome uneaſineſs, one could no longer ſuppoſe it after the capitulation of the town, though the citadel was not yet taken. It was the ſame man whom they would have bought ſix months after at any rate; who preſented himſelf, of his own accord, to negotiate peace with all the appearances of ſincerity. A man whoſe credit was ſo high at this time, that he could give either peace or war; and they deprived themſelves of his good offices by an anſwer equally diſguſting and ill conceived. It was however known, that although the Marſhal of Berwick had re-eſtabliſhed affairs in Spain, every where elſe misfortunes ſeemed to be accumulated ſince the battle of Hockſtet, at Ramillies, at Turin, &c.; that the Court had been ſo much diſheartened by the firſt defeat, that ever ſince the year 1705 they had been tempted to begin a negotiation with the States-General. Helvetius, the phyſician, a Dutchman, (father to him who was firſt phyſician to the late Queen, and grandfather to the author of the Treatiſe *de l'Eſprit*) and the Marquis d'Alegre, ſince Marſhal of France, had been em-

ployed, one after another, for that purpoſe. (See Supplement to the Memoirs of M. de Torcy). In 1707, M. Helvetius having been invited by M. de Wenvoirden, of the illuſtrious houſe of Waſſenaar, one of the principal members of the Privy Council, to go to Holland to give him his advice in a long fit of illneſs, advantage was taken of that opportunity to renew the negociation, which had been ſuſpended by the operations of war. M. Helvetius ſent word that the States-General were more than ever inclined to enter into negociations for peace, provided it was concluded with ſecrecy, and without the knowledge of their allies, with whom they appeared to be very much diſcontented. Upon this advice, the Court of France ſent M. de Menager into Holland, to open a negotiation of a private treaty, which they did not deſpair of concluding with the Dutch, without the knowledge of their allies; but Prince Eugene and the Duke of Marlborough had acquired ſuch an aſcendancy over the States-General by the brilliancy of their victories and the extent of their conqueſts, that it was difficult for all theſe ſecret and particular negociations, which were made without their concurrence, to have any effect. Thoſe two Generals had made themſelves maſters of the deliberations of the republic, and nothing was concluded without their conſent: the Penſionary Heinſius lived in perfect intelligence with them. The members of the Privy Council who had liſtened to the propoſals of Helvetius, the Marquis d'Alegre, and M. de Menager, were more than once afraid of having gone too far; and there was nothing they ſo much recommended to M. de Menager, when he ſet out from the Hague, as the keeping an inviolable ſecrecy upon what had been

been ſaid in their private conferences, and above all, not to expoſe the members of the Council by name; which was a plain proof that they did not think themſelves authorized to treat without Prince Eugene and the Duke of Marlborough, who had credit enough to ruin them, if they had been informed of what had paſſed between them and the ſecret Envoys of the Court of France.

Such was the ſtate of the negotiation with the Dutch, when the Duke of Marlborough made offers of his ſervices, which appeared ſincere. Only ſix months after, without France having received any other check, than the loſs of Ghent and Bruges, which the allies retook at the end of the campaign, peace, which had been in ſome meaſure rejected, was looked upon as the only reſource of the ſtate. The miniſters of the Court of Verſailles, having loſt all hopes of ſucceeding by a private negociation with Holland, took the reſolution of treating openly; and the Preſident de Rouillé was ſent to the Hague, with the title of Plenipotentiary, to obtain peace. Louis XIV. that Monarch, who was till this time accuſtomed to vanquiſh and preſcribe laws to every power, in vain offered the reſtitution of a great part of his conqueſts, that of the Spaniſh monarchy, the forſaking his allies, &c.

"The account of the laſt conferences between "the Preſident Rouillé and the Dutch negociators "being read in Council, deſtroyed all hopes of "peace, (ſays M. de Torcy): the neceſſity of it "was felt the more, whatever it might coſt."—— The King conſented to more ſacrifices; and accepted the offer M. de Torcy, his Miniſter for foreign affairs, made him, of going himſelf in perſon to ſolicit

the Penſionary of Holland. I do not mean to tranſcribe what may be read in M. de Torcy's memoirs, vol. I. page 337, and the following. One cannot help ſaying, that thoſe who compoſed the King's Council did not appear ſufficiently like Romans on this occaſion. The conſternation and weakneſs of the Court of France had the effect they ought to have, that of rendering an enemy of little generoſity more inſolent. Accordingly the good old man Foſcarini ſaid to the negociators, (Supplement to the Memoirs of M. de Torcy) "Would you forſake "the Spaniſh monarchy when you can preſerve it? "Make peace or war; do not remain meanly thus "in a place that ſuits your dignity ſo little; (at "Gertruidenberg): you have to do with coarſe "people, that are unacquainted with generoſity; "this brings you nothing but ſhame without profit; "you loſe on all ſides. If you are in ſo great want "of peace as to make you reſolve to act againſt "Philip V. at leaſt make your conditions, and you "will certainly obtain Naples and Sicily. Theſe "people are proud, only becauſe they ſee you in an "unworthy humiliation; they think themſelves "ſtrong, only becauſe you ſhew yourſelves weak; "they eſteem themſelves rich, becauſe you own you "are beggars; and if you think ſeriouſly about it, "you will find that you are not much worſe than "they." However M. de Torcy informs us, that the Duke of Marlborough, who had offered his ſervice in 1708, was the chief occaſion, in 1709, of all that was done in Holland to counteract all the meaſures of the Court of France. His great ſucceſſes had confirmed his authority in England to that degree, that, although Queen Anne was already very much

diſguſted with the Dutcheſs of Marlborough, Godolphin the Treaſurer, and he, reigned there like Sovereigns. They gave all the places to their friends; they turned Harley out of the Council; formed a Houſe of Commons that was entirely at their devotion, which without any debates granted all the ſubſidies required. They obtained ſeven millions ſterling for the campaign, and an augmentation for the army of ten thouſand men. The Engliſh General went over into Holland in the Spring, where he excited the Penſionary againſt France; and was the occaſion of the harſh anſwers that Buys and Van den Duſſen gave to M. de Rouillé. He returned into England at the end of the month of April, and did not wait till the wind was fair for his paſſage: this was done to maintain himſelf and ſupport his friends; but his animoſity was ſo notorious, that the common opinion was, that the principal motive of his journey could be no other than the ſettled deſign of breaking off all negociation of peace. At his return into Holland, he ſaid to M. de Torcy, "That he had "taken a journey for his private affairs, which he "would not have undertaken, but would have re- "mained in Holland, if he had known the King's "Miniſter was coming there. He obligingly com- "plained of not having been apprized of it, as he "might have been very eaſily, *if the Duke of Ber-* "*wick had been charged to inform him of it. Beſides* "*the affectation in him of naming the Duke of Berwick,* "*he teſtified a great ſhare of affection for a nephew,* "*who deſerved the eſteem and friendſhip of every body* "*who knew him* *." Was not this reproaching the

* Mem. de Torcy, vol. II, page 145.

Miniſter

Miniſter for the little notice the Court of Verſailles had taken of the advances made on his part through that nephew a few months before?

No. III.

THE Marſhal of Berwick does not agree with the accounts of ſeveral hiſtorians, in what he ſays of the battle of Villavicioſa. Let us ſee what the King of Spain, who was there in perſon, ſays. That Prince had too much real greatneſs of mind and veracity to diſguiſe the truth, with a view to hide circumſtances that might diminiſh his glory. We ſhall give an extract of the letter which he wrote to the Queen of Spain; and it will be found, that what the Marſhal of Berwick ſays, agrees perfectly with it.

Extract of a Letter from the King of Spain. *Written at the Camp of* Fuentes *the* 11*th of* December, 1710.

"A MOMENT after, both our lines moved "forward to charge the enemy; and about half "paſt three, the battle began by the right of the "cavalry, which broke their left entirely, and routed "them; fell upon ſome of their battalions, which "they cut their way through, and handled them "very roughly, and made themſelves maſters of a "battery of cannon the enemy had upon their left.

"Ours

" Ours charged a moment after; and after ſeveral " charges, and having driven them, and been re- " pulſed, at different times, it got behind the enemy's " infantry; and our cavalry of the right, which had " alſo defeated the enemy, joined them behind that " infantry, while they were fighting with ours with " a great deal of vigour, and were puſhing them by " degrees, all but our Walloon guards, who made " their way through the two lines and the corps de " reſerve of the enemy, and drove every thing in " their way far beyond the field of battle, making " a great ſlaughter. *M. de Vendoſme ſeeing that our " centre was giving way, and that our left wing of ca- " valry made no impreſſion on their right, thought it time " to conſider of retreating towards Torija, and gave or- " ders for that purpoſe; but as we were on our march " thither with beſt part of the troops, we learned that " the Marquis de Val-de-Canas and Mahony had charged " the enemy's infantry with the cavalry * under their " command, and had handled them very roughly.—This " made us immediately take the reſolution of marching " back with the reſt † of the army; and we advanced to " the heights of Brihuega, where we waited till day- " light to return to the field of battle,*" &c. &c.

It is impoſſible not to admire the King of Spain's modeſty in his account of this battle, to the ſucceſs of which he principally contributed; in as much, as, the right wing which he commanded, was, with the Walloon guards, the only part of the army which put the enemy in diſorder. It was certainly to his

* A reſerve of fifteen ſquadrons.

† It appears, that the reſt of the army is the whole army, excepting the fifteen ſquadrons under Val-de-Canas.

own

own firmneſs, heroic courage, and even activity, on this occaſion, that Philip owed the re-eſtabliſhment and forming a new army, which put him in a condition to recover the ill effects of the defeat and rout of his troops at the battle of Saragoſſa.

THE END.

ERRATA.

P. 13, l. 16—ſhouid—*read*—ſhould
46, l. 6—the ſame—*read*—ſome
54, l. 10—Gentil homme—*read* Gentilhomme
64, l. 9—migt heaſily—*read* might eaſily
66, l. 2—that it—*read*—that water
74, l. 19—Haverge } —*read*—Faverge
76, l. 2—Taverge }
77, l. 6—Aggebelle—*read*—Aiguebelle
93, l. 11—deſcent—*read*—deſcent
113, l. 19—Lauret—*read*—Laurent
124, l. 7—near the Francin—*read*—near Francia
128, l. 24—Pragdelas—*read*—Pragelas.
165, l. 4—wit hout—*read*—without
187, l. 6—only that—*read*—only one that
218, l. 24—legitimate—*read*—legitimated
252, l. 17—Malmaiſm—*read*—Malmaiſon
254, l. 8—interſt—*read*—intereſt
332, l. 6—under take—*read*—undertake
387, l. penult }
393, l. 15 } Eſeanaffe—*read*—Eſcanaffe
395, l. 21 }
417, l. 20 } dele the ſecond *that*
452, l. 16 }
443, l. ult.—impoſibilities—*read*—impoſſibilities

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